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South East Asia and
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
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The Institute for Strategic Studies

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South-East Asia and Security

HIS EXCELLENCY SOEDJATMOKO

The following analysis, of the place of South-East Asia in world politics, has been taken from an address given by the Indonesian Ambassador to the United States. The address was made at the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange between East and West in Honolulu, Hawaii, on 14 May 1969.

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It is important for the clarity of our vision to free ourselves from the obsession that all of us inevitably have with the Vietnam war and the manner of its resolution. After all, the future of the South-East Asian region will not be determined solely by the outcome of that war. Firstly, the population of Vietnam, or even of the whole of erstwhile Indo-China together, constitutes less than one-third of the total population of South-East Asia. On the other hand, Indonesia's population alone accounts for almost half of that total. In keeping the Vietnam war in its proper proportions, it is important to realize that if Indonesia had become a Communist country, any military gains in the Vietnam war would have been nullified.

The other point that should be made here concerns the so-called 'domino theory'. One pertinent aspect which I have tried to bring out in my previous lecture is the largely autochthonous origin of the problems that underlie the political instability in the area. I tried not only to show the magnitude of these problems, but also to convey the long period of time that will be needed to develop the stable political structure capable of coping effectively with the requirements of national integration and economic development simultaneously. What I have tried to say was largely a plea to see and to accept that many of the problems of South-East Asia are problems in their own right. Whether a country starts off from a liberal-democratic, a traditional, a militaristic, or a Communist base, the pressure of its historical problems is bound in due course to give the political structures that emerge a complexion very much their own. This holds especially true, inasmuch as the Communist tide that at one time threatened to engulf the Third Worldt

seems to have largely dissipated its expansive force. It is, therefore, not the political colour of a regime that counts in the end, but its capacity for nation-building and development. More important than the question whether a country will turn towards Communism – however important that may be to the country concerned – is the question whether in doing so it will become a satellite of outside forces or not. For underlying my whole argument is the conviction that in the present world situation no outside power can for long force any South-East Asian country to do its bidding. The South-East Asian nations do not constitute lifeless entities that automatically fall one way or the other, depending on which way their neighbour falls. History does not operate that way. What matters is the will, the political will, the determination of a nation to preserve its own identity. Out of our own national experience, we in Indonesia more than ever believe that this is the crucial element in the equation. Without such a will and determination, the infusion of external power will fail to make much difference. The domino theory, therefore, is to us rather a gross over-simplification of the nature of the historical processes that go on in the area. It obscures and distorts rather than illuminates our understanding and offers no guide-lines for realistic policy.

Having thus cleared the obstructions from our angle of vision on the future, one observation inescapably emerges: the *multi-polarity* of the new constellation of forces in the post-Vietnam era. The actual configuration of forces is inevitably still unclear at this point, for very much will depend on some fundamental decisions which, before too long, have to be made in Moscow, in Tokyo, in Peking, as well as in Washington, DC.

One new element in this constellation of forces is going to be the continued presence of Soviet power in South-East Asia. One of the ironic features of the Vietnam war is that, more than anything else, it has helped to solidify the Soviet Union's direct interest in the region. It seems quite unlikely that the end of the Vietnam war will see a reduction of this presence.

The level as well as the direction of Soviet interest in the area will in the first place be determined by the question whether the world is going to move towards an East-West *détente* or towards an intensification of the cold war. Much will depend also on the balance the Soviet Union will manage to strike between her responsibilities as the other super-power and her need to retain the ideological leadership of the Communist movement in the world in the face of Chinese competition. Thirdly, it will be influenced by the development of Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean basin, and finally, by the manner in which both China and the United States will react to her presence in the South-East Asian region.

The second element in our equation is Japan. Because of her tremendous industrial growth, her need for raw materials from the South-East Asian area, her investments in resource development, and her support of South-East Asia's developmental programmes, Japan at present is already deeply involved in the affairs of the region.

Having reached the stage of now being the third industrial power of the world, she is becoming increasingly conscious of her accomplishments and potentialities and of the need accordingly to redefine her national purposes and the place and role she ought to assume in the present international order.

Specifically with regard to South-East Asia, or more broadly, the Western Pacific region, Japan is approaching the point where she has to make a fundamental choice, affecting her own future security policies as well as the security of the area as a whole. The options available to her in this respect appear to run between two basic courses: either continue to emphasize and enlarge the predominantly economic role she is playing now, or assume a direct political and military role.

The first course offers her the convenience of not having to carry the full load of expanded defence expenditures. At the same time it provides her with the opportunity to enlarge her

contribution to the development efforts of the South-East Asian region, thus speeding up the region's own security capability. But its weakness is that it will place her in a position of continued dependence in security matters on the United States. How long this course could be maintained, in the face of the growing assertiveness of Japan's newly found national pride and self-respect, however, remains to be seen.

On the other hand, if Japan decides to assume a military role, the mere existence of China's nuclear capability will make it impossible for her not to go nuclear as well. This in turn will compel her to move out from under the American defence system and to assume a political and defence posture of her own. Japan's implicit desire not to tangle with Communist China and simple calculations of warranted risks as against national interest, will in all likelihood propel her in this direction.

One sometimes has the impression that those in the United States who are eager to see Japan shoulder part of the military burden in the Pacific do not all fully realize the far-reaching implications of such a proposition. While it is possible to argue that Japan's assumption of an enlarged military role may conceivably add to the security of the region as a whole, this may very well mean a reduction of United States control. The manner in which this dilemma between security and control will be resolved in the coming years will have an important bearing on the constellation of forces that will constitute the environment in which South-East Asia will have to find its place.

It should be said, that in Japan itself at the moment there is still strong psychological resistance against such a military role. Still, when the time comes to make the decision, it may very well be psychological factors, more than anything else, that will tip the scale.

To an important degree, these factors relate to some specific aspects of Japanese-American relations. Of these, the Okinawa question and the impending review of the US-Japan Security Treaty in general, appear to present themselves as the first crucial tests of the direction in which things will move.

Moreover, as Japan's life depends on her trade and her access to markets in developed countries, a development towards protectionism in the United States would inevitably affect the manner in which Japan will position herself in relation to

the countries of the Western Pacific, including the Asian part of the Soviet Union, mainland China as well as South-East Asia. An abandonment on the part of the United States of her vision of the world as a single economic unit by withdrawing into a protectionist isolationism, will clearly open the door towards the development all over the world of closed systems of economic spheres of influence. I think it would be folly to minimize the fear that within these spheres, the price for progress that the underdeveloped nations would have to pay might well be the acceptance of a neo-colonial relationship.

The configuration of forces of which I am speaking will further be influenced by China's stance and where she moves once the Vietnam war is over. The crucial question that will soon come up before her is whether she should persist in a hostile isolation or break out of it. The prospect of a global understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union and the consolidation of a new balance of power in the South-East Asian and Western Pacific region may make it advisable for China to break out of her isolation. As to whether, within the context of her own domestic balance of forces, China will have the capacity to do so, is of course a different matter. Here again, the manner in which the United States conducts her search into the possibilities of a Chinese *rapprochement* will to a large extent condition China's initiatives and reactions in the years to come.

Two more elements, I think, should be briefly mentioned to complete the picture at this stage. First, Australia's decisions regarding her defence strategy and her relationship to South-East Asia; the choice she has to make between concepts of forward defence or a 'fortress Australia' posture, and her defence relations with the United States. Second, the development of strategic significance in and around the Indian Ocean, to which I have referred earlier.

It appears possible then at this juncture to draw a few tentative conclusions.

First and foremost, one is struck by the tremendous extent of inter-action and the far-reaching implications of the decisions that will have to be taken by the countries I have just mentioned. It is obvious also how greatly the manner of this inter-action is going to affect the scope within which the nations of South-East Asia themselves will have to work out their own

destiny. Thus, for example, political decisions taken by the United States in the context of her global policies *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union, Japan and others, as well as her economic decisions related to her balance of payments difficulties will inescapably affect the South-East Asian environment.

The second conclusion that logically presents itself is that as long as South-East Asia is unable to fill the power vacuum left in the wake of decolonization by its own indigenous strength, or in other words, without a South-East Asian indigenous component, the constellation of forces in the Western Pacific will remain unstable.

Lastly, it appears valid to assume that it is against the interest of South-East Asia to see any single force within this constellation emerge in a position of paramount power. If my reading of American history is correct, this conforms also to the traditional position the United States has taken in the past with regard to her interests in the Pacific.

This brings us to the question of the relationship between South-East Asian security and the redefinition of the American defence posture after Vietnam. The importance of the power umbrella provided by the nuclear guarantee and naval presence of the United States is beyond question and needs no elaboration. It seems to me, that in further defining the American military role in South-East Asia, the new logistical deployment capabilities which have been developed could be an important element in giving greater flexibility to the United States defence strategy. But beyond this, I would imagine that it will also very much depend on the way in which the South-East Asian nations themselves see their security problem, and on their readiness to assume responsibility in meeting that problem.

Let us, therefore, first have a look at the nature of the threat to the security of the South-East Asian area. Provided that the present stability of mutual nuclear deterrence remains, I think it is realistic to assume that the danger of massive open military aggression against this region is very small. China's capacity to project her military strength outside her boundaries is for a long time going to be quite limited. While her growing nuclear capability undoubtedly will give her some diplomatic and political leverage, the rationale for a nuclear threat or for nuclear blackmail against any of the South-East Asian countries

seems rather distant, if not absent. The threat to the security of South-East Asia, therefore, lies not in China's military capacity, but rather in the fact that China constitutes a political and ideological high-pressure area, that is bound to exert an influence on the shape and direction of political discontent within the South-East Asian countries. The primary threat, therefore, is one of internal subversion and insurgency.

It is not primarily a nation's military capability that will determine its capacity to overcome these threats to internal security, but rather the cohesion of its political system, the viability and the effectiveness of its government in dealing with the problems of poverty, social inequalities and injustices, in bringing about economic development and in continually expanding its base for popular participation. Here again it is not only factors of economic growth, but beyond that the elements of will and determination that are decisive, as well as the people's loyalty to the government and faith in its purposes. As Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik once remarked: 'In dealing with the defence against insurgency it does not suffice for the people to make verbal expressions of loyalty. It requires a government for whom they are willing to die.'

In this light, therefore, military alliances will add little if anything to a nation's capacity to cope with the problems of insurgency. One might even say that at this stage of political formation and consolidation through which South-East Asian nations are going, the infusion of external military power runs the risk of becoming a destabilizing factor, leading to a false polarization of forces in the country or giving its leaders a false sense of security and a corresponding unwillingness to engage in necessary political and social reform.

Recently, President Soeharto of Indonesia reiterated this viewpoint in unambiguous terms. When asked by the press how he viewed probable developments in South-East Asia after an end to the Vietnam war, he said: 'I do not realize that the general situation in the area after Vietnam will give the Communists a bigger scope for infiltration and subversion in the countries of the region. The main threat, however, will not derive from Communist military strength but rather finds its source in ideological fanaticism. This threat should not be met by military pacts or

military power, but by strengthening these countries' national will and capacity to resist, through international and regional co-operation in the fields of economic development, culture and ideology. The strengthened will and capacity to resist in the countries of the region will form the strongest defence against this infiltration and subversion.'

It is important, therefore, to see ASEAN, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, not as a prelude to a military alliance, but very definitely as an attempt to speed up the economic development and political viability of the region as a whole, as well as that of the individual member-countries. ASEAN is an expression of the will and determination that exist among its member-nations to shape their own future and to work out their problems of stability and economic development in freedom.

We of course realize that to transform potential into reality, much more is needed than pious intentions. Even at this moment, unresolved tension and conflict among ourselves, such as manifested by the dispute over Sabah, threaten to disrupt the fragile structure of our preliminary efforts. But if we understand the nature and basic causes of instability in the region, then we will understand that problems like these will continue to crop up, as the unavoidable agonies in a process of growth.

It does, however, point to the need for South-East Asia's leaders to bring up the kind of statesmanship capable of preventing the deterioration of this conflict into a state of self-destructive armed hostilities. It also reveals the necessity for ASEAN to develop as quickly as possible the organizational machinery for peaceful conflict-resolution in the area. As for Indonesia, we remain confident that within the context and in the true spirit of ASEAN, the current tensions over Sabah can and will be overcome in due course.

