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THE INTELLECTUAL IN A DEVELOPING NATION

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We owe to Edward Shils possibly the first picture in depth of the animal we will be discussing tonight - the intellectual in a developing nation. Since then a number of other studies have appeared, some dealing with the impact of foreign education on the intellectual of such a developing nation. After the collapse of parliamentary government in a number of states and the emergence of regimes dominated in varying degrees by the military, a spate of studies was published dealing with the intellectual in uniform. In most of these studies the intellectual comes through as the modernizer, the formulator of the new goals and purposes, as well as the articulator of dissent. He often emerges also as a man tormented by his own sense of alienation - most of us I suppose are familiar with the classic statements on this subject by Nehru and Sjahrir - stemming from the clash between the two cultures to which he feels he belongs. Part of this picture of the intellectual is also the manner in which he sees himself as performing the function of relating universally held human values to the concrete situation in which he finds himself and to the methods by which he seeks to pursue his goals of modernization. In this respect he is continuously and crucially concerned with the cultural and moral or normative problems of identity and expression, purpose and direction, structure and meaning, perception and motivation.

A great deal of time has passed, a great many events have taken place since Shils started to draw attention to this general topic. This passage of time has been characterized by the collapse of many of the illusions Shils' intellectuals held when they entered into the era of independence. Simultaneously, there have been considerable changes in the general intellectual climate the world over from which the third world intellectual in part draws sustenance. Thirdly, many of these men have felt the impact of the experiences, previously unfamiliar, of entering into positions of responsibility. And fourth, there has been the emergence of a new post-independence generation of intellectuals, bringing with them a ⁽⁷⁾ different *lebensgefühl*, and often a more nativistic orientation. There seems, therefore, to be enough justification to have another look at the beast.

Rather than utilize the sociological perspective, in the way Shils went about his task, I will try to describe the third world intellectual as he is defined by his dilemmas, by looking at him from the inside rather than from the outside, by examining his internal conflicts rather than the external pressures. In doing so, I hope you will not expect from me a Rousseau type of self-revelatory posturing. On the other hand, I am fully aware of the inevitably Indonesian cast and personal character of my description; but I do hope that a sufficient ability to objectify will lend to my observations a rather more general validity.

Despite all the changes in the political situation in many of the new nations, the basic role of the intellectual has not changed, mainly because the process of social transformation in which his nation is involved is still going on. Thus he is still faced with essentially the same dilemmas Shils analyzes. But there have been some important shifts in the perspective under which he looks at his dilemmas, and consequently some changes in the intellectual's sense of self-awareness and in his responses.

His first and foremost dilemma remains that of his relationship to power. Insofar as he has clear ideas about the future of his country, the goals that have to be pursued, and the manner in which those goals should be pursued, he is inevitably fascinated by power as the unavoidable means to translate his ideas into reality. At the same time his own ambivalence to power has remained the same. The slowness of change, the inevitable compromises that characterize administrative responsibility, and the need to cater to popular prejudices and preoccupations that he is unable to share in order to buttress his power base in any political structure,

⁽⁷⁾ different sense of life, a

do violence to the clarity of his vision of the future and to the directness and vigor which he sees as an essential condition for successful implementation. These conditions all seem to threaten his integrity and his continued creativity as an intellectual.

Moreover, political and administrative responsibility is concerned with order, and insofar as change is concerned with orderly change. New ideas always constitute a threat to the established order. And while administrators or political leaders may be well aware of the crucial contribution the intellectual could make to the success of their regime, they quite often are also suspicious of the potential danger the intellectual and his freedom -- the minimal condition for the flourishing of his creativity -- constitutes for their need for a minimum degree of order. Inevitably, many intellectuals have felt it necessary to come to terms with this dilemma immediately after the attainment of independence. There was the urgent and legitimate need to man the government services, to help lead the political parties, the newspapers and so forth. On the whole one might say that over the years the pattern of such adjustments has remained much the same; still it would be an interesting study to discover possible shifts in the relative percentages of those intellectuals who became mandarins in the highest sense of disinterested service, those who become sparkless bureaucrats, those who descended to the level of cynical apparatchiks serving self-perpetuating power, and those who preferred unstructured influence to power. The categories of political style have also remained: the populist, the elitist, and that often most dynamic combination of these two -- the Jacobin.

