Policymaking for Long-term Global Issues

Soedjatmoko

| International Governance

The governance of the international system resides, in formal terms, in a
collection of agreements and institutions entered into by the governments of
nation-states. Some see the proliferation of such agreements and
institutions slowly chipping away at the prevailing anarchy of the system,
perhaps leading to the emergence of some kind of world government. But I
would like to make clear at the outset that when I speak of international
governance, I am not speaking about international government. Indeed, one
of the elements of the argument I will set out is the limited role that
national governments per se are capable of performing in the governance of
the international system.

By governance, I mean to encompass the aggregate of forces, systems,
institutions, movements, conflicts, and accommodations by which human beings
cooperate and compete. Frameworks of human interaction as diverse as
financial markets, armed conflicts, transnational corporations,
international organisations, mass migration, drug trafficking, resource
regimes, religious movements, and intergovernmental negotiations all fall
within the realm of governance.

The institutions and arrangements through which national governments
attempt to manage such complex phenomena were devised, for the most part, in
the immediate aftermath of World War II. The world today is so
fundamentally different from the world of 1945 that the obsolescence of the

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postwar institutions can scarcely come as a surprise. The population of the globe has more than doubled, with by far the largest share of growth occurring in the southern hemisphere. The achievement of decolonization has rewritten the political map, multiplied the number of actors in the state system, and opened a channel for the expression of the aspirations of the Third World. There has been a revolution of mobility and communication, so that the problems and conflicts of one group of people can no longer be confined to one corner of the globe. The international division of labour has changed radically and disruptively, but in the process of doing so has contributed to an explosion of human productivity that has put undreamed-of affluence within the reach of hundreds of millions of people. The new affluence has heightened the awareness and the insupportability of absolute poverty, which has also grown with human numbers.

The rise in production to meet human needs and desires has created problems of waste, pollution, and resource abuse on a global scale. The extension of humankind's prowess in penetrating hitherto inaccessible realms--the deep seas, outer space, the most hostile deserts, mountains, and frozen wastes--has removed buffers and neutral areas that once served to cushion and dissipate hostilities. The exponential growth of destructive power and its concentration in weapons systems that are small, powerful, portable, and easily obtainable have magnified the difficulties of keeping the peace. The development of two vast arsenals of nuclear weapons has not only given the superpowers the ability to eradicate human civilization, but has also changed fundamentally the nature of international politics, with possession of nuclear weapons seen as the entry card to great power status.

The current pace of demographic, economic, and technological change is such that the next forty years promise to be as volatile as the last, if not more so. Any new institutions or arrangements for international governance that are devised now may also be seen as obsolete in forty years--or even by the time they are in place. No single group of policymakers has the capacity to marshall all the facts, understand all the alternatives, predict all the reactions to, or anticipate all the interpretations of, an action. This fact argues for maximum flexibility, the widest possible consultation, and a large degree of humility in framing new instruments of governance.

Limitations of the Nation-State

Apart from its volatility, the major characteristic of the international system is its complexity. Reaction to this complexity is very often a tendency toward reductionism--one of the most serious manifestations of which is perhaps the fiction that the only actors of consequence in the international system are governments of nation-states. Even the term inter_national_ reveals this bias. One might more accurately use the term global or transnational to describe the forces that drive individual and collective human interaction.

Today, there are a multiplicity of actors capable of making their presence felt in international relations. These actors exist at both lower and higher levels of aggregation than the nation-state. It has been amply demonstrated in recent years how powerful an impact can be made at the regional and even global level by very small groups of people accountable to no one but themselves--for example, terrorists, arms dealers, or drug smugglers, operating on the margin of the state system, as well as financial

speculators. Unorganized masses of people acting unconsciously in concert have similarly profound effects on the ecosystem and economies they inhabit. Individual decisions, such as whether to have another child, cut down a tree, open an overseas bank account, or move from the country to the city, aggregate themselves into major societal trends.

