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## Cultural Diplomacy

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"WORLD POLITICS"

An Introduction

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In wartime or when nations are locked in great power conflict, observers are prone to write rather scornfully of the importance of cultural diplomacy. The cultural officer in a foreign office, or the cultural attaché in an embassy abroad, tends to be low man on the totem pole. Budgetary allocations for cultural relations are often the first to be slashed in competition with funds for strategic or diplomatic efforts. The hard-headed diplomatic negotiator or the tough-minded armaments specialist is tempted to view cultural diplomacy as a continuous round of chamber music concerts and afternoon teas with little bearing on the substance of international relations.

But the cultural is more comprehensive and fundamental than any one of its manifestations, important as each may be. Cultural relations involve human relations as they occur across national and cultural boundaries. They are influenced by social forces that create an ever-changing context within which cultural diplomacy must operate. These trends are the result in part of technology, but also of intellectual, economic, and political factors.

Perhaps no development has had such far-reaching impact—potentially and actually—as the communications revolution. The present-day media bring people face to face across vast expanses of geography and ideologies. These new instruments have made our crowded world, with its manifold problems, a shrinking world in which everyone can be acutely aware of the human needs of everyone else. No man is an island anymore because the circumstances of a burgeoning population and limited resources make human and cultural contacts a necessity and ever-present reality—present through the miracle of worldwide mass communications. In such a world, the urgent need is for men and nations to work out new ways of living and working together in peace and harmony.

It is fair, therefore, to ask. Why is cultural diplomacy important now? What reasons can be advanced why this aspect of international relations, so disparaged in the past, has importance for the future? Two concerns would seem to be worthy of consideration. First, the reduction of the probability of direct military conflict among the major powers has led to a corresponding decline in the prominence of military and strategic problems. The receding importance of this dimension of



interstate relations has pushed other problems to the fore. All these problems are in one way or another involved with cultural diplomacy, whether trade and aid, science and technology, environmental issues, monetary questions, or educational exchange.

Second, while there has been a reduction of the possibility of military conflict among the major powers, there is a continuing likelihood of small power conflict, as the events of the 1960s and early 1970s have made increasingly apparent. Even before the reduction of tensions between the great powers had reached its present state, conflicts which absorbed the nations of the world had occurred, not in Europe or America, but in Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nigeria, Iran, and the Middle East. In the 1970s, the necessity of reducing the possibility of military conflict among small powers will increase, as it did in the 1960s for the major powers. Cultural relations can play an important role, as they have in Europe and America, in reducing the sources of misunderstanding, ignorance, and fears that carry the seeds of strife and in laying the foundations for new political relations.

### THREE AREAS IN WHICH CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IS IMPORTANT

There are at least three spheres in which cultural diplomacy takes on renewed importance. First, with the diminishing of the intensity of the cold war, we are witnessing the rearrangement of international patterns of power. The age of the two superpowers has passed. New multipolar constellations of powers are emerging, approximating what the late Martin Wight described as the chandelier pattern of power politics. China, Japan, and the European Community have joined the Soviet Union and the United States as "major powers." There is talk of a new trilateralism linking Japan with Europe and the United States. Regionally, new patterns are developing between major powers and the smaller nations, and among the smaller nations themselves.

At the same time, important shifts in trade and economic relations are occurring. New patterns of cooperation are bound to appear in

trade, whether between the United States and the Soviet Union, Europe and Africa, or Japan, Southeast Asia, the Southwest Pacific, and Latin America. For these new patterns to hold, however, more is needed than commerce alone and the calculus of economic advantage. New cultural affinities must be built. Nations which have known little or nothing about one another must discover each other, and nations which have known one another but not well must come to know one another better. These rearrangements and new constellations in international politics require that nations define the areas in which cultural diplomacy must take hold: for example, in the early 1970s Japan and Malaysia, New Zealand and Southeast Asia, the United States and the francophone countries. For one reason or another, various forms of isolation have prevailed. The British Commonwealth exercised a limiting influence on Australia and New Zealand. Memories of past imperialism and Japan's military ambitions, interrelated within its "co-prosperity sphere," have persisted and circumscribed its relations in Southeast Asia. But nations within such regions must learn to live together. Fear as an incentive is not enough. National and local resources are rarely sufficient to meet national problems. The cultural basis of cooperation must be strong enough to undergird all other forms of cooperation.