It should be noted that ASEAN, in its present composition of Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, was from its inception only seen as a beginning. I do not think that its members have relinquished the hope that eventually ASEAN will include all other nations in South-East Asia. The possibility of a neutralized Indo-China emerging from a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam war would open new possibilities along these lines.

Let me now recapitulate very briefly the major

internal requirements that will have to be met if South-East Asian regional co-operation is to become a reality. *First*, there should be a continuing top-priority commitment to economic development on the part of the political leadership in each of these countries. *Second*, these countries should be able to develop a mechanism for regional conflict resolution which would obviate the need or compulsion to arm against each other and to seek solutions by force of arms. *Third*, plan harmonization; though, given the strength of narrow nationalist feelings, this will take some time, they must gradually develop the willingness to agree on the most suitable location of certain industries in terms of their overall regional impact. This means a willingness to sacrifice short-term national interests. *Fourth*, increased intra-regional trade, common endeavours in the field of price stabilization of primary commodities, joint marketing operations and eventually, after all the countries of the area have developed a sufficient manufacturing capability, a regional common market. This may still take a very long time, but it is the direction in which we have to move. *Fifth*, effective population control.

The nations of South-East Asia must be able to develop these capabilities if regional co-operation is to mean anything in the immediate foreseeable future. Above all, there is an urgent need for clarity of vision as to the community of destiny in which their future is bound up; the realization that there is no future for each of them, unless

they jointly work together to secure their common future.

The awareness of the historic opportunity that has opened, and the will to move in that direction, should inspire not only the statesmen of South-East Asia, but its intellectuals, scientists and businessmen as well. These are the internal requirements.

There are, of course, certain external requirements, the most important of which is the continued willingness of countries like the United States, Japan, Australia, Europe, and hopefully the Soviet Union and the East European countries, in continuing foreign assistance at adequate levels to the countries in this region.

The recent announcement by the Japanese Government of its intention to allocate aid at substantially higher levels was therefore welcome news indeed. In a way it further emphasizes the crucial importance for us in South-East Asia of the decision that the United States will have to make regarding the level of her aid programme in coming years as well as the new concepts underlying it. More than anything else the United States could do in relation to South-East Asia, the continuance at adequate levels of her aid programme would significantly bolster political morale, accelerate the indigenous capacity for development, and commensurately the indigenous capacity of these nations to deal with their own security problems. Without it the US military role in the security of the South-East Asian area would become politically meaningless.

The Brezhnev Doctrine

HELMUT SCHMIDT

The Atlantic Community Quarterly

This article was first published some months ago. It is reprinted here shortly after the author's visit to Moscow as leader of the Social Democratic Party in the Bundestag and on the eve of the Bundestag elections, for the indication it gives of the thinking of an important German political figure.

The Atlantic Community Quarterly (Washington, D.C.). Summer 1969.

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Various Soviet declarations following the invasion of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by troops of the five states of the Warsaw Pact have now been characterized as part of the Brezhnev or Moscow Doctrine. They all have a common core: the limitation of the sovereignty of Communist states. Both the name and the date of origin of this doctrine are matters for dispute. Some date it from the appearance of an article by S. Kovalyov in the *Pravda* of 26 September 1968; others from the speech by the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the United Nations on 3 October. Other experts favour the official declaration made in his Warsaw speech by the Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev on 12 November 1968.

In point of fact, the essential thesis of all these declarations made after the invasion of Czechoslovakia is already to be found formulated before 21 August. On 27 June 1968, Gromyko had declared in unmistakable terms to the Supreme Soviet: 'The calculations of those gentry who would like to tear away at least one member of the socialist community are short-sighted and built on sand. The socialist community will not permit this to happen...'

The Doctrine of intervention

This thesis was formulated in even more precise terms in the Warsaw Letter of 15 July addressed to the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party by the 'leading representatives of the parties and governments' of what subsequently proved to be the five interventionist powers: 'We shall never permit imperialism –

whether by peaceful or warlike means, whether from within or from without – to effect a breach in the socialist system and thereby change the balance of power in Europe in its favour.'

Czechoslovakia, according to the Letter, could only maintain its independence and sovereignty as a socialist country and as a member of the socialist community of states. It was expressly stated that only enemies of socialism would speculate with a solution expressed in terms of a 'defence of the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic against the socialist countries,' that is, 'against those countries whose alliance and fraternal co-operation form the sure basis for the independence and free development of each one of our peoples'.

The Letter continued: 'Our parties and nations bear the historic responsibility for ensuring that the revolutionary gains achieved by struggle should not be lost. Each one of our parties has a responsibility not only towards its own working class and its own nation but also towards the international working class and the entire world Communist movement. It cannot withdraw from the obligations which stem from these responsibilities.'

Thus the Warsaw Letter contained in unusually frank form the essential elements of the later declarations:

1. There was never to be any question of permitting the socialist system or the balance of power in Europe to be changed by peaceful or bellicose action, whether internally or externally;
2. A socialist country could only preserve its

independence and sovereignty as a member of the socialist community;

3. Accordingly, no socialist country could oppose other socialist countries by an appeal to the defence of its sovereignty.

Gromyko reiterated these principles in his speech to the United Nations and defined the socialist camp as a union of states with special interests and rights dependent on the maintenance of national security, fraternal aid and international solidarity. Ulbricht supported this line in his October speech to the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of East Germany.

Leonid Brezhnev repeated this general thesis at the Congress of the Polish Communist Party on 12 November 1968. He declared: 'If the internal and external enemies of socialism think they can attempt to divert the development of any single socialist country to a restoration of the capitalist system, if there then arises a threat to socialism in this country which is a threat to the security of the entire socialist community of states, then this is not merely a problem for the country concerned, but a general problem that must engage the attention of all socialist states.'

Article by S. Kovalyov

The most detailed exposition of the doctrine of the limited sovereignty of socialist states was given by S. Kovalyov in an article in *Pravda* on 26 September 1968, entitled 'Sovereignty and international obligations of socialist countries'.*

Kovalyov refuted the accusation that the action of the five socialist countries was in conflict with Marxist-Leninist principles of self-determination.

Such accusations were based on abstract conceptions of sovereignty and the right of nations to self-determination and did not take into account class concepts.

He emphasized that the peoples of the socialist countries had freedom to determine their path of development, but that no decision could be permitted that was in conflict with the basic interests of other socialist states.

According to Kovalyov, one consequence of this must be the limitation of sovereignty of individual socialist countries in the interests of world socialism: 'The sovereignty of individual countries cannot be used in opposition to the

* Reprinted in *Survival*, November 1968.

interests of world socialism and the revolutionary world movement.' Kovalyov made use of cleverly slanted quotations from Lenin to explain his concept of 'socialist self-determination'. The purported plan to effect Czechoslovakia's exit from the socialist camp by a 'lot of nonsense about the right of nations to self-determination' was in opposition to the basic interests of Czechoslovakia herself, and moreover, would damage other socialist countries. Such 'self-determination', which in practice meant the movement of NATO troops right up to Soviet borders and the splitting asunder of the community of socialist countries, was in actual fact an attack on the vital interests of the peoples of these lands, and accordingly was in basic contradiction to the rights of the peoples to socialist self-determination. In consequence, the occupation of Czechoslovakia represented 'aid extended by other socialist countries to the working people of the CSSR as they were exposed to the pressure of counter-revolution exported from outside, which represented an open struggle to deprive them of their sovereignty and deliver their country to the imperialists'.

Kovalyov went even further. He maintained that socialist countries reserved the right of intervention not only against fraternal states but also an unlimited right of intervention against states outside of the socialist camp. Such states were those which spoke of the 'illegality of the action undertaken by the socialist fraternal states in Czechoslovakia'; and he added that as far as the Soviet Union was concerned even in international law the laws and norms of what constituted legality were subordinate to the laws of the class struggle and the laws of social development. The concept of sovereignty must undergo some restriction, he maintained, and this applied not only to socialist countries but to all countries of the world. The class view point should not be abandoned in favour of formal juridical argument. Whoever permitted this was depriving himself of the only correct class criterion for estimating the norms of legality, and would begin to measure events with the yardstick of bourgeois law. He continued that such an attitude towards sovereignty would mean, for example, that the progressive forces in the world would be powerless to act against the rebirth of neo-nazism in West Germany, or against the despotic actions of Franco or Salazar, or against the reactionary

measures of the 'black colonels' in Greece, as all these could ostensibly be considered 'internal matters affecting sovereign states'. The Soviet Union, according to Kovalyov, has always had the right to intervene, since true revolutionaries would always assist, precisely by virtue of being internationalists, the progressive forces in all countries in their just struggle for national and social liberation.

Hegemony instead of equality

Even though the content of the new doctrine is obviously still in the discussion stage, its political implications are already clearly definable in at least three areas, as follows:

1. A nation finds its true happiness in 'socialist self-determination'; if it does not recognize this happiness then it thereby endangers the happiness of its socialist neighbours and must be compelled to accept its fate. Communists of fraternal states cannot permit socialist states to stand idly by and witness a country's exposure to the dangers of an anti-socialist upheaval in the name of some abstract idea of sovereignty.
2. National interest can only find expression in Marxism-Leninism. It is for the leadership to determine when 'active help' is required by friendly states in the interests of socialism and to preserve sovereignty and socialist self-determination.
3. When such a danger is recognized as present, the Soviet Union can at any time undertake 'extraordinary, emergency measures' [Brezhnev].

The first of these points served as justification for the Hungarian intervention of 1956, and even the Chinese appended their signature to similar declarations between 1957-60. Later there were differences of interpretation, with the Poles leaning towards the ideology of co-existence.

In the early 1960s Soviet ideology concerning international law developed in three ways. Article 2 of the United Nations Charter was only valid for relationships between 'capitalist' and 'socialist' states; between capitalist states themselves imperialist and interventionist principles still ruled; between socialist states there was international law of a higher quality based on 'socialist' and 'proletarian' internationalism.

It should be noted that this concept of 'proletarian internationalism' has, ever since the

1920s, served in its general political application as an instrument of power for the Soviet leadership.

So it can be seen that the justification for the actual limitation of the sovereignty of Communist states is not something new, but for a time after 1960 there was no occasion for an extension of this idea. On the contrary, the general declarations of Bucharest (1966) and Karlsbad (1967) laid emphasis on the sovereignty and independence of all states and all Communist parties. Only in 1968, as a result of developments within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, did there occur a revival and a sharpening of the doctrine of 'socialist internationalism' which found a corresponding support in the pronouncements of Ulbricht and Gomulka. These two in particular realized they were seriously threatened by the Czechoslovak wind of freedom, for - unlike Dubcek, Kadar, Ceausescu or Tito - they are unable to rely on internal support for their regime from the majority of the people.

Opposition from Communists

The sharpening of the doctrine, as well as the intervention in Prague itself, have both been contested by Communists throughout the world, especially as it is the Kremlin which *de facto* has the power of decision for intervention and also because of the growing tendency to involve non-Communist states such as the German Federal Republic in the Soviet class-oriented concept of international law based on a one-sided interpretation of the Potsdam agreement and Articles 53 and 107 of the United Nations Charter.

The practical application of this aspect of the doctrine of intervention is to make it function in the service of Soviet power. The nearer a state lies geographically to Soviet power, the more it lies under the threat of this doctrine. The Yugoslave leadership, for example, is especially concerned about the new Soviet definition of sovereignty in the socialist connotation of the term, and all the more so since the Soviet leadership has avoided an exact demarcation of the limits of the concept of the socialist community. The Belgrade official party organ *Borba* raised the question in its issue of 3 October 1968, as to which was to be considered valid, the new Soviet theory on limited sovereignty or the series of documents which had been signed in Moscow

purporting, in solemn fashion, to guarantee the independence of each and every party.

On 5 October the basic problem was defined by Ljubomir Radovanovic in the Yugoslav foreign policy journal *Review of International Affairs*, in these terms: after the events in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, was it necessary to view inter-state relationships between the socialist states as being determined by law of a special kind outside the boundaries of the general legal institutions of international law?

Radovanovic proceeded in ironic terms to point out that the doctrine was highly convenient for socialist states which had the power to exert pressure for realizing political aims which could then be legalized in the name of socialism. The doctrine was less pleasant and less convenient for states unable to withstand pressure and deprived of the protection of international law

Radovanovic concluded that this doctrine is in no way a prerequisite or a basis for normal relations between states. The definition of the interests of socialism is in any case dependent on subjective measurement, and since there is not in existence a firmly stated type of a socialist community system, judgment on the nature of these interests, which it is proposed to protect by extraordinary measures, must perforce be arbitrary and dependent on the attitude of the intervening country. Under such conditions the international system of law is transformed into an arbitrary system based on the power of the pressure or the hegemony of a certain type of order. This order has the say.