At the other end of the spectrum, the freedom of action of national governments is constrained by the decisions and requirements of supranational institutions and forces. These include institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, organisations such as the European Economic Community and the United Nations, and corporations such as Toshiba, Fiat, or Citibank, as well as more diffuse forces, such as currency and commodity markets, religious movements, the international communications media, and expatriate populations. The governments of individual countries, clearly, have very limited control--though they often have considerable influence-- over either subnational or transnational processes. Moreover, governmental freedom of action is also constrained by an ever-tightening noose of environmental phenomena, such as air and water pollution, climatic change, soil erosion, and geological instability.

The bedrock of the contemporary international system is the principle of state sovereignty. Increasingly, however, state sovereignty is being revealed as a myth. Of course it has always been true that, as George Orwell might say, some states are more sovereign than others. But the myth of sovereignty has been, until fairly recently, a useful one, deliberately adopted to blunt the edge of brute force and constrain the exercise of coercive power. Certainly for the new nations in the Third World, sovereignty is the expression of their right to self-determination and

identity, and their most powerful weapon in protecting their rights and
securing their rightful place in the world. Sovereignty, therefore is still
a valuable and necessary function.

The myth of state sovereignty, however, also encourages a tendency
toward unilateralism, an unrealistic belief that the problems confronting a
country can and perhaps should be dealt with by the government of that
country acting independently. This fosters an illusion at best futile and
at worst dangerous--that certain values which are in fact indivisible can be
divided up into pieces corresponding to the size and shape of particular
nation-states. Security, prosperity, the integrity of the environment are
no longer within the grasp of any single state, even the most powerful.
Each nation is intimately bound to its adversaries as well as to its friends
by a common vulnerability.

Our Common Vulnerability

I would like to dwell, for a few moments, on the nature of our common
vulnerability, for it is something new in our era. The restrictions that it
imposes on the behavior of governments and other actors set the parameters
of international governance. The three spheres that I have mentioned--
security, the economy, and the environment--provide some of the clearest
illustrations.

War between the most powerful, nuclear-armed states has utterly lost
its usefulness as a way of resolving disputes or achieving policy
objectives. It can only be expected to lead to mutual annihilation.
Geopolitics has been changed, radically and permanently, not only by the
technology of nuclear explosives but by what Daniel Deudney has called the

"transparency revolution": the advances in communications and transportation technologies that have abolished the geographical front line or rear guard as meaningful military concepts. Today, the global commons-- the oceans and the atmosphere--are thoroughly militarized. Rather than serving as protective barriers or buffers, they are the fluid suspension media for a global war-making capacity against which there is no realistic defence. Security for the superpowers is no longer divisible, and it rests on the ability to avoid war rather than the ability to defend against attack. The nonsuperpowers are also implicated in this imperative, since they would suffer equally from the destruction of civilization and possibly permanent damage to the planet's ability to support life.

It is relatively easy to make the argument for common security in the nuclear sphere, though it is by no means universally acknowledged. But conventional war, too, in recent years has lost much of its effectiveness and its legitimacy as a method of pursuing national interests. The spoils of war are no longer seen as the just deserts of the victor. For example, the Israeli annexation of the West Bank and Gaza after its victory in 1967 in a war which it did not start is not recognized as legitimate even after twenty years. Libya has twice won the Aouzou strip from Chad, but still is not its acknowledged master. Vietnam's conquest of Cambodia remains a bone of contention, even though much of the world was relieved to see the Khmer Rouge dislodged from power.

The reluctance of the international community to accept a military victory as the decisive outcome of a conflict has reduced the effectiveness of war as an instrument of policy. Developments in military technology have had the same effect. Highly sophisticated, powerful, portable weapons are

easily available on the open market, making it extremely difficult to put an end to resistance by military means. It takes only a handful of people to do great damage to a nation's infrastructure and tranquility, and only a modest amount of money from an interested bystander to equip them. The seemingly interminable conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Central America, and the Middle East all bear witness to this. Not only is it easy and cheap to keep a conflict going; it is also easy for a small but determined force to inflict disproportionate damage to conventional military forces, which tend to present large and concentrated targets vulnerable even to rather unsophisticated weapons, such as a mine or a car bomb. The picture of the mightiest navies in the world drawn into the Persian Gulf and then thrown into disarray by small units of speedboats laying mines by hand and firing machine guns or shoulder-launched rockets must be a sobering one for military strategists.