Second, nations must seek the establishment and growth of nonsecurity networks of relationships across the globe for scientific, educational, and technological purposes. These networks can facilitate scientific and technological exchange, the spreading of the findings of applied scientific research in fields such as agriculture and health, understandings in monetary and trade areas, environmental concerns, and problems of development. All this in turn can lead to the formation of new arrangements and coalitions for specific goals. The hope for a more durable world community depends on a multitude of crisscrossing functional groupings with cross-cutting memberships which can have the importance for the 1970s and 1980s which security groupings had in the late 1940s and 1950s. Moreover, the importance for the major powers is as great as for the smaller nations. Today the major powers gain



limited leverage at best from the display or withholding of power, given the constraints on the use of traditional forms of power. Substantial leverage in international politics is open to those countries with membership in many such groupings where they can trade off favors and support on certain issues with certain nations and on other issues with other nations. Thus even from a political standpoint these new, far-flung coalitions have immense importance, always presupposing relative stability in security relationships.

What is called for, then, is the intensive and rapid flow of information back and forth, and the building of new and more relevant international channels and forums. The extent of such relationships and their potential for increasing understanding are illustrated by the fact that every day of the year almost every country is represented by an official delegation at some international meeting someplace in the world. Add to this the participation of nongovernmental leaders in nonofficial conferences and the number of contacts expands geometrically.

Third, cultural diplomacy can be a major force in the shaping of a new international system and regional subsystems. The quest goes on at two levels—in the search for new concepts on which such a system can be built, and in the role perception of each country in its own eyes and in those of other countries. What are the roles of Japan and the United States as they perceive one another and are perceived in turn by other powers? What are the roles of India, Indonesia, and New Zealand as they see one another and are in turn seen by nations in that or in other parts of the world? The issue is not only awareness of other nations' deeper expectations and their conceptions of the laws of history. Here we touch on the fundamental assumptions nations have of themselves, of their purpose in the world, and of their citizenry and their historic role or mission. The new international system requires cultural policies that affect the innermost notions of societies—their concepts of human rights, fundamental goals and values, notions of themselves and of the human community. Every nation must have a cultural policy to help it achieve a measure of identity in the present and for the future. It must have a cultural policy that in the long run

can change how it is perceived by other nations. It must also state its goals in the cultural field, their place in the hierarchy of foreign policy goals, and the instruments through which cultural policy will be pursued. Herbert Butterfield has observed that there is no more difficult and demanding task than that of placing oneself in the position of another person or nation. The processes of cultural diplomacy and the workings of a large variety of new and old international institutions can help bring this about.

It is true that the U.N. embodies, in its Charter and in the thousands of resolutions passed by its members, the broad general values of the international community. These include the beliefs common to almost all mankind today that it is better to be fed than hungry, free than enslaved, housed than homeless, educated than ignorant, independent than oppressed. Such values are fundamental and true, but they will remain, in the words of Madame Pandit, mere verbiage unless they can be made operational. Regional and functional organizations in spheres of nonsecurity relationships can breathe life into these fundamental values much as within sovereign nations vast networks of official and voluntary agencies and institutions struggle to give concrete meaning to national aspirations.

### THE GOALS OF CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

The goals, then, of cultural diplomacy are far broader and more fundamental than the exchange of cultural artifacts and manifestations, important as these may be. They include the changing perceptions that countries hold of themselves and of others and the influence this has on the behavior of other countries. At the founding of the American Republic and even before, the thirteen colonies sent cultural envoys abroad to interpret their goals and aspirations. In every period in which the United States has enjoyed trust and respect abroad, it has done so through some form or other of cultural diplomacy. The Marshall Plan, which Winston Churchill described as the most unselfish act of any nation in the history of the world, was fundamentally an act of cultural diplomacy. It need not concern us here that the



Marshall Plan was a matter both of enlightened self-interest and of broader humanitarian goals, for there is always a convergence of interests in the most virtuous actions of states. What mattered was that somehow the Marshall Plan expressed the best instincts of the American people and earned them the respect of nations around the world. For every nation there are moments in its history when it appears to have defined its national purposes in such a way that it connects itself with the then current worldwide aspirations and goals. These moments will have to occur more frequently for the rest of the world to view that nation with confidence and trust. While this may be a counsel of perfection, America, and other nations, should remind themselves that American prestige was never higher than when its values and identity were associated with the concept of a republic based on the consent of the governed, a continuing revolution grounded in the Bill of Rights, the Emancipation Proclamation and the preservation of the Union, the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter, the creation of the United Nations, and the hopes raised in the early days of the Kennedy administration. These landmarks in American history are not important primarily for what was accomplished, but for the affirmation by a people of its national identity and its place in history. There are, of course, examples from the histories of other nations around the world, particularly the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions, and in anticolonial nationalist movements that are equally significant.