Radovanovic conceded that a special kind of law governing inter-state intercourse between socialist states could be elaborated, but that this should be done on a treaty basis. Until now the socialist states had neither reached agreement among themselves about the limitation of sovereignty in specific cases nor about the procedures for intervention in their internal affairs. Accordingly the obligations of the United Nations Charter were also binding on socialist states. As members of the United Nations the socialist states, in common with all others, had accepted the legal system and obligations which stemmed from the United Nations Charter as a general international treaty. They had also recognized their obligation to bring their international conduct into accord with the principles of the Charter and to accept the rule that such an obli-

gation had precedence over any other eventual commitments entailed by other international agreements. No single country, at the time of accepting the Charter, had made any reservation or objection to its clauses, and it was these that determined mutual relationships between members of this organization. The Warsaw Pact and the obligations emanating from it would still have to be in accord with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. And the same was likewise true of the treaties concluded between the socialist states: they must accept and reiterate the provisions of general international law and inter-state relationships.

On 29 November 1968, the Rumanian Communist Party leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, also rejected the Soviet thesis of restricted sovereignty. The statutes of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON), he said, could not be reconciled with the proposals for supra-national economic boundaries and supra-national powers. These would not only damage the sovereignty and independence of states, but would also hinder effective collaboration between member-states and have a negative effect on the image and influence of socialism in the world.

In point of fact, said Ceausescu, all Communist states and parties are aware that the basic theme of restricted sovereignty or 'socialist sovereignty' is an attack on the fundamental concept of international law, namely, the independence and sovereignty of individual states and non-interference in their internal affairs. The Soviet Union, as a founder member of the United Nations, pledged itself to uphold this concept, and this undertaking was renewed in powerful form in the Warsaw Pact of 14 May 1955.

Contradiction to Moscow's claim

The common political declarations of the Communist parties and states of the 1960s are in direct contradiction to Moscow's present claim to limited sovereignty over socialist or even other states. The signatory states to the Warsaw Pact further stated, in the Bucharest Declaration of 6 July 1966 on European security, that, in order to create a firm basis for peace and security in Europe, it would be necessary to achieve inter-state relationships that had as their starting point the solution of international disputes by peaceful means and the renunciation of threats and the

use of force. Inter-state relationships were to rest on 'the principles of sovereignty and national independence, of equal rights and non-interference in internal affairs, and also on the principle of respect for territorial integrity'.

The Communist Parties reaffirmed in their Bucharest Declaration the concept that one of the basic conditions for making European security a reality was the creation of 'normal relationships between states and their further development through respect for the fundamental principles of sovereignty and national independence, and non-interference in internal affairs'. The Warsaw Pact states still believed in 1966 that these principles would meet with 'growing recognition'.

Since 1968 Moscow has been silent about all this. Nobody can now overlook the facts. Today it is a question of finding an ideological justification for a Soviet claim to hegemony that is coupled with the threat of the use of force. Brezhnev is well on the road to a foreign policy that will be remade in Stalin's image, in which the whole of Europe will be under the direct influence of the Soviets. At present it is still a completely open question whether and when the ideological and political struggle for power between Moscow and Peking will again make him switch course. However, the clearly negative reaction of the European Communist Parties has till now been of no avail.

If today the Soviet Union suddenly adopts an interpretation that is in diametrical opposition to her international relationships and obligations in respect of both the United Nations Charter and the Warsaw Treaty, and in respect of the declarations she reached with the fraternal parties at Bucharest and Karlsbad, then it naturally behaves the governments of both Communist and non-Communist states to ask the following question in the future: are the basic concepts of international law as they affect the Soviet Union now to be declared unilaterally null and void? On the other hand, the Government of the Soviet Union must be fully aware that it is now endangering its own credibility, since its treaty partners are being faced with the sheer necessity of checking the validity of a treaty in the light of Soviet interpretation of Marxist-Leninist teaching. And likewise, the credibility of Soviet loyalty to treaty obligations is endangered, as is belief in the political declarations of the Soviet Union.

Whoever wants to come to some form of conclusion about the workings of the new doctrine to

date has at his disposal the following possible interpretations of Soviet policy.

1. A simple attempt to find an ideological justification for the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
2. A threat of intervention against members of the Warsaw Pact in the event of a 'liberalization', or other alteration of internal relationships in the power structure which do not meet with Moscow's approval.
3. A threat of intervention against a member of the Warsaw Pact in the event of the appearance of a foreign policy contrary to Moscow's wishes: this need not involve an eventual break-away from the Soviet system of alliances - for example, a policy that moved away even partially from the Soviet Union's package of demands to the Federal German Republic, including a declaration of the entire invalidity of the Munich agreement, recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, recognition of the DDR (German Democratic Republic), recognition of West Berlin as an independent political unit and renunciation of atomic weapons.
4. Justification being taken for granted for any future intervention against Communist states which are not members of the Warsaw Pact. There is no way of knowing whether Albania, Yugoslavia or China or Mongolia, etc., are excluded from this theory.
5. The threat of intervention against non-Communist states with justification being taken for granted. The assertion of a general socialist international law on a basis of class allegiance offers an ideological basis for unlimited intervention against every state in the world. If, in the estimate of the Soviet leadership, there was no chance of effective resistance, such expansion could take place at any time under the camouflage of the class struggle.

Implications of the doctrine

Herbert Wehner (Deputy Chairman of the SPD and Federal Minister of All-German Affairs), speaking in the Bundestag on 18 October 1968, made the pregnant observation that any countries seeking to maintain or build up relationships with states under Soviet control ran the risk, under the Soviet Union's special concept of law, of being branded as enemies of peace.

The Brezhnev Doctrine equally applies to the

DDR, whose leaders have given it their support. It also, by implication, constitutes a threat to the German Federal Republic in so far as the latter attempts to reach treaty arrangements with the DDR on a 'live and let live' basis, or with other Communist states.

Admittedly, there have been previous threats of Soviet intervention against non-Communists states. These were sometimes specifically directed against individual states, as for instance against England on the occasion of the Suez crisis and against the German Federal Republic on many other occasions. Sometimes these threats were of a more general nature and did not specify particular states. So far, the new doctrine does not present the West with anything that is categorically new in its content. All the same, it is made clear that the phase of Soviet foreign policy which was accented in favour of co-existence has given way to a phase where the emphasis is placed on hegemony. General co-existence is now restricted to co-existence between hegemony powers.

From the strategic standpoint of the defence of the West, it would be wrong to assume that here is a case of development towards a new or higher aggressiveness. Soviet foreign policy was always characterized by a potential tendency to expansion. This characteristic is of the essence of Soviet Communism – quite apart from its 'Great Russia' overtones. The necessity, therefore, remains to offer the Soviet urge to expand no gap or opening: both before and after the Brezhnev Doctrine, this is the key strategic task of the western alliance. For the extent of the success of Moscow's potential expansionism depends, now as before, on the question of concrete power relationships and correct or incorrect estimating of them in both East and West.

The most far-reaching significance of the Brezhnev Doctrine is for those states which are *not* protected from Soviet claims to hegemony by the counter-balance between East and West. Many people till now could contemplate an armed conflict between the Soviet Union and China, but for the first time there arises the real and earnest possibility, as a result of the Brezhnev Doctrine, of a war between European Communist states. And not only in the judgment of the West.

The most important factual result of the Brezhnev Doctrine is that people in the capitals of Eastern Europe must now take into account such an attitude on the part of their 'friends'.

Every Communist leader in Eastern Europe is urged to the greatest care and circumspection in dealings with Moscow, and the last months have confirmed this in the attitude adopted by Bucharest and Belgrade. The will to an independent foreign policy, whose course is determined by national interest, has accordingly and in considerable measure been psychologically undermined.

Fear of a Western attack has diminished in the Eastern European states because of the nuclear stalemate, but in its stead has arisen fear of the Kremlin. Moreover, the Czechoslovak crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine have highlighted the importance of conventional armed forces in an epoch of continuing nuclear stalemate between the world powers.

After 1960 the nuclear stalemate seemed to offer a chance for a general political polycentrism and for an extension of a general ideology of co-existence. Within the confines of Soviet power, Moscow now seeks to do away with this polycentrism. The question is by no means settled now extensively and for how long she will succeed. The answer depends, too, on the outcome of discussions in inner Soviet councils on the new ideology of international law, although even the fact of these discussions is being flatly denied, though their most brutal formulation is seen in the justification of coming intervention against 'peaceful counter-revolutionaries'. The answer also depends on the degree of unscrupulousness the Soviet leadership is willing to employ in directing the weight of its power against its own comrades. This in turn depends amongst other things on the will and ability of the West to cooperate in its eastern policy. Expressed in negative terms, the smaller the unity achieved in the West's Eastern policy, the greater are Moscow's chances to achieve its hegemony in the East by the use of force.

The lesson should be clear for De Gaulle as well. His intransigent European and Russian policy only serves to strengthen Brezhnev's hand and it will be an irony of history if it is through France's help that the reality of the Yalta agreements is prolonged even more. The Brezhnev Doctrine also tempts Washington to play a similar dominating role in the West, although it does not seem that the Nixon Administration will fall victim of such temptations. But there is a psychological climate in the United States that urges a

reduction in the number of American conventional forces in Europe. This would endanger Western security on a line from Berlin to the Eastern Mediterranean.

Consequences for West Germany

The new situation is no less complicated for the German Federal Republic. Moscow has imposed very narrow and clear limits on our bilateral reduction of tension and understanding with the states of Eastern Europe. We cannot exceed these limits because the partners in the Warsaw Pact are no longer permitted to be prepared to meet us half-way, and because Moscow can exploit the isolated position of Berlin to exert pressure against us in a thousand ways. An attempt to reach a bilateral agreement with Moscow alone would not only be seen to harm the autonomy of the Eastern European states, it would also further embroil us in the whole question of the recognition of the Brezhnev Doctrine, with all its direful consequences for the divided German nation.

Our desire for a reduction of tension remains unweakened, but we must recognize that the chances are not as favourable as at the time of the Bucharest and Karlsbad Declarations.

Western Europe needs political unity – not under the leadership of the United States but in partnership with her. Only on such a basis can the counterbalance in Europe be maintained, and this without delivering our continent in two halves to the antagonistic hegemony of two super-states. Only on such a basis can the West European states and peoples offer their East European neighbours and contemporaries possibilities for economic co-operation and support, which they so badly need if they are to increase their area of self-determination. Only on this basis can we dare think of Europe and Germany in process of growing together again.

But if the lack of direction in the West should persist, if De Gaulle's separatism, Britain's isolation, the Common Market standstill, the leaderlessness of the United States typical of the Johnson era – if these are not overcome, then the Soviet Union's strategy, which hitherto has been one of conservatism and consolidation, will revert back to an expansionist strategy. The ideological groundwork has been prepared in the Brezhnev Doctrine. It is therefore up to Western Europe to take the reins of fate in its own hands.

The USSR looks West

WILLIAM PARKER

The New Scientist

The border disputes between the Soviet Union and China are attracting widespread attention but the article below suggests that they coincide with a shift of the main centres of Soviet industrial development from East to West. The new emphasis could point to closer trade and technological links with Western Europe. The author is a lecturer in the Geography of the USSR at the University of Oxford.

New Scientist (London). 21 August 1969. Reproduced by permission.

Russians have long regarded the geographical position of their country in two ways. There have been those who have seen her as part of Europe. Although handicapped by being the easternmost state of the continent and therefore having the most difficult access to the oceans and sea commerce, she still had to strive to overcome this difficulty and take her place alongside the other European states as a maritime and commercial power. But to others she is the state in possession of the great interior heartland of the Eurasian land mass. She's a world apart, immensely rich in resources of all kinds. And it is her destiny to exploit these, despite the formidable array of physical obstacles. Signs of conflict between these two views, one outward- and the other inward-looking, are present today as they have been for centuries past.