The declining utility of armed force as a method of attaining security impels us to look for alternative methods. I am not one to dream of an end to conflict among nations and peoples. Competition and conflict are normal states of affairs among states, as among corporations or indeed members of a family. What is needed is greater reliance on methods of resolving, or at least managing, conflicts that are less destructive of the interests of the parties involved and the interests of the bystanders.

It is, in other words, time to reverse the classic formulation that "war is diplomacy by other means" and resuscitate the art of diplomacy. It might be more precise to say that we need to reinvent the art of diplomacy, for the issues, instrumentalities, and dynamics of foreign policy have changed so thoroughly that time-honoured traditions of diplomacy may require

major overhauls. Certainly, the application of sheer power to counter threats to security has shown itself to be costly, frustrating, and frequently self-defeating.

Economic security is perhaps even more elusive that military security. The global economy today functions as a single unit. Small and middle-sized countries especially are subject to economic forces over which they can exert little or no control and which play themselves out in distant, anonymous financial centers. The collapse of commodity prices in the past fifteen years was in large part the result of recession in the industrialized countries, compounded by advances in synthetic materials and technology and, ironically, by overproduction, as Third World countries desperate for foreign exchange tried to export more and more to make up for falling prices.

International capital markets shift huge sums of money around the world on electronic impulse, affecting the exchange rates, creditworthiness, and interest payments of sovereign borrowers. The governments of the five, or seven, or ten largest market economies have been compelled to cooperate in order to moderate the violent fluctuations in some capital currency markets, but their policy coordination remains fairly superficial. They have not yet come to terms with the need for deep intrusion into domestic economic prerogatives. Nor have other actors, such as banks, corporations, and members of stock exchanges, accepted the need for self-regulation in the interests of the stability and prosperity of the system as a whole. Until they do so, they invite the intervention of the state, however limited and imperfect its power to control may be.

The domestic impact of global economic forces may contribute to the erosion of the perceived legitimacy of the state. The state is expected to defend and advance the material well-being of the citizenry. When it is seen to fail in this task, the state comes under criticism or even attack from the growing masses of people who are progressively alienated from a state that is unable--or unwilling--to provide them with opportunities to sustain or better their economic condition. In some countries, a pattern of instability has been established as successive governments, equally powerless to control the economy, fall. Opposition may well turn to violence, or provoke it, as a particular regime clings to power in the face of economic failure.

However, the alienation resulting from economic stagnation may have positive effects in some situations. It may persuade people to throw their support behind an opposition that does offer a positive alternative, even if an unpalatable one in the short run. It may, in particular, persuade the professional and middle classes, who often have a bias for the status quo, that their interests lie with change, in common cause with the poorer sections of society. Redemocratization in Southern Europe, Latin America, and the Philippines was clearly given impetus by the economic failures of authoritarian regimes. Whether the political reformers will be able to better the economic record of their predecessors remains, in several cases, to be seen. Even the highest standards of economic management will not protect newly democratized countries--or any others--from the degradations of low export prices for commodities, high interest rates, the drying-up of commercial lending, protectionism in the major importing countries, and speculative transfers of potential investment funds.

Our common vulnerability is perhaps most graphically illustrated on a daily basis in our physical surroundings--the global environment. We are learning, as the science of ecology develops, to regard our planet as an organism, and to understand how delicately balanced some of its resource systems are. We know that the origin of acid rain, which has reduced lakes in Northern Europe and the northern United States to crystal-clear deserts, lies in the burning of fossil fuels. We are fairly certain that the use of fluorocarbons threatens the ozone layer. We have good reason to suspect that the buildup of carbon dioxide from combustion of organic and fossil fuels may warm the atmosphere enough to melt the polar icecaps sufficiently to flood many heavily-populated, low-lying areas. We understand much less about the general dynamics of the global climate and the way it may be affected by, for example, deforestation and desertification--but we know enough to realize that we may be approaching certain points of irreversibility.