What did change in the light of post-independence experience was the intellectual's awareness of power, its function, its limits and its character. There is among intellectuals now a greater awareness of the need for a strong central government, capable of pursuing the goals of nation-building and economic development against the intractable obstacles posed by tradition, ignorance and backwardness. At the same time there is also a greater awareness of the need for establishing and developing countervailing forces within the society that could limit abuses of power and ensure voluntary popular participation, initiative and organization. The intellectuals of developing nations have aligned themselves on both sides of this dividing line, their place mainly being determined by temperament and incidental factors. But whatever their place, it is clear to all of them that a sufficiently large number of intellectuals should stay outside of the government, outside of direct political involvement. This is necessary for them to be able to strengthen and nurture the intellectual institutions and the voluntary associations needed to secure that balance between state power and the power of society which is a precondition for freedom and civility in the political system.

One of the sobering lessons many intellectuals have learned since independence concerns their personal interest in gaining power, i.e. that the reach of their persuasiveness in their own country has often little to do with the validity of their arguments or the correctness of the positions they take. They find it very difficult if not impossible to break through the reserve with which their ideas are greeted beyond the boundaries of their own solidarity group, or the communal group from which they originally came. During the struggle for independence, the risks involved in defying the colonial ruler made the power role of the activist-intellectual more broadly and nationally accepted. Many have now made the ironic discovery that in new nations where deep communal cleavages and suspicions exist, the more convincing the intellectual's disinterest in political power, the more his political ideas are taken seriously beyond the boundaries of the communal group to which he belonged. This certainly is no balm to the intellectual's ego,

but it does strengthen his belief that ideas do have legs. It is conceivable that, at least in some cultural traditions in Asia, an inverse relationship between influence and involvement of the intellectual in the power game has something to do with the recognition on the part of the general public that the intellectual's role harks back to older, more easily recognizable roles in the traditional system: the role of the prophet, the seer, the sage, the carrier of the basic values of a society, in all cases characterized by the sage's own disinterest in power.

The difficulties in getting economic development in motion, especially in some of the larger developing nations, have made many intellectuals realize that power is not an indifferent commodity that can be applied to all problems and all tasks. I think it has become quite obvious that not all power lends itself to the solutions of development problems. The manner in which power is built and in which its constituency is welded together, the nature of the appeals used, the rethoric and later on the doctrine articulating that power, and also the forces, the emotions and motivations appealed to - all these together very much determine which tasks could be undertaken by the application of that power, and which tasks are almost a priori precluded. For example, I am quite convinced that Sukarno's appeal to certain emotions precluded the possibility of success in solving the basic structural problems of Indonesia. I am also convinced that the Indonesian Communist Party in its quest for mass support paid a high price for soliciting millenarian impulses among the Javanese masses, thereby infusing an alien and uncontrollable element into the internal dynamics of that party. Therefore the intellectual may find himself in the paradoxical situation that if he wants to seek power himself, he can only gain his end by sacrificing - for the sake of gaining mass support - the very motivations that he needs to mobilize more widely in order to achieve his modernization goals, which was the reason he became interested in seeking power in the first place. Under circumstances where modernization has not advanced sufficiently and tradition has remained rigid, the intellectual as modernizer is often therefore precluded from seeking power himself. If through historical accident power is thrust upon him he can only make do with what is available, do the best he can, and in the meantime try wherever he can to stimulate the modernizing impulses within his society. It is only after he has helped the modernization process further along that he can hope to build up the kind of power he can fully identify with.

The continued inability of many nations to overcome economic stagnation, despite all the national efforts for development, has pointed up another important role for the intellectual. That is to link up more closely, more broadly and more deeply, the primordial solidarity groups to the life, the purposes and goals, and the problems of the new nation state. Failure to overcome stagnation and to get economic development going in some countries has made many people fall back on the traditional structures of social organization, on the security of their community or their tribe, thus trading the insecurity of a new orientation and the pursuit of new goals for the safety and emotional comfort of tradition. This regression reinforces the other obstacles to social progress, and the country is locked permanently in the vicious circle of underdevelopment. It is only through their intellectuals that these communal groups can increase their capacity to come to grips with the new problems of modern existence and with the life of the nation. It has become very clear how crucial is the role of the intellectual to help the communal group which he comes in developing a national vision - and the new overarching loyalties that go with it - that encompasses the modern goals of development, and is linked to a redefinition of traditional values broad enough to accord a place and role for the other communal groups on terms meaningful to them.