The Tsars inevitably took an Eastern European or outward-looking viewpoint. Even had they had the ambition, they did not possess the technical means for overcoming the immense distances, the severe winters, the iron-hard permafrost, the wide-spread swamps, the arid deserts, the extensive mountainous regions characteristic of the Asian parts of their empire. Instead they struggled for access to the surrounding seas, only to discover that these were either ice-blocked for much of the year or land-locked, with passage through them controlled by suspiciously hostile powers. In war, they found themselves embarrassed and sometimes brought to their knees by denial of the overseas commerce on which they had come to depend. Russia seemed doomed to humiliating technological and economic backwardness, to political and military weakness, fated for ever to accept a back seat among the nations.

Marxism appealed to many thinking Russians because it offered hope of an escape from this dilemma. It offered the promise that natural obstacles could be overcome through social organization. Given courage and enthusiasm by this belief, the Soviets rejected for a time Europe and the oceans. Instead they turned their attention to the East and resolved to base a new economic and political independence upon the resources of the 'eastern regions' – the Urals, Siberia, Central Asia. Using modern technology and by dint of immense human suffering and toil, they attacked and overcame the 'anti-resources' which had hitherto barred the way to development of the resources. Great new industrial and urbanized areas were created, unique in that they were a thousand miles and more from the sea and independent of world commerce. Indicative of the results of the new policy is the contrasting history of inland and seaport towns. Thus the population of the Siberian city of Novosibirsk rose from 120,000 in 1926 to 886,000 in 1959, and its rank among Soviet centres – although over 2,000 miles from navigable sea – improved from 24th to eighth. During the same period the seaport of Odessa increased from 421,000 to only 667,000, falling in rank from fifth to 14th. One important result of this development of the eastern regions was that it enabled the Soviet Union to survive the loss of much western territory in the German onslaught of 1941–42.

The 1960s, however, have witnessed some significant changes in this outlook, in particular in the policy of industrial location. It is now in the western rather than the eastern regions that most new industrial development is taking place. For the first time in the Soviet period the

proportion of many important industrial products coming from the eastern regions is beginning to

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE OF OUTPUT FROM THE EASTERN REGIONS

(*Narodnoye Khozyaystvo*, 1967, p. 202-6)

	1940	1950	1965	1967
a Pig iron	28.5	47.4	38.3	38.1
Fertilizer	31.5	41.1	33.5	31.2
Machine tools	1.6	6.2	5.2	5.0
Synthetic fibre	0.0	3.7	21.0	17.2
b Coal	35.9	47.0	50.0	50.7
Petroleum	11.5	29.8	28.9	31.5
Natural gas	1.0	12.3	17.9	25.1

fall (see Table 1a). The White Russian Republic - Belorussia - relatively neglected before the 1960s, but occupying a strategic position between the highly industrialized areas of Moscow and Leningrad on the one hand and the countries of Eastern Europe on the other, is now one of the most rapidly advancing parts of the country. With under 4 per cent of the national population, it is receiving over 10 per cent of the major industrial enterprises being built under the present 1966-70 five year plan. Its capital, Minsk, is now the fastest-growing large city in the Soviet Union, with a phenomenal increase in population from 509,000 in 1959 to 818,000 in 1968.

Other population data confirm the change in emphasis as between east and west: during the 1939-59 intercensal period, 17 of the 30 towns to make the largest absolute increase in population were in the eastern regions, but in the 1959-68 period the figure was only eight out of 30. Of the 20 towns with the fastest rate of growth in 1939-59, 13 were in the east, but in 1959-68 the proportion was only seven out of 20.

The reasons for preferring industrial location in the western regions are several. Increased cost-consciousness causes the authorities to look with much greater circumspection at difficult projects which would formerly have been hailed as 'triumphs of Soviet Man over nature'. Most Soviet development is very expensive. Natural obstacles can be overcome by using modern technology, but only at a price, a price that has to be paid either by sacrificing other projects or by a lower standard of living. The deep-seated reluctance of Russians to go into the eastern regions to live and work is even more difficult to overcome than the physical 'anti-resources'; and the incen-

tives needed to persuade migrants add still further to costs. Stalin's methods of compulsion, though workable in the earlier and cruder stages of an industrial revolution, could not be successfully applied to the skills increasingly required by modern technological progress.

Before the 1950s the Soviet Union appeared to lack sufficient petroleum and it looked as though the country would have to base its industrialization upon coal. Owing to the difficulties of moving large quantities of coal long distances without benefit of water transport, and because 93 per cent of the reserves lie in the east, the case for locating industrial areas there was a strong one. During the last two decades, however, geological prospecting has revealed enormous reserves of oil and gas, and although the largest deposits of these are also in the east, their output can be brought westwards relatively cheaply by pipeline.

With consumer goods making up a rising share of industrial production, proximity to the great western population centres is of increasing importance as a locational factor. And it is in the densely populated agricultural regions of the west that the greatest reserve of labour for industry lies.

The strained relations with China, breaking out at times into armed border conflict, are hardly likely to encourage increased investment in the Far East. Soviet doubts about the economic wisdom or practicality of further large-scale Russian development in that region are further illustrated by the protracted negotiations that have been going on with Japan. It appears that the USSR is prepared to allow Japan to assist in opening up the rich mineral resources of eastern Siberia.

This is not to say that the development of Siberia is being abandoned, but rather that development is proceeding with more of an eye to its cost in scarce capital and labour resources. Basic commodities essential for Soviet economic growth continue to be vigorously exploited. The West Siberian oilfield, the Lower Ob and Central Asian gasfields - all discoveries of the 1960s - are rapidly expanding their output, despite the difficulties of working in mosquito-ridden swamp, in Arctic tundra and in arid desert. Thus, although the share of the eastern regions in industrial output, after dramatic increases throughout the Soviet period, has begun to decline relative to that of the west, their output of basic fuels and raw materials continues to grow (see Table 1b).

Electricity is the one resource which is continuing to attract large-scale industry to Siberia. East Siberia will soon have the three largest-capacity hydro-electric power stations in the world with the completion of the installations at Krasnoyarsk (6,000 MW) and Ust Ilim (4,500 MW); that at Bratsk (4,500 MW), was completed in 1965. Thermal stations of larger capacity are being built on coal and lignite fields in Kazakhstan and Siberia. These power stations are becoming industrial centres with aluminium smelters, saw-milling and pulp and paper mills built around them. But even electricity will increasingly travel westwards as these new giant stations are attached to an all-Union grid by transmission lines of such high voltage as to make long-distance transport of current feasible and economic. During the present five year plan (1966-70), steel-aluminium 1.5 million volt d.c. transmission lines between 1,250 and 1,500 miles long will link Siberia and Kazakhstan with the Urals and the west.

The role cast for the eastern regions has, in effect, been transformed from that of receiving large, new, densely populated, integrated industrial areas, based on the exploitation of local resources, to that of producing these resources for trans-shipment, not only to the western regions of the USSR but, increasingly, to other parts of the world. The growing network of railways, oil and gas pipelines and electricity transmission lines not only makes it easier to bring the resources of the Soviet eastern regions westwards, but also increases their availability for other countries. Many of these are islands and peninsulas along the margins of the Soviet heartland. Traditionally they have looked outwards to each other across the oceans over which they have traded, their backs to the great continental interior, glancing over their shoulders only in fear or suspicion. But as development of Soviet resources leads from abundance to superabundance, these peripheral states are beginning to look inwards. Already Soviet natural gas flows through the *Bratsvo* ('Brotherhood') pipeline, not only to Czechoslovakia, but on to Austria. Its extension into Italy has been agreed and further links with France and West Germany are possible. Meanwhile, on the Pacific side, Japan shows keen interest in the acquisition of Soviet minerals.

These growing exports are enabling the Soviet

Union to become once again an important trading nation, without sacrificing the hard-won autarchy achieved with the development of the eastern regions. Table 2 shows how rapidly Soviet trade has grown, more than doubling in the ten years 1958-67, while the amount transacted with capitalist countries has expanded even faster. During the same period the tonnage of her merchant fleet has risen from under 3 million gross tons to 10.6 million, and her world rank as a shipping power from 12th to sixth.

TABLE 2. TRADE OF THE USSR
(*Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR*, 1967, p. 10
and 1963, p. 10)

	Total trade (millions of roubles)	Percentage with capitalist countries
1958	7,782.4	25.9
1967	16,366.6	32.2

The form of things to come may perhaps be deduced from a brief look at the pattern of Russia's trade with Japan, especially as that country is both the most rapidly advancing capitalist state and the one with which Soviet trade is expanding fastest. In 1967 Japan imported from the USSR goods to the value of 318 million roubles (compared with only 17.9 million in 1958), the main commodities being wood and pulp products (27 per cent), raw cotton (12 per cent), pig iron (11 per cent), oil and oil products (10 per cent), coal (7 per cent) and non-ferrous metals (7 per cent). Soviet imports - much less at 149 million roubles - were mainly machinery and industrial equipment, textiles and clothing. With the United Kingdom a rather similar pattern is observed.

Growing trade of this nature does nothing to harm Soviet self-sufficiency, but it does enable it, through imports of machinery and machine tools, to speed up its own industrial progress and, through the import of consumer goods, to raise the standard of living. Thus it may be concluded that the USSR has gone some way towards resolving the dilemma of its geographical position, and is beginning to get the best rather than the worst of both worlds - the interior world of the developing continental heartland and the exterior world of ocean-linked trading nations.

Israel and the NPT

GEORGE H. QUESTER

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

In last month's issue an article dealt with Japan and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Here is a detailed appraisal of the position of another near-nuclear nation whose decision is of particular significance, written by a specialist in this field, on the staff of the Harvard University Center for International Affairs.

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Among nations resisting the great powers by declining to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Israel is remarkable for its relative indifference to the substance of the treaty itself. In the second year after victory in the six-day war, the acquisition of nuclear weapons, or renunciation of acquisition, does not hold the attention of many Israelis; there are more immediate, more serious problems.

The 1967 conquests produced boundaries easily defended against conventional attack, but perhaps less secure against random terrorism. No tendency towards recognition of Israel has emerged in any of the Arab states, and the obvious loss of territory may have left Jordan, Egypt and Syria incapable of resisting extremists or of contemplating more moderate approaches. Soviet moral and material support for the Arab states has not decreased, while a French embargo has forced Israel to turn to the United States as its major arms supplier.

The atmosphere thus precludes many of the supposed advantages of NPT. The mutual renunciation of nuclear weapons will not induce waves of political good feeling that multiply out into real *détente* for the Middle East. Distrust is already at such high levels that either side would from the first assume no good faith from the other. If so, Israel may well see some marginal advantages to withholding signature, outweighing any marginal losses.

It is possible that the United States will come to care enough for NPT to be willing to offer substantial assistance and support in exchange for Israel's signature. Through the long delay on the American sale of 50 *Phantom* jet fighter-bombers

to Israel, it was rumoured that Israeli signature of NPT could have accelerated the American arms transfer. In the event, the aircraft were promised without an Israeli acceptance of NPT, but this may simply show that the treaty should be held in reserve to be traded for still larger parcels of assistance. Yet the new Nixon Administration seems inclined to attach less significance to NPT and more to Arab feelings, which might make any substantial aid offers less likely in the future.

There have also been rumours that Israel will demand the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR, one of the depositories for NPT, as the price of signature. A Soviet embassy in Tel Aviv, coming after the rupture of relations during the 1967 war, would once again affirm Israel's right to exist, and would thus take some steam out of more extreme Arab positions.

Aside from such great-power concessions, many officials see a marginal value in staying out of NPT, if speculation about Israel's nuclear potential will psychologically intimidate the Arab states. The theories of strategic psychology propounded here are quite different from those used by Americans to describe their balance of terror with the USSR. Israelis are not so directly concerned with carrot-and-stick games of encouraging the Arabs to do this, deterring them from that. Signing NPT in order to get Arab states to sign has no logical appeal. There is also little speculation that if Israel had nuclear weapons she could decisively deter Arab attacks. Rather than attributing a rational calculus of costs and gains to their Arab adversaries, Israeli planners impute a more visceral sense of power and weakness. By refusing to sign NPT, therefore,

while for the moment not making any bombs, Israelis do not guide the Arabs, but rather hope to cow them with a vague sense of power, a sense which can be furthered by periodic rumours of bomb projects. Arab propaganda inevitably assists in this purpose by claiming that Israel is already manufacturing nuclear weapons: if enough Arabs come to believe this, it might be gratuitous to dispel their illusions.