The fate of the global environment and the disposition of resources lies not only in the hands of governments, international organisations, and corporations, but int he hands of hundreds of millions of people who face constraints in their daily lives that not one of us here faces. Many of us probably have great difficulty even in imagining them. I am talking of the poor peasants whose land-use decisions, made under the most cruelly limiting circumstances, will determine the future of forests and watersheds, and thereby the productive potential of entire regions. These hundreds of millions are decision makers as surely as are the timber barons or cattle ranchers, though the latter are both more destructive and less constrained in the choices they make.

| Long-Term and Nonterritorial Issues

The kind of problems encountered in the spheres of security, the economy, and the environment illustrate the problems of international governance, that is, the governance of complex systems characterized by lack of control, lack of accountability, and great uncertainty about outcomes. The late Aurelio Peccei, the founder of the Club of Rome, near the end of his life lamented "the absolute ungovernability of society as presently organised....Despite the system-like nature of humankind's global body, no political philosophy or institutions have been evolved to ensure its governance."

The problems of international governance seen as a systemic need, as opposed to the simpler notion of governing relations between national governments, are especially difficult when it comes to dealing with long-term issues and nonterritorial issues. There is no constituency for the future, particularly the more distant future, beyond the lives of our own children or grandchildren. Today, we build nothing that is the equivalent of the medieval cathedrals, built to last for a thousand years and more. *Short-run considerations*--generally as short as a term of office--dominate national political considerations. And domestic political cycles are generally out of phase with global needs--whether they be a consistent approach to multilateral negotiations, a decades-long plan for environmental recovery, or a gradual phasing out of nuclear weapons.

If constituencies for long-term issues are weak, so are constituencies for concerns beyond national borders. This is true despite the realities of interdependence, which have blurred the demarcation between domestic and

foreign-policy issues. One increasingly important example, out of many, of the interpenetration of domestic and international problems is that posed by the growing scale of population movements between countries. They are the result of continued and even worsening disparities in living standards and economic growth rates, of deterioration of the environment or of security, and of gross disparities in rates of population growth.

This trend confronts many of the affluent industrialized countries with three options. One is to revive the flagging international development effort. The second is to allow the free movement of people across national boundaries, as is already the case, in large measure, with the free movement of capital. The third option would be to accept the inevitability of multiethnic societies, and to develop calibrated policies relating the scale of intake to improved absorption and integration policies that would help reduce the likelihood of racial or ethnic conflicts. The urgency of choice is obvious. However, the absence of political will, the weakness of national and international constituencies, as well as the lack of an agreed analysis that could form the basis for a collective approach, are equally obvious.

The problems of policymaking on a global scale for long-term and nonterritorial issues are therefore not just political. There is genuine scientific uncertainty about the consequences of decisions taken and implemented today, and disagreement abut the implications of the uncertainty. To take one example, many people feel that the probability of serious accidents at nuclear power plants is large and outweighs any possible advantage, given the availability of safer advantages. Others believe that the probability is low enough to justify the benefits, and

doubt the viability of the alternatives on either technical or economic grounds.

In addition, many of the issues that have to be addressed lie at the intersection of traditional disciplines and fields of study: security and development; environment and human settlement; hunger and poverty; climate and human modification of the environment; interdependence and autonomy; and science, technology, economic growth, employment, and culture. As these interfaces are approached, it becomes obvious that the basic conceptual tools for dealing with them are often inadequate.

The work that needs to be done will have to go beyond sectoral approaches, area studies, and even interdisciplinarity to find new modes of analysis for dealing with complex realities. This holds for universities as well as governments, if we are to understand--and act upon our understanding of--the complexities of simultaneous social, economic, political, technological, and cultural change in each of our countries, and their reflection in the international system. For the turbulence in the international system cannot be separated from these profound and rapid changes at the national level.