No less crucial is his role in establishing and nurturing the continuous dialogue with his peers coming from other solidarity groups. In the absence of these cross-communal dialogues, there is very little prospect for developing that kind of cooperation at all levels of national life without which the mobilization of forces necessary to overcome stagnation and to get development going, remains impossible. This requirement implies the crucial importance for the intellectuals of these nations to develop a strong and separate identity as intellectuals, one that can cut across the traditional lines of division in the society without, however, cutting their roots in and communications with their own traditional groups. It also shows the need to develop strong national, trans-communal intellectual institutions.

It is in this connection that I would like to pay tribute to the memory of Soe Hokgie, one of the most dynamic and promising intellectuals of the young post-independence generation who recently died as the result of an accident while climbing Mount Semeru. His total commitment to modernization and democracy, his reckless honesty, and his complete lack of self-consciousness in waging his fights, made it possible for him to overcome the traditional reservations towards him that many held because of his Chinese origin. To me he exemplified the possibility of a new type of Indonesian, of a truly Indonesian Indonesian. It is this message I think that his brief life contains for us.

If the cross-communal dialogue in a new nation is reduced to polemics in newspaper editorials, without personal communication between the intellectuals of the communal groups involved, then obviously a very serious danger point in the life of the nation has been reached. Without deliberate efforts by the intellectuals of all communal groups to maintain a continuing dialogue, it will become impossible to secure some degree of civility in the resolution of serious political conflict. The fragility of the social preconditions on which the political consensus of the new nation states rests has also become more obvious. It has certainly forced many intellectuals to take another look at the question of dissent in a developing nation.

As those who by virtue of being intellectuals are continuously concerned with diverse possible courses of action and the formulation of alternative choices, the intellectual easily falls into the role of the articulator of dissent in his society. It is an essential and creative function in the new nation-state. But how is dissent brought into the political system to enable it to play such a constructive role, if the political culture concerned is traditionally unfamiliar with the notion of a loyal opposition? Or, if -conversely - dissent is too particularistic to grow easily into the role of a loyal (national) opposition? Or in countries where independence was attained only after a long and violent struggle, which put a premium on loyalty, solidarity and disciplined conformity? It has often proved to be difficult to switch to a political structure that gives scope to the establishment of a loyal opposition. Also, the fragility of national unity in cases of continued stagnation, or direct experience of rebellion and threats of secession with or without foreign support, have made the intellectuals in many of these countries deeply aware of the need for self-restraint in their intellectual pursuits, and of the obligation to take into account the social and political consequences of their actions.

The intellectual's experience of civil war, or the blood-letting resulting from the total collapse of traditional social mechanisms for conflict-resolution, have only added to his sense of social responsibility. He has become aware more clearly now that for a long period to come it is going to be very unlikely that he will find himself in a situation that is sufficiently in accord

with his basic values and intellectual sensibilities to make him feel comfortable, without problems of conscience or of intellectual integrity. It is of course always possible to avoid involvement and responsibility, and in that way to keep one's hands clean, while wallowing in one's own sense of self-righteousness and waiting for things to run their course. It can be done by a retreat into silence, or through the kind of defiance that leads to imprisonment, exile or martyrdom.

However, given the instability and heterogeneity of the power structure in most developing nations, the fluidity of the constellation of forces underlying it, as well as the inefficiency of its bureaucracy, the intellectual's options are not necessarily limited to the two extremes; to join the dictator's stable of intellectuals, or jail. Even when freedom is officially disenfranchised, the intellectual can in some cases and up to a point still work less openly perhaps - with some degree of effectiveness, by trading the broadside delivery of new ideas for their pinpointed injection into the interstices of the power structure and of society in general. This requires, apart from a cool head, an understanding of his country's situation and the general direction of developments, as well as a sensitivity for the politics of instability. For all his understanding and tactical skill he may misjudge the level of tolerance, or he may have to draw the line at some point beyond which he is not prepared to withdraw. But of course this is not the only occasion in man's life where rational calculation ceases to be decisive.

In any case, whatever role he chooses, he is bound to pay a price for it. What is more important, he who stays outside - as well as the insiders - must work to establish meaningful alternatives out of the existing materials. To do so he may have to dirty his hands, to involve himself in situations that are bound to expose him to criticism and ridicule. He may, in pursuing this course, lose his soul as well. But I think it is a measure of the vitality of a nation that enough intellectuals can find it in themselves to take such risks, to dirty their hands, or at times to give in to certain pressures so as to avoid other more serious ones, in order to maintain the continuity of the struggle.