It is difficult to get Israelis to take seriously any of the reciprocal advantages of NPT. The Arab states are rated as being incapable of manufacturing their own atomic bombs at any foreseeable time. This is perhaps premature. The United Arab Republic does have a plan for a 150 megawatt power reactor near Alexandria: a plutonium source sufficient for 30 atomic bombs a year. The project would require Soviet or other outside assistance which is not yet assured. The threat of such an Arab counter-population weapon is moreover already vitiated by the existence of certain functional equivalents. Israel is the one nuclear-capable country whose home cities are already subject to international violence. If *El Fatah* can set off a TNT-bomb in a Tel Aviv bus terminal, who will worry about an Egyptian atomic bomb 15 years from now? The Egyptian use of poison gas in Yemen, with rumours of plans for such use against Israel in the 1967 war, adds another counter-population weapon which might kill Israeli civilians at rates comparable to nuclear weapons. Delivery systems are no problem in the Middle East, because the striking distances are so short. Precisely because of this, 'strategic' scenarios are so immediate that future ones lose their interest.

Israeli objections

There are some additional Israeli objections to NPT which may resemble those of other non-signers. The imposition of safeguards is expected to be a nuisance for any nuclear research and energy programme, as valuable time would be wasted in answering inspectors' questions, in proving that fissionable materials had not been diverted. For reasons real or imagined, the Israeli Government feels a special aversion to the International Atomic Energy Agency. By the regional structuring of the election process, it is almost impossible for Israel to get a seat on the IAEA Board of Governors. Similarly, no Israeli nationals at present are employed as IAEA in-

spectors. If the personnel and procedures of the Vienna organization were thus to be biased, the inspection process could easily enough be used to make trouble. Voting in the UN General Assembly these days shows greater sympathy for the Arab states. If the nationals of these neutral European and Afro-Asian states were similarly biased when serving with IAEA, they could generate unwonted charges of military activity or require unjustified shut-downs of some facility, merely as part of a policy of harassment.

Commercial espionage is of course a possibility for the longer run. For the short term, military espionage would also be a great threat, as the tactical and strategic situations again become intermeshed. An inspection of Dimona might ensure that Israel was not manufacturing plutonium bombs, yet details obtained in such an inspection might also aid an Arab air force planning a conventional reprisal attack, with the intention simply of polluting part of Israel with radioactive debris. The deployment of some of Israel's American-supplied *Hawk* anti-aircraft missiles around Dimona does not therefore prove that the facility will be used to produce weapons. Even under present circumstances it can be a target for Arab weapons.

Israel might be more willing to undergo inspection only by American officials under an NPT, but this is ruled out by the current treaty draft. There has moreover been a general aversion even to American inspection of the reactor at Dimona. American visits, when tolerated, are kept quiet, never to be dignified with the legal status of 'inspection'. The independence of the Israeli regime here reflects more than nationalistic objections of a parliamentary opposition, for the policy of 'keeping the Arabs guessing' is still in effect. Americans probably try to relay assurances to Cairo on the basis of what they have seen, reassurances that Israel is not making a bomb. As long as explicit American or IAEA inspections are not allowed, however, Arab propaganda will probably muddy intelligence channels enough to preclude full acceptance of such assurances. This is exactly what the Israelis want.

Violation possibilities

Had the NPT been written without an inspection clause, an Israeli signature might indeed have been more likely, but this may simply show once and for all the need for the safeguards of Article III,

even if it proves to be a nuisance in other parts of the world. Israel and the Arab states have an unhappy history of violated agreements, and it is clearly unlikely that a pledge of this sort would decisively preclude any state in the Middle East from making weapons. When one's national existence is at stake, treaties can be ignored, or can be signed in a relatively carefree manner.

Following suit

Under such circumstances, it can readily be seen that some other arguments for NPT carry no weight at all in Israel. Israel's non-adherence to the treaty clearly makes it easier for some other states not to sign. Aside from Arab states which may implicitly make their ratification contingent on Israel's adherence to the treaty, countries with more significant nuclear establishments can count on not being out in the cold alone as long as Israel stays out. Yet no one in Israel really broods about their contribution to India's retaining and some day exploiting a nuclear weapons option. This is true also of Japan or Brazil. Even the 'threat' of West Germany, which for historical reasons might easily rouse great concern within Israel, does not make NPT attractive. The idea that West Germany is somehow counting on Israel to make its own non-adherence to NPT less noticeable and unpalatable has not been widely circulated within Israel, and when circulated brings little response. Within knowledgeable government circles, the connection is complicated in that a leading German opponent of NPT is Franz Joseph Strauss, who was important in clandestinely channeling West German arms aid to Israel in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a 'friend' therefore.

All the Arab states except Algeria and Saudi Arabia signed NPT on the very day it was opened to signature, but none as yet has ratified. Israel professes not to care. The Arab states cannot explicitly make their signature or ratification conditional on Israel's, for to do so might hint at a recognition of a political entity by that name. It is nonetheless possible that the rush to sign NPT reflected a sincere concern that Israel should be pressured to sign, that Israeli nuclear weapons will otherwise come into existence. Alternatively, it may have reflected a more simple prediction that Israel would not sign up, so that Arab signature would look comparatively good in the eyes of the world. Finally, the rush to sign may have shown

the Arab dependence on Soviet arms aid, and the high priority the USSR now attaches to NPT.

Preparations afoot?

There is little doubt that Israel possesses the resources and expertise necessary for nuclear explosives. One can thus say (as with ten or more other countries) that Israel is 'making preparations' for the manufacture of atomic weapons. Lest this somewhat truistic statement be taken to mean too much, however, it must be noted that no large reactors yet have been constructed, and no noticeable plutonium enrichment plant. After some years of French assistance, the Israeli programme includes a reactor at Dimona which can produce five to seven megawatts of electrical power, or five to seven kilograms of plutonium (about enough for one bomb) a year.

There apparently are no French safeguards to assure peaceful use of the materials produced. Israel is now approaching self-sufficiency in nuclear technology, perhaps capable of undertaking the construction of larger power reactors and of separation plants for reprocessing plutonium, as well as more advanced projects. The assembly of fissionable materials into weapons is not beyond Israeli competence either, allowing a relatively small period to complete the basic research. It is only in the supply of uranium that Israel might remain for some time dependent on outside sources, although enough such material might yet be extracted from phosphates to support the Dimona reactor. Yet other nations with sizable uranium deposits may also remain outside the NPT system, especially South Africa, a country experiencing ostracism by many of the same states as Israel.

If Israel thus has marginal reasons to reject NPT, perhaps she should on similar considerations contemplate making nuclear weapons. A fuller discussion of nuclear options and scenarios has been inhibited in Israel until recently by censorship on grounds of military secrecy. However seriously military staff officers have contemplated these questions, they have not yet reached the intelligent lay reader. Israeli politics also have not polarized around nuclear weapons issues. The conflict attributed to the late Prime Minister Eshkol and Defence Minister Dayan concerned personality and generational differences more than concrete or ideological divergences of policy. At any rate, it would have been

difficult to label either faction as more pro-bomb or pro-NPT.

One can abstractly conjure-up a number of scenarios in which Israeli nuclear weapons might make a significant difference. The classic Israeli fear used to be of an Arab conventional armoured attack that succeeded, sweeping down on Tel Aviv and Haifa to push the Israelis into the sea. This also has often seemed to be the Arab dream. The Israeli expansion of 1967 may have made such an eventuality seem less likely, but one can still speculate about it, if 40 million Arabs ever become as technically and militarily competent *per capita* as two or three million Israelis. To remove the Israeli nightmare – or Arab dream – one might add a small nuclear retaliatory force, perhaps based on submarines in the Mediterranean, capable of destroying five or six Arab cities and the Aswan Dam. Would this not force the Arabs once and for all to give up hopes of driving Israel into the sea? Wouldn't it mean that the Arabs could never exploit any battlefield victory they might ever win, for fear of the intolerable last-gasp retaliation the Israeli nuclear force would inflict?

Financial costs *per se* are far from decisive as an obstacle. Israel's defence budget, despite the victory of 1967, has had to rise from \$447 million to some \$628 million per year. By comparison the annual costs of a modest plutonium bomb programme, capable of producing some ten Nagasaki-sized bombs per year, have been estimated in UN Secretary-General Thant's 1968 report as about \$19 million. Even the current Dimona reactor has been producing enough plutonium for one bomb a year. Six bombs produced over six years might not be an insignificant stockpile for the Middle East.

Yet for the moment Arab victories in a tank battle are not so imminent, and Israeli forces can probably make a mess of Cairo, Damascus, Amman or Beirut with the conventional weapons already in their possession. Just as there is no hinterland in Israel safe from *El Fatah's* 'strategic' attack, so also there is no safe interior in the Arab states adjacent to Israel. One can speculate about whether conventional bombs would be sufficient to destroy the Aswan Dam, or on whether Israeli tanks could reach Cairo or Damascus as readily today as they might have in 1967. For the moment the non-nuclear retaliation available to Israel is still likely to be massive enough to deter an all-out Arab attack.

Technological avenues

The spectacular victory of 1967 can be interpreted in conflicting ways. At first, Israelis saw it as once again displaying the superior military prowess of their soldiers, suggesting no need to change the rules of the game. After some days, details emerged on the Israeli pre-emptive air strike which established absolute air superiority from the very beginning of the ground campaign, suggesting that the victory was more heavily dependent on a full and fortuitous exploitation of technology, possibly implying that Israeli victories in the future will depend on every technological avenue (even the nuclear?) being explored. More sober analyses however show that Israel would have won the 1967 war in any event, even had the initial air strikes not succeeded, but at a slower pace with higher casualties.

If the immediate requirement for nuclear weapons is not overwhelming, there are some serious arguments against Israel acquiring them. The alienation of the United States is clearly an important consideration, perhaps the most important. It will be one thing for Israel to refuse to sign NPT, another to violate it. Such a move would shock and immobilize the American Jewish community and generally antagonize much other pro-Israeli opinion in America, as well as in Britain and Europe. No one can definitively predict the US Government reaction. If an American administration were at all anxious to disengage from commitments to Israel, opposition to nuclear weapons production might uniquely enable it to do so. If it conversely chose to remain responsible for peace in the Middle East, the United States might nonetheless decide that such nuclear activity required severe retaliation, as with a freezing of American private monetary transfers to Israel, perhaps until Israel cancelled all weapons programmes and submitted completely to an IAEA inspection guaranteeing no resumption. If Israel were forced to submit in such a case, it would be worse off than when it began.

Apart from American reactions, Israel, by acquiring nuclear weapons, would in effect be changing the game when she had been winning under the old rules. For the present, Israel will continue to experiment with measured escalations of conflict intended to inhibit the Arab governments from conducting terrorist operations. Such escalations may become less easy

when the threat of 'nuclear war' has entered into the calculations of all concerned. The daring of other nuclear powers has not been enhanced by such weapons.

Unpleasant prospect

Finally, there is the Soviet Union. It is clear that active participation of Russian armed forces in Middle East hostilities would make the Israeli task vastly more difficult, although not impossible. It is plausible that Israeli nuclear weapons would force the Russians to commit combat personnel to Syria and the UAR, along with a greater naval and air presence. It is also possible that fears of Israel going nuclear would deter the Russians from this much of a commitment. Undeployed Russian troops and unmanufactured Israeli bombs may thus deter each other.

Israelis are generally reluctant to speculate about wars in which they would have to fight Soviet forces also. It is further off than the time horizon normally extends, and too unpleasant to attract much contemplation. If a confrontation with the USSR were already inevitable, then Israeli nuclear weapons might make more sense. Ability to destroy as much of Russia as the French *force de frappe* might decisively deter the Russians from hitting Tel Aviv with nuclear weapons, or from opening the Arab road to Tel Aviv with Soviet armoured brigades. Yet an Israeli Moscow-oriented striking force is a much grander project than a few plutonium bombs carried by helicopter to the Aswan Dam. The costs are too high, the scenarios too unpleasant, for Israelis to ponder with relish.

The pledges of various countries involved in the Middle East dispute will be of some significance. When America and the USSR have themselves ratified NPT, they will stand committed not to give nuclear weapons to any other state. Hence, after Russian ratification, the USSR will be bound to deny the UAR nuclear weapons regardless of whether Israel acquires them. Communist China, the only other plausible source of nuclear weapons open to Egypt, will not sign NPT, but may also not be so willing to give weapons away. Yet the USSR and the United States stand informally committed to assisting any NPT-signatory against threats from any nuclear-weapon state. Hence Israeli nuclear weapons clearly can increase some kinds of Soviet commitment to the UAR.