Conclusions

What lessons can be drawn from this necessarily cursory sketch? There is in the governance of interdependence an obvious need for institutions at national and international levels, capable of mediating between long-term ecological, security, and economic needs and values and those resulting from the shorter-run cycles of domestic politics; between the conciliation or adjudication of conflicting interests as presently perceived and the

unexpressed interests of future generations; between national interests and those of the human community as a whole.

Another lesson is that a crowded, multivaried, competitive, and interdependent world community, itself in rapid change, cannot afford to depend on a single global system for its governance. It will have to rely on a plethora of intergovernmental as well as nongovernmental institutions, regimes as well as formal and not-so-formal arrangements. The growing awareness of this need is very much reflected in the rapid increase in the number of both intergovernmental and nongovernmental organisations, within as well as without the UN family.

At the national, domestic level, it is not primarily the government that determines the resilience of a society but the vigor of its civic and religious institutions. Likewise at the international level, it is dynamism of the transnational nongovernmental organisations that determines the strength and cohesion of the world community and its commitment to the values of human solidarity and human rights.

In addition, the fact that many processes of change, and the actors in them, have come to lie increasingly outside the control of governments inevitably puts limits on the effectiveness of intergovernmental organisations. The creation of nongovernmental organisations capable of policing themselves is therefore indispensable for effective multilateral action in those areas where governments have only limited influence. This includes professional organisations and institutions, commercial and financial associations, civic groups, and ad hoc independent study commissions.

Much of this is already happening, but not at the pace nor with the determination that the urgency of pressing global problems would require. Over and beyond this, we will have to find new institutional answers to the need for increased participation, representation, and coordination, as well as to the need for increased accountability in dealing with these issues. While governments are responsible to their parliaments, there is a need for transnational institutions that can hold governments in some ways accountable for their actions or failures to act on global, regional, or humanitarian issues. The European Parliament may well be looked upon as a useful prototype--although not necessarily the only type--of regional and perhaps eventually functional parliaments, capable of passing judgement on global, regional, and humanitarian issues, and on the intergovernmental and nongovernmental policies designed to deal with them.

From these speculative assertions it should be quite clear that there are no ready-made formulas to meet the new needs for governance of the unstable complex systems that together constitute what we loosely call the global community. It is obvious that the human community is at the beginning of a new era--a new learning phase--in which innovation and inventiveness are at a premium, not only in terms of policies and institutions, but also in terms of the very forms of organisation.

One suspects that the most responsive and effective organisations in a rapidly changing global information society will no longer be hierarchical in structure, but decentralised and co-archical, horizontal rather than vertical, having networks with some strong nodal points. A dense multidirectional flow of information within the organisation will allow for effective participation, dispersed autonomy, and effective coordination.

Such organisations would be equally sensitive to signals coming from their changing environment. Social learning, creativity, initiative, and self-organisation might well be the important properties in such a setting.

Much will depend on individual and social inventiveness, as well as on what might be called the learning capacity of societies, of their component elements, and of the international community. The learning experience we are just beginning to embark upon will include not only the development of new organisational forms and concepts. It will also include an extension of social and moral sensibility--a willingness to assume responsibility for problems that go beyond our conventional definition of the national interest towards an extended concept of the public good that encompasses both the human race around this globe and its future generations.

To try to do this at a time when the complexity and intractability of so many global problems have led to reductionism, unilateralism, intolerance, and privatism will continue to be the major challenge of our time. It is a challenge from which no aspiring diplomat can escape. It may well be the test by which history will measure us all.

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Question: You are an educator and the world you just outlined is very complicated. How do you plan to educate future generations to deal with this complicated world?