The problem of whether to meet the threat to the basic freedoms of a society frontally or indirectly, the choice of bringing about changes by working outside the system or within it, is a continuing dilemma that is, as many here tonight will be aware, not limited to developing societies. Only the risks in developing countries may be a little greater. The brittleness of civility in many new nation states has more than ever brought home to the intellectuals the depth, power and potential violence of the emotions, of the passionate hopes and fears, of the fervor and the desperation that go into the building of a nation, and that lurk below the level of day-to-day normalcy. It has made the intellectual realize more deeply the force of irrationality in the life of a nation; it has made him realize the extent to which his rational manipulations of situations only touch the top of the iceberg (or the volcano). It has also made him realize that many of his notions of modernization are doomed to remain lifeless constructs of thought unless he can connect them up with the deep-seated sources of feeling, drive and purpose that lie embedded in the subconscious of his nation. And this has led him to look at tradition with new eyes and with a new respect.

Among the many illusions that the modernizing intellectuals have had to shed since the attainment of independence has been the notion that tradition as a barrier to modernization could be overcome by frontal attack, or could at least be neutralized and circumvented. The strength and pervasiveness of tradition has taught many of these modernizers that unless they were willing to develop some kind of relationship with tradition they would find themselves isolated or at best reduced to the sidelines. If one was willing to use totalitarian methods it

might be otherwise, but even then one would most likely find that the power apparatus built up for that purpose would in some unexpected way be imbued by the very elements of tradition that one wanted to fight. But how to develop a modus vivendi with tradition without becoming a captive of it? This is a vexing question. The very practical need for developing a degree of operational effectiveness, however, has led to a better understanding of the social structure of tradition as a complex variety of currents and cross-currents, encompassing both mainstream and deviant behavior. Experience in inducing change has undermined the notion that tradition is a monolithic entity, and has opened the way to speed up the modernization process through the deliberate stimulation and mobilization of specific - often recessive, latent or minority - elements of tradition.

When it became clear that modern ideas and modern institutions failed to come to life unless they could fit into new structures of meaning that would link their developmental goals to prevailing notions and perceptions, the next step was the realization on the part of many intellectuals that any development plan, any movement towards modernization, would have to make use of existing impulses, existing skills, existing values and symbols. To provide this linkage, to help reinterpret traditional values or to rearrange them in new patterns of meaning is therefore a crucially important intellectual task. And while this close relationship to tradition has its risks, it has led to greater effectiveness for those who were able to maintain their modernizing drive.

It should be realized however that the modernizing intellectual's better understanding of the dynamics of tradition does not obviate the necessity for structural changes in society. Without these, modernization as a self-sustaining process cannot be achieved. This greater respect for tradition, this realization for the need to relate modern goals, modern concepts and institutions to existing impulses, motivations and structures, has coincided with the emergence of more sophisticated notions about the modernization process itself. The inapplicability of the communist model, the irrelevance of various scholarly development models, and the growing awareness that the Western history of modernization is just one of several possible courses, has led many older intellectuals to be less self-conscious about their own experimentations and tentative notions. In this respect the relationship of many intellectuals of the third world towards the West has undergone some significant changes.

More than previously, it is now being realized how culture-bound is the notion that modernization automatically implies the Western model. The relative success of the Soviet and the Japanese models had a liberating effect on the narrow concepts held earlier by many third world intellectuals. Equally important in their emancipation was the general collapse of faith in the great ideologies of communism or capitalism throughout the world, and especially as to their applicability to modernization efforts in the third world. The emergence of new problems, unforeseen by the doctrines of either East or West, and the complexity of international problems, made the third world intellectual realize that the major ideologies had lost their "magic" and that in the search for answers to the problems of his nation he would very much have to stand on his own feet. Gone is now the inclination to look over one's shoulder for the benign nod of approval of his mentors - at the London School of Economics, the editorial board of the New Statesman and Nation, Leiden University, or the Sorbonne. The younger generation of post-independence intellectuals was never very much bothered by this type of relationship with the outside world. Less erudite, less cosmopolitan, but - most important - imbued with a greater self-confidence, they are not so concerned with the psychological need for finding outside approval for their

intellectual activities. Neither are they bothered by the same kind of torment of alienation - the sense of belonging to two opposing cultures - that was tearing the souls of older intellectuals apart. They seem to be more firmly and less ~~severely~~ consciously rooted in their own society, and the accusation of an opponent being an "uprooted Westernized intellectual" is seldom leveled any more.