Israel's former premier stated his nation will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. The pledge leaves some ambiguities which hardly renounce all Israeli bomb programmes, since nuclear weapons have already been introduced into the Middle East, on board ships of the American Sixth Fleet, and very possibly on board Soviet ships in the Mediterranean. There is nothing in NPT to preclude this, or even to preclude the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons ashore in Egypt, as long as they are not placed under non-Russian control. Here the Israelis are correct in their statements that NPT settles nothing for the Middle East. Similarly an Israeli decision to produce nuclear weapons would settle nothing, but rather open wider the range of possible Soviet involvement on the Arab side. Situations may arise where Israel can examine the prospect of nuclear weapons without considering the USSR. For the moment, a deterrent which extends only to Arab population centres may be either redundant or insufficient.

A Fragile balance

Between the USSR and Israel, therefore, either side can upset the balance on nuclear weapons. If Israel is tempted to announce itself as the sixth member of the nuclear club, the USSR may have to match this somehow. If the USSR decides to brandish its own nuclear weapons in any fashion, either by rocket-rattling from Russia itself, or by deploying visible nuclears forward to the Mediterranean or Egypt, the Israeli public may well look seriously at its nuclear weapons option.

For the present, an Israeli decision for bombs would come very quietly if it came at all, with no public clamour for it. Yet this may also change, for it is possible that disillusionment may set in with the results of the 1967 war, and with the payoffs of conventional military prowess in general. If Israel must look forward to a war every ten years, a war which in no way terminates Arab hostility but only defers military exchanges for a time, then the prospect of an alternative solution may become attractive. If this disillusionment were conjoined with a sense of abandonment by the United States and Israel's other friends, nuclear weapons may be turned to as a panicky reinsurance measure.

For the moment Israel remains engrossed with the aftermath of 1967. *El Fatah* has been neither totally managed nor proven unmanageable.

Debates rage on how much of the occupied land to annex *de facto* how much *de jure*, how much economic integration to attempt, etc. All these issues for the moment seem much more important to Israelis than either NPT or the *status quo* on Israeli nuclear weapons. Yet by the time Israeli priorities change, this may also have changed.

It is one thing for a country like Israel to postpone an explicit decision to manufacture and demonstrate the possession of nuclear weapons; it is another to halt scientific progress which inevitably draws the nation closer to weapons. Several steps can be taken in the next six years to bring such weapons within months or weeks of any decision to acquire them, steps which may be entirely justifiable in terms only of civilian benefits. Newer and larger reactors may come into use for the production of electrical power, incidentally producing larger flows of plutonium. Plutonium separation plants may then become advisable for the processing of such material for re-use as reactor fuel. Still further along, an investment in an enrichment plant for uranium might become advisable. Either plutonium or enriched uranium can be adapted for use in nuclear explosives.

Desalination and plutonium

One might question whether Israel will really have the electrical power consumption required to justify large power reactors. The answer would be negative but for the option of electrical desalination of sea water, offering options of fresh water for all the Middle East. If such projects are undertaken nationally, large quantities of plutonium may be generated capable of conversion into 50 or 100 bombs a year. For the moment American co-operation may be required in the research on desalination processes, i.e. on how one uses the electricity generated by reactors. A number of Israelis believe that the United States has deliberately been dragging its heels on such projects, for fear of precisely the above prospects.

Vague hopes for reactor-desalination projects jointly administered by Egypt and Israel hardly seem close to practicality: they might solve the arms-control problem but they would require solving almost all political problems first. Estimates differ on whether Israel really faces such an imminent water or electrical power shortage. A year of bountiful rainfall can induce optimism, a

drought the reverse. Americans suggest that Israelis are exaggerating their needs in a move towards earlier weapons options; Israelis suggest that Americans have been judging the area's agricultural needs in terms of arms control.

If Israel refuses to sign NPT, the United States will probably refuse to co-operate on the desalination projects. A claim will be made that NPT requires the United States to refuse. Yet this would appear to be quite false, if US aid would not apply to nuclear reactor projects *per se*, but rather to the use of electricity generated in such projects. The United States might be no more bound here than it is bound not to sell light bulbs to India, wherever such bulbs are illuminated by electricity from unsafeguarded Indian reactors. It is also possible that Israel might need assistance in the construction of large reactors, which more clearly comes within NPT purview.

Regardless of whether plutonium production in Israel is vastly expanded as part of a desalination project, or stays at its current lower level, a separation plant will be required before any bombs whatsoever are produced.

Eventually, and even under present circumstances, the Israeli Government will have to ask itself: 'How close is too close?' At what point are peace and the national interest better served by actually going ahead to produce some bombs, better than always being three weeks from an arsenal? A three-week time lag may be a built-in inducement to someone else's pre-emptive attack, where a 'hardened second-strike force' would not be. Staying years away from weapons, for example, by never building a plutonium separation plant, might thus constitute the most magnanimous arms-control policy. If commercial considerations (or patriotic military prudence) require the building of such a plant, however, military stability might be better served if Israel then went ahead to stockpile some bombs where Arab pre-emptive attacks could not get at them.

Yes or no

If enough American assistance, or Israel's international reputation, become conditional on an NPT signature, Israel may still sign and submit herself to inspection. Some delay will remain appropriate while others are also still haggling. The exact conditions of IAEA inspection will have to be negotiated, and in this time the degree of Soviet or American involvement in the Middle

East may also become clearer. If most other states with significant nuclear programmes sign NPT, it may also prove less easy for Israel to abstain. A great number of failures to sign or ratify, conversely, would make Israel's position look more respectable.

Until IAEA inspection begins, it will be difficult for the world to assure itself that Israel has not entered the nuclear weapons club. Yet even afterward, the task of the IAEA inspectorate will be harder in the Middle East than anywhere else. Israeli decision-makers might well consider how many of the benefits and options of the present situation would still be retained even under NPT. If installing IAEA safeguards were to remove American resistance to desalination projects, the larger quantities of plutonium circulating in Israel might still keep Arab propagandists buzzing about Israeli weapons. NPT also does not rule out nationally operated plutonium-separation plants, and Israeli signature might reduce Western alarm about such a plant. If fissionable material were thus to become available, would Israel really have lost its military nuclear option or might it instead have been enhanced? If Israel arrested and deported the IAEA representatives while seizing safeguarded material for bombs, the UN Security Council would have to consider the act, but Israel has defied the UN before.

A brazen diversion of plutonium into bombs would perhaps only occur in some crisis seriously threatening Israel's defence position. More clandestine diversions would also be possible, however, given the inherent uncertainties of IAEA inspection procedures. If a two per cent range of error is inevitable, perhaps one per cent of Israeli plutonium can be milked off for secret assembly into bombs, as reinsurance for an eventual day of need. Arab propagandists will continually be accusing the Israelis of this, as may some non-Arab IAEA inspectors friendly to the Arab cause. With this much noise in the system, the Israelis might be able to keep a clandestine programme hidden. It is far from inevitable that Israel's adherence to NPT would, paradoxically, make Israeli nuclear weapons more rather than less available. In the Middle East possibilities of this sort must be considered.

Hence it can not be certain that Israel would receive any necessary assistance on desalination plants or nuclear facilities even after she had adhered to NPT. At the least, American and other countries' will to produce this kind of aid will be one more item of discussion as the bargaining goes on. The very circumstances that would make NPT more effective may serve as one more marginal disadvantage of the treaty in the pragmatic Israeli calculus.

Book Reviews

Finnish Neutrality; A Study of Finnish Foreign Policy since the Second World War. By Max Jakobson. London: Hugh Evelyn Ltd. 1968. 116 pp. 30s.

Max Jakobson's book is his answer to a question which President John F. Kennedy asked him in 1961: Why has the Soviet Union allowed Finland to retain her independence? Jakobson, a highly placed Finnish diplomat and at the same time a brilliant writer, goes a long way to tell us why.

His book is a very skillful survey of the surprisingly short history of Finnish foreign policy. In 'old' Europe, Finland is one of the youngest states – gaining independence as late as 1917. The new nation had certain difficulties in orientating its foreign policy. Efforts orientated towards the Baltic states, the League of Nations and, in the middle 1930s, towards the three Scandinavian countries were partly abortive and temporary. Although the four Nordic nations worked together quite closely through the late 1930s, Jakobson is probably right when he points out that the Scandinavian orientation never became a decisive trait in Finnish foreign policy.

Neither have the larger Western states – the United States and Britain – played a crucial role in Finnish foreign affairs. Finland's relations with these countries have been good all along. The Americans, for example, never forget that Finland kept paying her World War I debts when all other nations defaulted. But in the vital issues of Finnish independence and national survival, their place was marginal. On that level, the core countries are Germany and Russia. Finnish national security has been and still is a product of power relationships in the Baltic area. Changes in the distribution of power in that part of Northern Europe are bound to affect Finland's freedom of action and her orientation.

The long period of Swedish predominance made Finnish interests almost identical with Sweden's. After the Napoleonic wars, Finland passed over to Russia and remained in her possession as an autonomous Grand Duchy for more than a century. The rise of German power during the First and Second World Wars made Finland gravitate towards the German orbit, until in 1944 she shared the German defeats and once again was brought within the Russian sphere of influence.

In Scandinavia, Jakobson's book is titled, *Our own ways* and it is the author's great merit that he explains how it was possible for Finland, in the great-power game, to maintain such a high degree of national independence and freedom of action. One of

his cardinal points, to which he returns repeatedly, is the fact that Finland, contrary to most other European nations, never was put to the rigours of military occupation. This is true, but few would suggest that the Soviet Union, in 1940 and 1944 when the Finnish forces were notoriously defeated, was unable to impose an occupation status on Finland – if she had wanted to do so. Why did the Russians hold back?

The theory which most Finns seem to hold is that the success of the so-called 'Paasikivi-line' has proved that the Soviet Union was not aggressive and expansive, as she was pictured in the West during the 1940s and 1950s. The rather rough way the Russians have dealt with their neighbour states in Eastern Europe modifies this statement. There is, however, much substance to the author's point regarding the Finnish tradition of resistance. Although overwhelmed by the mass of Soviet military might, the Finns have never appeared particularly impressed by the individual Russian performance in the field. Finnish resistance-reputation upped the ante, but if the Russian needs were high enough, the restraints would probably have been overcome. In relation to other Russian goals, taking direct and full military control over Finland ranked too low on the Russian priority list and did not justify the calculable costs.

Jakobson deals with this issue somewhat implicitly. One might stress the point that with the defeat of the German and Finnish armies in Finland, and the subsequent arrangements with the Finnish Government, the Soviet Union had reached her strategic goals in that area. After the war the major military assets in Finland became the transit facilities for westward operations on the Scandinavian peninsula. As such a contingency then seemed improbable, there was no need for a direct Soviet control. Rather, with the rapid changes in military technology, Finland's strategic significance continued to decrease so sharply that in 1955 the Russians could return the occupied base Porkkala near Helsinki.

This was hardly much of a sacrifice to them, but it has played a great role in the relations between Finland and the USSR. This touches, in my view, on an essential part of the explanation for the high degree of independence which Finland enjoys and which is unique among the Soviet Union's neighbours. Since the war the main Russian objective towards Finland has been the denial of foreign influence, mainly American and German. As long as this goal is fulfilled, there is no need for drastic measures. On the contrary, the Finnish show-case of relaxed relations helps modify the general image of Soviet roughness

towards other neighbours, not the least Czechoslovakia.

An arrangement has lasting value when there is an element of mutual trust and respect. In the Finnish-Russian relationship this condition is fulfilled. Both parties have established a substantial fund of credibility. Since 1958 the Russians have demonstrated their ability and willingness to interfere in Finnish internal affairs and thereby to influence the choice of persons in the leading political positions. In 1948, Stalin's letter to the Finnish Government was written on the same day as the coup took place in Czechoslovakia. The next claim, the 1961 note, came simultaneously with the test explosion of the Soviet 50 megaton bomb. The Finns are unlikely to misread signals the way the Czechs did in 1968.