Dr. Soedjatmoko

I referred to it very briefly in my text. The problem that all the educational systems in the world face is the problem of how to learn to live with uncertainty and unpredictability. The size of the labor market will change before the educational system has reset its targets, and it will continue to do so. What our educational systems will need is much greater flexibility, an emphasis on innovativeness, on inventiveness, and on an awareness of where to get the knowledge and the skills that will be required in an unforeseeable future. These are demands that will have to be responded to by the educational systems.

At the moment we all know how universities all over the world are struggling to respond to new demands and having great difficulty, given the rigidities of universities generally. How to link basic research more closely to industrial applications. How to deal with the shortening of the distance between findings in the basic sciences and their application in the

consumption sphere. How to train people for changing job opportunities.
The emphasis will have to be on retrainability of those who pass through
the university. It is part of a new need for continuous learning. The
universities will have to respond to the longer life span that many of us will
have in this world and prepare people for a two- or three-career life, or for
different kinds of jobs.

In the developing world, the problems are in part that, but there is a
much larger problem. The educational systems are too expensive to reach
the poor, even though much progress has been made through nonformal
systems. Still, the absolute number of illiterates has increased. What we
need is to search for more inexpensive, poor man's learning systems.

One of the problems is that (I hope you will forgive me for saying
this) education has become too important to be left to educators alone.
The whole range of national sectors must be involved in decisions regarding
the educational system. The primary problem will be how to infuse greater
flexibility in our educational systems.

Question: I am wondering if you would comment on the Soviet Union,
particularly in relationship to glasnost. Is it a realistic opportunity for us
to solve some of these international problems together?

Dr. Soedjatmoko:

Every nation, not only the Soviet Union or the Third World but also

this nation, goes through periods of closing in upon itself and of opening out to the world. I think the Soviet Union is in such a phase of opening up, for very important domestic reasons. I spent just recently two weeks in the Soviet Union as a guest of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and I was reminded very much of the visit I made to India when Rajiv Ghandi had just come into power. I was struck then by this tremendous groundswell of new hopes, new expectations. I found this in the Soviet Union at the time of my recent visit.

I can well understand the continued, let's say, refusal to suspend disbelief in considering how real glasnost is going to be. However, within the Soviet Union itself, I talked to many, many people who are absolutely delighted and who are speaking of the new Soviet man, a new Soviet period, with great pride and expectations. I believe it is important to take these reactions into account. This is not the place to engage in a debate over which of the various interpretations are possible and valid, about the ultimate significance of this development. But I believe it is a very serious development which those of us who are hoping for a more relaxed international situation, and certainly the major powers, cannot afford to let go by.

Question: Earlier you mentioned that we don't build anything today like the medieval cathedral, and you pointed out that what we do build is for the short term economically and, at best, for the nation politically. One

thought that comes to mind is that the medieval cathedral not only was built for a longer term and for something beyond the nation; it also reflected very powerfully and concretely a common cultural synthesis, which in the Middle Ages in Europe was shaped and assured by the church. In today's world, between the Western powers, the Soviet bloc, and the developing world, there is no such common cultural synthesis. So I ask you, sir, how do we speak to one another effectively in terms of shared human values when we have no shared common language?

Dr. Soedjatmoko:

I am not so sure that we don't have the beginnings of a shared common language to express some very basic human values that are to be found in all cultures. Those values are to be found in different configurations in each culture, in different relationships to each other, but they are there. One of the efforts in which we will have to persevere is in making ourselves understand that there is a common bedrock of those human values.

The problem really is to develop a sense of common solidarity and universality not on the basis of the lowest common denominator, but on the highest values of each of our societies. That will require a density and level of communication that goes far beyond what we are accustomed to in the age of electronic media. But we should also be aware how easily those media, and the short attention span of modern man, tend to distort our

images of each other. The problem is to go beyond the superficiality and the superficial stereotypes that are very often created by instant communication.

We will have to develop much more effective means for a deeper level of understanding. And here one reaches, of course, into the level of basic concepts with regrd to the ultimate meaning of human life. These are areas that are usually not talked about in cultural exchanges, but I believe that unless we do, we may fail to understand how people in other cultures respond to the uncertainties and the unpredictability of the situation in which they find themselves.