Second, a prime goal of cultural diplomacy is the building of new constituencies of knowledge and sensitivity in other countries for the sake of more stable relationships and affinities between peoples and nations. Only through such ties and understandings can the stability of their relations remain undisturbed by the vagaries of international politics. For Americans, their enduring friendship with the British has rested primarily on such foundations. It may not be utopian to hope, in an increasingly interdependent world, that through cultural diplomacy other nations are moving or have moved in the same directions.

Third, it is fundamental in cultural diplomacy to assume that any national system will be unable

to function in the world unless it achieves a clearer awareness of the fears, hopes, aspirations, and interests of others. A whole new constellation of forces has destroyed old patterns of international relations. Nations have, therefore, to position themselves anew. But this is only possible if they know and understand the basic interests of others, their secret fears, and their enduring aspirations. Cultural policies can help bring about this understanding, but more will be required than the exchange of information. This is a matter of building a comprehension of what is basic in terms of the inner personality of other nations. It means delving deeply into the cultural and social roots of the other. It demands that we bare ourselves to others with all our strengths and foibles, our self-confidences and insecurities. It means making ourselves understandable to other countries, not only from our own national perspectives, but in light of their own frame of reference. And this means cultural policies and cultural relations.

All this may be possible if there is a massive flow of information and a growing capacity of understanding. It goes beyond public relations tactics, image building, rhetoric, or political propaganda. It involves a people's reaching out to try to know the soul of another people. One instrumentality may be the building of institutions—centers for the study of one culture by another. But this involves a broader framework than the study of the politics of another people. It is more than people becoming involved with each other in what is commercially viable. It requires new structures, new cultural centers, both governmental and nongovernmental. It means nothing short of the creation of a dense network of channels for all kinds of different knowledge about one another.

#### INSTRUMENTALITIES AND APPROACHES

The search for vehicles or instrumentalities within a country through which cultural diplomacy can be pursued drives us back to the country's traditions and culture. Underlying the institutions of cultural policy are concepts and commitments the nation has made to itself and



to the world. France has looked out on the world through the concept of its *mission civilisatrice*—the compulsion it feels to disseminate a superior culture. Given the power of this commitment, it is hardly surprising that France has done much to order its educational and manpower priorities to achieve cultural goals. French scholars and professors who teach abroad return to their mother country without having lost their place in the scramble up the academic ladder. Attacks on illiteracy, even at the most basic level, use the French language and culture. Not surprisingly, given its *mission*, French cultural diplomacy has been linked with French imperialism from the start. In geography, the areas to which France has reached out have all been in French Africa and Asia. This has both restricted and concentrated its influence. Culture, diplomacy, and trade have gone hand in hand, and France today maintains a larger educational assistance program than any country in the world.

Great Britain has also been among the first to reach out to advance education in the less developed countries. Its efforts have been confined neither to Africa nor to Asia, and a strong emphasis has existed from the start on building institutions of higher education and social and economic research. While the French effort from the start has been closely integrated through the Quai d'Orsay, the British educational establishment, represented by a more or less independent body, the Inter-University Council, has played a dominant role, at least until recently. The high quality of the British educational effort has in part reflected a determination to build universities abroad modeled after Oxford, Cambridge, and London (with accompanying strengths and weaknesses). The British were among the first to engage in institution building, but now both they and the French are asking themselves how appropriate these institutions are for development. Still, the English language as the medium for education has been spread throughout developing countries, with the enhancement of their opportunities for cultural understanding of the history and literature of Britain. The British Council is engaged in the promotion of the English language abroad and the development of closer

cultural relations with other countries. It has far-flung involvements around the world and substantial resources.

Japan is a latecomer to the field of cultural diplomacy, but no country has approached Japan in its capacity for cultural assimilation. One looks in vain for significant literature elsewhere in the world which has not been translated into Japanese. All this has enriched Japanese culture without destroying or changing many of its basic traditions. And today Japan, long the borrower and consumer of other cultures, is struggling to express its own culture to others, though with little success so far. It has established a fund for cultural relations, but has made only halting steps toward its use. A Japanese Cultural Center can now be found in Dusseldorf, Germany. Others may soon be established in Jakarta, Indonesia, and Bangkok, Thailand. If there is to be any hope for Japan in its cultural diplomacy, it must recognize that the absorbing of the cultures of others is not enough. It must reach out creatively and self-confidently to express its own culture rather than merely seek to absorb other cultures. It must discover its own soul beyond its technological virtuosity if it is to enter into a true dialogue with its friends. It must free itself from the almost paranoid sense of its own uniqueness and recognize more fully the equally unique and valid assumptions of other cultures.