This shift in attitude may also be a function of the much larger number of intellectuals who have been exposed to the same influences, and a much larger domestic audience for these intellectuals; thus it might reflect the rapidity with which the modernization process has advanced. While on the whole the younger post-independence generation has shown a lack of interest in the ideologies of the 20's and 30's, they are showing a considerable interest and faith in the social sciences, especially in what the social sciences could do for the modernization of their country. This has been the natural result of the larger number of them with training in the social sciences. The contribution that science could make to speeding up the modernization process is of course beyond dispute. Modernization implies the application of "science" and rationality to the resources of the country in attempting to solve its problems. However, many intellectuals - those who are continuously and crucially concerned with basic cultural and moral evaluations, and with problems concerning the public good - are finding themselves unable to develop a blind faith in the social sciences or in the superficial pragmatism that can stem from it. To those intellectuals it is only too obvious how many of the fundamental problems of nation building, modernization and development have so far not been adequately dealt with by the social sciences.

Elsewhere I have addressed this question more elaborately*). Suffice it to say here that as long as existing development theories avoid dealing with basic normative issues, with cognitive questions of an essentially ideological nature; as long as these theories ignore the central question of power, the political preconditions for development, the relationship of social change to the power structure, and as long as development strategies are not linked to political dynamics, there is not much hope that through these development models we will be able to come to grips with the basic problems of our stagnant societies. Equally serious is the historical one - dimensionality of these models. After all, we are not concerned here with stable situations, with unilinear growth, but we are concerned with processes of fundamental historical change that frequently involve the collapse of political and social systems, and with the violence that often accompanies it. We are concerned with what one might call the politics of instability with its own peculiar dynamic. There could be no greater danger for the young social scientists in the third world than to lose themselves in the kind of social research that is a mere extension of the traditional academic concerns in the developed stable countries of the West, and to remain blind to the more basic issues that will have to be identified and defined by the intellectuals of the third world themselves.

To define the problems of their societies in terms of their new sense of national purpose, to sharpen the vision of the kind of society they want theirs to transform into, to relate emerging value patterns to changing social realities, to illuminate the road ahead, to identify the pitfalls, and constantly to search out alternative roads, to find the significance of each new development in relation to the common goals, these are some of the intellectual challenges that will have to be faced. And it is in this framework that social scientists will have to reorient their researches in their own countries.

*) Asia. A Special Report by The Asia Society on Social Science Research in Southeast Asia. 1968. pp.84 ff.

These then are some of the dilemmas the intellectual in many parts of the third world faces in performing his function. The complexities in his relationship to power, to reason and tradition, to nation and primordial group, as well as to dissent, that this essay has brought out only reflects his deeper awareness of the fundamental nature and the magnitude of his task. The self-restraint which stems from this deeper awareness does not necessarily diminish the strength or the depth of his commitment, or reduce his willingness to push his fight.

Increasing rationality, widening the area of freedom and emancipation, nurturing civility in politics, building respect for the basic civil and human rights, maintaining the pressure for modernization, these are the intellectual's continuing commitments. The impossibility of finding clear and unambiguous answers to the dilemmas that are part of his situation has however led to a greater sobriety, greater realism. To win his fight not only courage and tenacity will be required of him, but intelligent flexibility as well, and a deep and sympathetic understanding of his own society. He can not fail to be aware of the wholly political nature of his commitments and of the need for political engagement. The nature of his political role is of course very much a personal and subjective choice, although on the other hand it will depend very much on the situation which he faces whether his role in a given situation should be an ^{or a revolutionary} evolutionary one.

Still he has also come to realize that, despite his continued fascination with power, and irrespective of his place and role in the power game, as an intellectual he should not lose himself entirely in waging the political battles of the day. For it is clear that his most important, most enduring contribution lies in changing the perceptions by his nation of the problems it faces, in changing the capacity of the nation to respond to new problems, in changing the terms in which the political struggle will be waged, in defining the issues around which the political forces will range themselves, in changing the criteria for leadership selection, and finally in changing the terms of evaluation of leadership performance.