The Finns, for their part, have established a record of credibility with the Russian leaders which seems no less impressive. In 1944 Finland met the condition for a peace arrangement by overnight turning her weapons against her previous allies, the Germans, and driving them out of Finland. She did so very effectively. In the payment of war reparations and in a number of small and large issues in later years, Finland has shown the same willingness to live up to her obligations (cf. war-debt to US). She has proved that she can be trusted and that harsher Russian measures are not needed.

The point which the Finns have understood and have practised all along, is that Finnish national interests can be made compatible with the general direction of Soviet foreign policy in Northern Europe. There exist, of course, areas where they very easily could conflict, but why not rather concentrate where there is concord? The Finns seem to think that if there is a high probability of being forced when pursuing a certain policy, why not make the appropriate adjustments before difficulties develop?

It is impressive to observe the degree to which the entire Finnish nation seems to participate in their government's policy of balance between East and West. This may indicate a special trait in the Finnish people, but the Soviet 'rewards', pay-offs such as the return of Porkkala, membership in the Nordic Council and the United Nations, association with EFTA, all illustrate that the arrangement works. The Finns seem to have learnt that it pays to row with the stream rather than against it.

If the Soviet leaders felt they could face the risk of repercussions from neighbour countries in Eastern Europe, who also lost territories at Russian hands, they might reap great political benefits from a return to Finland of Viborg and other ex-Finnish territories in Karelia. These are now strategically and economically unimportant to Russia, while their loss remains a sore point with the Finnish people. Such 'rewards'

would make a deep impression and substantiate further the benefits of the present arrangement.

These points, naturally go somewhat beyond what Jakobson has expressed in his book. It should, however, be stressed that a pre-condition of this special relationship is the sense of dignity and cool realism which is a Finnish characteristic in their relations with their large neighbour. Through their difficult and turbulent history they have grown accustomed to living in the shadow of great powers. They have learned to adjust, without losing themselves and their own values.

Max Jakobson has done us a great service by spelling this out in his book. He would however, have increased its value if he had projected these policies into future situations and discussed them on the basis of some possible scenarios. It should be kept in mind that the many advantages that the Finns seem to reap today are products of a very special situation which is unlikely to become permanent. The remarkable qualities which the astute Finnish nation has demonstrated provides no panacea, and the limitations might well deserve some attention.

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The United Nations and United States Security Policy. By Ruth B. Russell. Washington, D.C., and London: The Brookings Institution and Allen & Unwin. 1968. 510 pp. \$10.00 and 95s.

It comes rarely to one author to write two books, each of which scholars regard as authoritative and indispensable. But *The United Nations and United States Security Policy* is, by any standards, a *tour de force*; and together with Ruth Russell's earlier volume (written with the assistance of the late Jeanette Muther) is essential reading for any serious student of UN questions.

Miss Russell is nothing if not thorough. No chance remark ever slips from her pen, no statement is issued unless its implications have been fully analysed. Her footnotes reveal that her evidence is drawn from a wide range of diplomatic and historical sources (though she eschews the reliance by many of her colleagues on the social sciences) and are of themselves helpful and interesting. Where others have been impressionistic, Miss Russell is precise. This volume will, inevitably, be compared with Lincoln Bloomfield's *The United Nations and US Foreign Policy* (2nd ed. Boston: Little Brown, 1967). While comparisons between two good books are traditionally invidious, it must be said that Miss Russell's is infinitely the more substantial and scholarly.

It is not that the subject matter is so different. In

spite of the difference in the two titles, Professor Bloomfield devotes a mere fifteen pages to the economic aspects of the United Nations' work. Nor is the focus so very different: in both, the main emphasis is on the United Nations rather than the United States, though both maintain a sensible balance. It is rather that they are painting with a different brush, with Miss Russell providing more detail on a larger canvas.

The subject matter is organized interestingly. After an introductory section, Miss Russell takes the reader through a series of chapters on the Charter security system, on arms control, on the limitations and alternatives to collective enforcement, on peace-keeping, on political change, on the rule of law and the use of force, and on organizational problems. In the concluding section of the book, she recalls each of these main themes and looks to the future. Particular case studies are therefore scattered. South Africa, for example, is dealt with in the chapters of collective enforcement measures, the rule of law and the control of force, and the problem of peaceful change. This is surely right – the rigid case-study approach inhibits an understanding of the full implications of political events within the United Nations.

Perhaps the most interesting sections are those which deal with United States posture in respect of UN arms control attempts (because this traces so well the history of GCD talks and collateral arrangements, and highlights the UN context where it is relevant); and with the United States Trust territories (because comparatively little is known, in Europe at least, about these, and about the interplay between Congress and the Trusteeship Council).

Inevitably, there are small points which a reviewer can make. The pages which deal with the Congo are a little thin, and the complex web of competing American interests not fully brought out. Speaking of forcible sanctions, Miss Russell writes 'In principle, none of the permanent members of the Security Council (save France) appears opposed to the possible eventual use of sanctions to force South Africa and the illegitimate Rhodesian government to conform to United Nations judgments on their policies' (p. 400). But Lord Caradon (as well as Mr Wilson) has made it clear that in neither case will Britain entertain any movement towards military sanctions. It is also arguable that the Control of Force – admirable and hardheaded though it is – is perhaps a little too traditional in approach. It could have been more profitable and subtle instead to analyse the role of law in the use of force.

But these are minor points of personal judgment and preference in an admirable volume. The shrewdness of Miss Russell's analysis throughout is exemplified by her pages on the peace-keeping impasse. Recalling, among other things, UNEF's withdrawal

from Egypt in May 1967, and the device of a non-resolution consensus to get UN observers on the Suez Canal in July 1967, she comments 'the United States might be better advised to accept the knowledge that a majority favour its general attitude and to refrain for the time from pushing for endorsement of its specific proposals' (p. 404). Like most of the appraisals offered in this book, this is not one from which reasonable men would wish to dissent.

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The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility. By Paul Ramsey. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1968. 554 pp. \$12.50.

'Moralists are unhappy people. When they insist on the immutability of moral principles they are reproached for imposing unlivable requirements on us. When they explain the way in which these immutable principles are to be put into force they are reproached for making morality relative. In both cases, however, they are only upholding the claims of reason to direct life (and, I would add, of a rational explication of Christian ethics).' Paul Ramsey aptly makes these words of Jacques Maritain his own in this collection of twenty-four essays, some of them hitherto unpublished and the rest reprints of articles, pamphlets or chapters of symposia written since 1961 when he published *War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War be Conducted Justly?* Professor of Theology in the University of Princeton, Ramsey is one of the most acute moral theologians of our time, and among Protestant moralists unique in the persistence with which he has devoted himself to detailed and specific problems of modern war. In his previous book he undertook an analysis and restatement of the traditional Christian doctrine of the Just War when many had too hastily assumed that a doctrine based essentially on discrimination and restraints had ceased to have any relevance in an age of nuclear weapons which were inherently indiscriminate. Whilst affirming that most projected uses of them are immoral, Ramsey worked out the necessity and possibility of restricting their use to counter-forces as against counter-peoples warfare. Since 1961 he has continued to pursue these themes in a way proper to Christian moralists, that is to say he has involved himself with experts in their various fields and those who actually carry responsibility for decisions. This book is the fruit of his work. Some repetition in such a large volume of essays is inevitable, but it is not excessive.

The analysis of 1961 is carried further in several

respects; in relation to the thought of the second Vatican Council, and to the practical problems of selective conscientious objection and insurgency warfare, both brought to the fore in the USA by the Vietnam war. In one matter Ramsey tells us that he has changed his mind since 1961. Then he thought there was no moral justification for retaining the sort of force which it would be immoral to use; now he thinks such a deterrent posture may be morally justified in that the ambiguity of a threat may avert a war even if in fact it would not be carried out.

The book has five sections: (1) Political Ethics, (2) The Morality of War, (3) The Morality of Deterrence, (4) The Second Vatican Council and a Just War Theory of Statecraft, (5) Vietnam and Insurgency Warfare. In it Ramsey has three main aims. The first is to protest against the American habit of alternating between an incoherent semi-pacifism when not involved in war and a narrow doctrine of military necessity when involved in it, and to show that the only way out from this is a just-war theory of statecraft. His second aim is to elaborate such a theory, involving a discussion of political authority, political community and political responsibility. Here he appeals to the Augustinian tradition in Christian thought as the common possession of most of historic Christendom. Although it is expressed with somewhat different emphases in traditional Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist and Anglican thinking, what these traditions have had in common is much greater than their differences, and in the light of it the common American assumptions against which Ramsey is protesting appear as sentimental, crude and dangerous simplifications. His third aim is to explore how political decisions in the field of foreign policy ought to be taken, with special reference to the use of power and in the end force, which must be regarded not as an exceptional feature of the political order but as the essential differentiating feature of it, so that it is of fundamental importance that power be used properly, that is to say in the interests of order and justice.

Ramsey is essentially a polemical thinker. The word is not used here in a pejorative sense, but merely to point out that he defines his thought best by dissecting that of someone else (it is immaterial whether he is mainly in agreement with it or not). This does not make his work easy reading. On the other hand it means that all his arguments are meticulously detailed so that the reader has no excuse for not defining his own thoughts by reference to them. Ramsey's own political opinions are distinctly conservative. He clearly thinks that on the whole the USA has been waging a just war justly in Vietnam. And twice he remarks without argument that no Christian (and no one who loves ordered liberty) should do anything to help a Communist government to come to power. It

must be the only generalization made without detailed analysis in the whole book. Nevertheless, he rightly insists that his particular political judgments must be distinguished from the general argument of the book, which could hold if Communism had never been heard of. Interestingly enough it ends with a criticism of the USA for its bombing raid on 10 March 1967 on the Thai Nguyen iron and steel complex thirty-eight miles from Hanoi on the grounds that it was not directly involved in the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam and the attack was therefore upon the peoples' stake in their country's future. He adds mordantly that American dissenters from the war had so exhausted themselves in indiscriminate moral protests that they never noticed when the time came to make a discriminating one.

Ramsey is particularly concerned to clarify the respective role of the churches and of what he calls the 'magistrates' in making political decisions. The former are concerned with general indications (except in extreme circumstances, as 'before the gates of Auschwitz'), the latter with detailed decisions. There are more problems here than Ramsey deals with. Indeed he gets near to the sharp separation of 'Church' and 'World' in the classical Lutheran 'Two Realms' theory which at other times he would condemn. He is a little too kind to the generalities of Vatican II, and a little too severe on the particularities of the Geneva Conference of the World Council of Churches in 1966 on 'Church and Society'. Indeed he criticises not only the conclusions but the method of the latter, holding that to call a conference of theologians and experts not to speak officially *for* the churches but *to* them is an invitation to irresponsibility. In this he is surely mistaken. Ways can be found of helping Christian people to move beyond general considerations without giving a Christian sanction to the details of specific policies. It is the way of establishing what have been called 'middle axioms'.

In general this is an exceedingly useful book. It deals with vital matters at a time when nations possessing nuclear power are tempted to make unjust wars central in their plans. It breaks new ground in the two new questions it discusses. The problem of selective conscientious objection, that is on the grounds that a particular war is unjust not on the grounds of objection to the use of force as such, is difficult in that no government could allow objection merely on the grounds of a dissenting political judgment. An individual might feel morally obliged to dissent on such grounds, but it could not be a legal right or society would not have enough cohesion to hold together. Some way of distinguishing a *moral* judgment would have to be found. Ramsey shows that it could only be on the basis of an ethic of principle

(deontological) and not an ethic of consequences. He himself is a supporter of this because the whole just-war doctrine is based on the principles of proportionality and discrimination. He breaks new ground, too, in his discussion of the use of incapacitating gases and germs in the counter-insurgency or guerilla warfare which is becoming more and more common in our time. Can they achieve the maximum of incapacity with the minimum of force? Can they be controlled? Ramsey hesitates about stepping across the non-rational but existing barriers to their use for fear that the situation would get out of control, though he thinks sooner or later their use must be faced.

Ramsey also goes over old ground most persuasively when he shows Christians that a proper use of force in the political order is not merely an essential requirement of it, but springs from a right understanding of love. In the New Testament love is dramatically presented in personal terms, as in the parable of the Good Samaritan, but in the on-going structures of the world it has to be translated into corporate terms. Thus the Jerusalem to Jericho road needs policing to prevent thieves beating up Samaritans in the first place. In international relations Christian love passes not directly from man to man but through structures which protect against the unpredictability of other collectivities. How to bring some order and predictability into them is the perilous task of our time. It springs directly from an understanding of social charity.