Here I would like to mention very briefly the inadequacies of the social sciences as we conduct them now. There is a need for a much greater interaction between the social sciences and the humanities in order to make us aware of levels of analysis that are not limited to interests and aggregation and conflicts of interest, but.that lay open the very basic motivations that drive human life and human actions.

Question: Does not the threat that comes from unilateral exercises of leadership come from a lack of understanding of the known goals of other nations, the lack of a plan that other people can have confidence in, and a lack of integrity within nations, or factionalism? Is there a role for coordination between schools of diplomacy internationally so that we can begin to get a handle on this problem?

Dr. Soedjatmoko:

I agree with you. It would be very useful for students of schools of diplomacy to visit other schools in other countries and do it regularly. There are a number of things that could be done at that level. However, the problems, I think, lie deeper than that. Given the complexities of the problems in the world, it is very difficult for countries, and especially powerful countries, to accept the fact that the world is different from what they had expected it to be. To learn to live with manifestations of social and political and cultural life that do not easily fit one's own preconceptions about what social life and society should be is one of the most difficult lessons.

Now, one way of dealing with that is not to wait for people to reach schools of diplomacy, but to start at the secondary level to develop international schools -- on a much larger scale than some have already done -- where people from different countries learn to know each other and, what is most important, to trust each other as human beings. I have talked to many graduates of these international schools, and I am struck almost in every case by how greatly their lives have been affected, changed for the better and enriched, because of this international exposure, living with people from other cultures.

It is at the level of human trust that understanding becomes possible. If one denies or is not ready to accept a common humanity with

people who have entirely different outlooks, then no cultural exchange may be very helpful. The fundamental need is to develop the kind of exchanges that engender human trust.

About the Speaker

Few men bridge the divide between the thinking of the new nations of
Asia and that of Western Europe and North America as effectively as the
Indonesian intellectual, Soedjatmoko--rector of the United Nations
University in Tokyo from 1980 to 1987, diplomat and statesman, author and
editor, lecturer and scholar.

A Javanese born in Sumatra in 1922, Soedjatmoko studied at the medical
faculty of the University of Indonesia in Batavia (now Jakarta) in 1940-42.
When war interrupted his education, he joined with other young Indonesians
in opposing the Japanese occupation and supporting the rising movement for
independence from the Dutch.

In 1945, Soedjatmoko joined the Foreign Ministry of the newly formed
Indonesian government as head of the foreign press department. In 1946, he
edited a nationalist magazine. From 1947 to 1952, he served on the
Indonesian permanent delegation to the United Nations, and again in 1966 as
a delegation member. In 1950-51, he studied at Harvard. He returned to
Indonesia in 1951 to edit a daily newspaper, Pedoman, then edited SIASAT
magazine, 1952-60.

From 1956 to 1959, he served as a member of Indonesia's Constituent
Assembly. He did not agree with the policies of Soekarno, Indonesia's first
president, and remained out of government service until Soekarno was
replaced in 1965. From 1967 to 1971, he served as Indonesia's Ambassador to
the United States.

Although well tuned to the political aspects of life, Soedjatmoko's
main interest has always been the social and cultural dimensions of a
nation's development, as demonstrated in his principal writing and

lecturing. From 1971 until assuming his post as UNU Rector in 1980, he served as advisor on social and cultural affairs to his country's National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS).

Soedjatmoko's incisive scholarship is widely recognized. He has been a member of the Club of Rome, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the board of the Ford Foundation. In 1978, he received the Ramon Magsaysay award for international understanding. Yale University awarded him an honorary Doctor of Humanities in 1970.

His publications include <u>An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography</u>, co-editor, 1967; <u>The Re-emergence of Southeast Asia: An Indonesian Perspective</u>, 1969; <u>Southeast Asia in World Politics</u>, 1969; <u>Development and Freedom</u>, 1980; <u>The Primacy of Freedom in Development</u>, 1985; and numerous journal and magazine articles.