In the end this role may be more important, more decisive in putting his country on the road for development, than the question of who wins office, which faction, which combination of forces. For his basic concern and responsibility is the modernization of politics, as a prelude to the depoliticization of modernization and development. In performing this function, he will have to operate on the national level, in the communal framework, as well as in the area of transcommunal relationships.

Over and beyond this he has one other crucial function to perform, one other linkage to make. This is the linkage with a rapidly changing outside world, a world that itself is in crisis, and that is bound to affect the fate of his country, for better or for worse. It is not enough any longer to think that as soon as modernization and development has taken place, the countries of the third world will be able automatically to take their rightful place in the world. By the time we reach the place where we want to be, the world will in the meantime have moved on, and the requirements for survival, security and equality will have changed as well. Also, while he remains firmly convinced of the need for more rationality in the life of his nation, he cannot but be deeply affected by the strength of the backlash that he observes in developed societies against too much uncompensated rationality, and against the resulting existential emptiness of much of modern life. And like it or not, he is forced to think through once again the assumptions on which his notions of modernization are based.

The capacity of his nation to understand the nature of the changes in the world, to evaluate properly the direction of its movement insofar as that is humanly possible, to plot a course that is in line with the interest of its people that capacity is very much dependent on the quality of its intellectuals and the breadth of their interest.

It has also become obvious how much the future of the new nations will depend on the kind of world mankind is moving into. The reduction of international tension, an international peace that will make possible a fundamental reallocation of world resources between armaments, and the combatting of domestic and international poverty, the forging of the instrumentalities that will make possible the kind of massive transfer of knowledge, skills and capital, i.e. the ingredients necessary to lay the foundations of a new international order which will not only free us from the scourge of war but, more importantly, will be reflective of a new sense of international social justice - these are direct concerns of the new nations in the third world as well. Very few of the problems that will determine whether the world of the last few decades of the 20th century will be a livable place can be solved unless collectively, by all the nations of the world, rich as well as poor, and on a global scale.

In developing the necessary comprehension, in shaping the perspectives, conceptual tools, in short in developing the language that will enable mankind to come to grips with these problems, the intellectual of the third world will, I believe, have some contribution to make.

The fact that the intellectual of the third world, like his colleague of the developed world, will have no ready answers to contribute only emphasizes the extent to which we all, rich or poor, developed and developing, are in the same boat, dependent on each other when it comes to facing up to the great and urgent problems of our near future. The different perspectives, emerging from different life experiences, may help us to sensitize each other to other modes of living, other forms of social and political organization than those that present themselves from the perspective of one's own culture alone. They may enrich the common fund of human experience from which eventually the elements will be drawn that will go into shaping of a new and we hope more tolerable life in the decades to come.

This account inevitably raises the question whether I am not exaggerating the importance of the intellectual in a developing nation. That may be true to some extent. It may very well be that I have not been describing the role that he is playing but one that he should play - a description, therefore, that defines the challenge rather than describes an actuality. Certainly the life of an intellectual in the third world is not without risks. The dangers and penalties are not just jail, unemployment, or loss of integrity, but also irrelevance. And this might be a much more humiliating experience. The challenge certainly is there. The freedom that he craves and needs in order that he can function properly as an intellectual, he will have to fight for himself. The strength of the intellectual institutions, the standards and criteria of performance by which intellectuals should operate, will to an important extent be created by the example of his own performance.

I am also aware that when listening to this account some of you may think, how common "hubris" is as an affliction of intellectuals the world over. To those I would like to say that the intellectuals in a developing society have come to realize too vividly the strength of the irrational forces involved in the process of nation building for them to be able to afford the luxury of arrogance. Moreover, to use rather freely the words of an old American friend of mine who

exemplifies to me many of the intellectual virtues and to whom I am therefore greatly indebted, the big issues of politics and the human condition are in truth intractable. The answers we seek to give to these problems will not prevent these problems from arising again in different forms. Still we keep throwing stones, some using small pebbles, while others throw great rocks into the stream. But big or small these stones will disappear with scarcely a ripple, much less influence the course or speed of rushing waters - gone before hardly being seen. Still we are bound to keep on throwing pebbles or our rocks. For it is not success or failure that is the measure of the meaning of man's life. And if this statement brings on echoes of the Bhagavad Gita, I can only say that it is not entirely inappropriate for a modernizing intellectual of a developing nation to be deeply aware that it is within the stream of historical continuity that he fulfills his destiny. Nor is it inappropriate to end this lecture on this counterpoint.

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