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The Search for Peace in the Middle East. By Samuel Merlin. Cranbury, N.J., and London: Yoseloff, under the auspices of the Institute for Mediterranean Affairs. 1968. 490 pp. \$8.50 and 60s.

The Big Powers and the Present Crisis in the Middle East. By Samuel Merlin. Rutherford: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, under the auspices of the Institute for Mediterranean Affairs. 1968. 201 pp. \$6.00.

Crosscurrents in the Middle East; A Primer for the General Reader. By James P. Warburg. London: Gollancz. 1969. 244 pp. 38s.

'The study of international relations must begin with the study of the history, the economy, the society, and the geographical position of the countries concerned.' Members of the Institute for Strategic Studies do not need to be reminded of this precept. But, sadly, there are many writers on the modern Middle East who do. One such is Samuel Merlin, the

author of *The Search for Peace in the Middle East*. For him the area is 'the region *par excellence* of rumours', where all is 'restlessness and inconsistency', and where 'everything is possible'. Again, the Arab leaders live in a world of 'emotion and fantasies', while Egyptian policy depends on the 'mood' of President Nasser. This bankrupt approach which seeks to divorce something called the Arab personality from its economic and social environment is better suited to certain types of after-dinner conversation than to a would-be serious work.

Mr Merlin's subject is the series of speeches given by Habib Bourguiba on the subject of Arab/Israeli relations early in 1965, in which he seemed to be calling for a peaceful solution to the Palestine problem and even, on one occasion, for direct negotiations with the Jews. These caused something of a stir at the time but are now almost completely forgotten. Not even the most enthusiastic supporter of President Bourguiba would want to argue that they have done anything tangible to bring peace nearer.

There is little doubt that Bourguiba was often only stating publicly what a number of Arab leaders were saying privately. But why did he make this particular initiative at this particular time? Even after a survey lasting over 450 pages Merlin remains uncertain. But he is probably right in suggesting that Bourguiba's main concern was to assert Tunisia's freedom of action by using the Palestine issue to attack the whole concept of a unified Arab block under Egyptian hegemony. For him, as for Merlin, the only reason for the Arabs to unite was their opposition to Israel: take this way and there is nothing left to keep them together. However, proof of this hypothesis would require a visit to Tunisia to talk to Bourguiba himself, which Merlin has not made. The newspapers upon which he relies almost exclusively as a source of information are no substitute.

Nevertheless, such basic criticism apart, there are a few useful lessons to be learned from the author's account of this mysterious episode. One is the demonstration it provided of the anger and hostility which will still greet any Arab leader who even hints at the need for direct negotiations with Israel. Another is the way it highlighted the fact that Israeli diplomats and politicians are far more adept at dealing with talk of war than with talk of peace. Bourguiba's speeches, by their very appearance of reasonableness, seem to have created considerable confusion in Jerusalem; and the Israeli response when it came was particularly uncertain and unsure.

Samuel Merlin is also the editor of a second book, *The Big Powers and the Present Crisis in the Middle East*, which contains the proceedings of a one day conference organized in New York in December 1967. But, in spite of the fact that papers were presented by a number of distinguished experts, includ-

ing Benjamin Rivlin, Abba Lerner, and Richard Nolte, the former American Ambassador in Egypt, this is another unsatisfactory book. The conference came too soon after the end of the June war to allow participants properly to assess the changes which had been produced in the Middle East by the Israeli victory. Moreover, most contributions were of a very general nature and there was little inclination to examine specific problems in any depth. Here and there an interesting point was made, as when Professor Lerner argued strongly against the idea that peace could be obtained by means of an international programme of economic development in the area: as he rightly stated, such a programme could only work once political stability had been obtained first. Again, Cecil Hourani's efforts to look at the conflict through Arab eyes served as a useful reminder of how Israel's close ties with Jews in America, Russia, and elsewhere make it a state unlike any other, and one which will always be regarded with suspicion so long as its future outline remains unclear. But, for the most part however, the comments made at the conference have long since been overtaken by events, while readers will search in vain for anything new about the subject which was supposed to be at the centre of the discussion – the role of the Great Powers.

There is even less to be said in favour of James Warburg's *Crosscurrents in the Middle East*. Described as 'A survey of Arab-Jewish relations in historical and European perspective' and also as 'a primer for the general reader' it contains an unusually large selection of the false myths about the Arabs which have long bedevilled foreign writing about the area. Here, once again, is the assertion that the Arabs' was 'essentially a civilization of the spoken word', which left few written records. Anyone who has been to southern Spain or Damascus or to the Islamic Museum in Cairo, anyone familiar with the works of the great historian, Ibn Khaldun, or of the poet, Al Mutanabbi, will only shake his head in wonder that such mistruths can still be retailed. Even more pernicious is the statement that the Turks brought economic ruin to the Middle East. However convenient for the Israelis it may be to believe that they took over a desert and made it bloom, the fact remains that the evidence is far from clear. But we do know enough to state, on the one hand, that the Ottomans inherited an empire which was still suffering from the drastic effects of the Mongol invasion and the plagues and disturbances of the fifteenth century; while, on the other, that there was a considerable amount of economic progress in the Middle East from the eighteenth century onwards including, in so far as Palestine was concerned, the development of a large export trade in wheat and oranges to Britain.

Turning to the present day, Warburg is often

equally misleading. He writes of 'the cruelty and irrationality' of Bevin's behaviour during the last days of the Mandate. He assumes that the extraordinary resolution passed at the 1944 Labour Party conference, that the Arabs of Palestine should be 'encouraged' to move out as Jews moved in, remained Labour's policy after it came to power a year later. He asserts that Ben Gurion was 'reluctant' for Israel to become involved in the Suez affair. And so on, right up to the point at which he swallows the story that the body of a Russian airman, supposedly flying for the Egyptians, was found in the Yemen during the Civil War. There cannot be many people in the Middle East who do not now know that this incident was manufactured specially for a group of foreign journalists by an American public relations adviser.

It is difficult to know how such books get published. By the author's own admission he got most of his information from four or five other works all of which are readily available in bookshops and libraries. It is full of mistakes. Together with the two books by Merlin already mentioned it provides a perfect anthology of all the most common errors which writers on the Middle East unfortunately continue to commit.

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The Czech Black Book. Edited by Robert Littell. London: Pall Mall. 1969. 303 pp. 58s.

The Czechoslovak Crisis, 1968. Edited by Robert Rhodes James. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, for the Institute for the Study of International Organizations, University of Sussex. 1969. 203 pp. 40s.

The Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 may yet go down to history as the occasion on which the Soviet Union demonstrated to the entire world that it had ceased to be in any sense a 'revolutionary' power. That it intervened to protect its own sphere of influence was nothing new, it did so in East Germany in 1950 and Hungary in 1956; that it justified its intervention by reference to a doctrine of 'limited sovereignty' was not new either, for Lenin had enunciated such a doctrine in the early 1920s. But the Czechoslovak situation differed radically from that of East Germany or Hungary during the 1950s, where in the one case order was to be restored in an occupied country with no pretensions to complete sovereignty, and in the other a weak and discredited Communist Party in a former enemy country had lost control of events, yielded its place of primacy, and bowed hastily to public pressure by declaring its secession from the

Warsaw Pact. In Czechoslovakia on the contrary, power had been taken by constitutional means, and in the presence of Brezhnev himself, from a discredited Novotny, and assumed by men who declared at every opportunity their loyalty to the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the principles of Communism. Their avowed intent was not to dispense with 'Socialism' but to make it work better, to give it a 'human face' and make it more attractive to its subjects. The leaders of Czechoslovakia attempted to operate under the '1956 rules', by going no further than the Poles had in that year, limiting their reforms to the internal sphere, and avoiding any suggestion of radical change in foreign policy. In so doing they expected to succeed in implementing economic, social and political reforms without arousing Soviet anxiety, and avoiding Hungary's mistakes. As it turned out, however, the '1956 rules' are no longer in force. After months of hesitation, the Soviet Union and its allies invaded, apparently convinced that the Czech leaders lacked the desire or ability, or both, to control the pace of events, that a 'peaceful counter-revolution' was in progress, and that some Czechoslovak conservative leaders willing to lead the country back to a less disturbing course could be installed. In the event, these conservative leaders, on discovering how little support they were likely to receive from the people, declined to assume the role of executants of the Soviet will, thus forcing the Soviet leaders into negotiation with the government which they thought they had deposed.

The Czech Black Book was compiled by the Czechoslovak historians as a counter to the 'White Book' in which the Soviet invaders attempted to justify their action. It is intended as the raw material for history, in that it attempts to present an hour-by-hour account of the invasion and the days immediately following, up to the return of the Czechoslovak Government delegation from the Moscow negotiations. From it three main points of interest to posterity emerge, the first that the attempt to form a government of pliant conservatives failed only narrowly, the second that the resort to passive resistance was improvised and prevented from irruption into violence only by conscious effort, and the third that the invaders, themselves reluctant to resort to violence, were additionally inhibited from doing so by the non-violent nature of the Czechoslovak protest, and by the insistence of the population at large that the goals of the reformers were the same as those professed, at least in theory, by the leaders of the invading countries. The 'Black Book' does not set out to analyse the situation, merely to record what happened as the Czechs themselves saw it. The version under review has omitted some of the material which appeared in the original Czech version, especially Soviet press statements and United Nations

proceedings. Nevertheless, what remains is a valuable account of what may yet turn out to be a watershed as important in Soviet policy as Vietnam in that of the United States.

The Czechoslovak Crisis, 1968 sets out to do much more than the *Black Book*, and possibly for that very reason falls shorter of its objective. It contains a chapter on the Czechoslovak background which fails to note that, unique among the governing parties of the Warsaw Pact, the Czechoslovak Communist Party had from 1918 to 1939 and 1945 to 1948 been a legal mass party, operating successfully within the framework of a democratic constitution. Even now almost one-third of the Party's members have held their membership since before the Second World War, a fact which would help to account both for the outspokenness of the debate and for the alarm shown by the other countries' leaders, accustomed to a rigidly disciplined existence as harrassed and in most cases illegal conspiratorial groups before taking power and rigidly centralized governing cliques after doing so. In brief, while references are made to past democratic traditions, nowhere in the book is there any attempt to analyse the effects of these traditions upon the Czechoslovak Party itself. Furthermore, the chapter on events in Czechoslovakia itself says almost nothing about events inside the country between the election of Alexander Dubcek as First Secretary in place of Novotny on 5 January 1968, and the Warsaw Pact invasion on 21 August. These events are either dealt with tangentially in discussion of the Soviet attitude, or relegated to a chronology, which is no substitute for an analysis. This is on general academic grounds a serious omission in a work entitled *The Czechoslovak Crisis*, and has the particular defect of failing to show how the Government and Party throughout 1968 found themselves trailing in the wake of public expectations, which were both expressed and stimulated by the mass media, and thus gradually came to appear to be losing control of the situation. That the authors are aware of this is hinted at in the chapter on 'The Soviet Dilemma', but is linked to the 'Action Programme' of the Party, and the '2,000 Words' manifesto. The 'haste and imprecision' of the first is explainable in terms of rising public expectations, which had to be given verbal satisfaction quickly, and the second evidences dissatisfaction among the intelligentsia. But they were not isolated manifestations, and in its failure to discuss the internal as well as the external pressures on Dubcek and his colleagues, the crisis is treated with insufficient rigour.

Even more diffuse is the treatment of the role of the Warsaw Pact, in that eighteen pages are devoted to a brief history of the alliance, and only four to its role in the crisis. The chapter on 'NATO and the crisis' contains a useful potted account of certain aspects of

NATO since the mid-1950s, very little of which is directly relevant to the book's theme, but in its last twelve pages argues strongly and cogently against either extension of NATO's commitments to the 'grey areas' of Europe or abandonment of the pursuit of arms-control objectives. A mostly narrative chapter on the role of the United Nations concludes somewhat lamely that it 'acquitted itself reasonably effectively', without any definition of 'effectively', and a brief but useful section entitled 'Interpretations and Conclusions' highlights the need for the Western

countries to agree among themselves on the 'limits of detente' and avoid facile hopes that Eastern European countries can be induced to move substantially ahead of what is permitted by the Soviet Union.

The book as a whole contains much that is useful, but more careful fitting of its subject matter to its title and more ruthless editing would have made it of greater utility.

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