In Southeast Asia, individual countries have lost touch with each other. To say national understanding will come in the wake of trade may be a pious and ill-founded hope. There is an overriding need for the countries of Southeast Asia to know one another at a deeper level, and the question is, Will there be time? New Zealand and Australia are discovering belatedly what it means to live in Asia; they know now that their fate is bound up more with Asia than with the British Commonwealth. They are trading more with Japan and less with Europe. But trade is not enough; they must develop new affinities, as must all the countries of Southeast Asia, kept apart during the colonial era but now sharing a common destiny. The same is true of Africa, and even of Latin America.

For the new nations around the world, no



single pattern of cultural diplomacy has yet emerged. Some, such as Indonesia, have found that cultural relations provide rather effective ways of generating interest and support where political antagonism had prevailed. Cultural diplomacy has been a tactical weapon and tool; perhaps it has always been this way at the start. But the new cultures are also beginning to produce cultural interpreters and spokesmen. In the same way that the American Republic in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries sent leaders of unsurpassed intellectual powers abroad to interpret the fledgling Republic to its European neighbors, the developing countries have shared their best with the world. Indeed, it is the developed countries rather than the less developed ones that tend to send mere cultural technicians or "development specialists" when the need is for men of commanding breadth and vision. If cultural diplomacy is to fulfill its high goals of self-awareness and mutual understanding, the task cannot be left to third-raters.

This brings us to the United States, and here the picture, however we view it, is a mixed one. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the United States was limited, but not severely confined, in cultural relations by its isolationist foreign policy. Cultural affairs were a concern of certain sectors of the population; there was missionary and commercial involvement, but not a definite national policy. American students in numbers pursued their education in Europe. As an outgrowth, some foreign students began to move into American cultural and educational institutions. But there were few integrated or organized efforts to assure that they both learned and contributed. The flow was virtually one-way, and, through much of the period, the leadership came from religious and educational groups in the society. Following World War II, the national effort was greatly expanded. The Department of State, as well as other agencies of government, undertook cultural programs. Educational assistance was from the outset a central part of foreign assistance programs. The number of foreign students in the United States jumped to 130,000 from one-tenth that number prior to World War II. Area study centers for nearly every

world region were established in major universities. Exchanges took on a two-way flow as American professors and students went abroad to engage in institution building.

Yet progress was uneven. Cultural affairs officers remained at the bottom of the diplomatic ladder. The full extent of the problem was illustrated when the Congress, having passed the International Education Act in 1966, failed to allocate a single dollar for its realization. There has been a certain national ambivalence in the cultural diplomacy efforts of the United States. At times expressing a firm commitment to the task only to cut back as domestic needs or military and scientific development took precedence, the United States has never been able to decide whether cultural diplomacy is a necessity or a luxury. However, one significant advance has been the movement from a rather naïve view of the American mission to educate mankind to a greater awareness of the need for mutuality.

#### INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL WELLSPRINGS AND MOTIVATIONS

It seems useful, therefore, to review the sources or motivational wellsprings for cultural diplomacy. Broadly construed, they have been idealistic, pragmatic, or some combination of both. It is fair to question whether cultural relations can flourish in the absence of religion or philosophy. The decline of religion or the absence of philosophy in some countries throws doubt on whether cultural diplomacy is possible. Japan suffers from the absence of philosophers who can serve as anchors of the culture. The Japanese realize now that power is not enough to give direction to a people, but their own culture thus far has not given them a clue to what more is needed. One of the great virtues of Christianity, setting it apart from other religions, is the idea of being "my brother's keeper." When the Rockefeller Foundation decided, early in its history, to expand its public health programs to other countries, one of the trustees, in justifying the action, quoted from an entreaty to St. Paul: "Come over into Macedonia and help us." Not disregarding all



the cruel and barbarous things that have been done in the name of Christianity, it has provided a deep wellspring for assistance, for reaching out to others. It has been the basis for much of private philanthropy as well as public giving. Other religions and philosophies stress individual salvation and inner perfection, and some have "alms giving" as a religious duty, but the broad scope and power of *caritas*, or Christian love, is unique.

There is also the wellspring of universality, or the essential unity of mankind, the roots of which go back, at least in the West, to Græco-Roman thought if not to earlier cultures that religiously and linguistically are sources of the world community. The infinite threads that bind men together stem from their common humanity. Writing during World War II, Raymond Fosdick, then president of the Rockefeller Foundation, explained:

In peace as in war we are all of us the beneficiaries of contributions to knowledge made by every nation in the world. Our children are guarded from diphtheria by what a Japanese and a German did; they are protected from smallpox by an Englishman's work; they are saved from rabies because of a Frenchman; they are cured of pellagra through the researches of an Austrian.<sup>1</sup>

This unity is of course evident not only in health but in all fields. There is an essential unity of all knowledge that necessitates cultural relations. Toward this goal, cultural exchanges and the flow of information must be expanded and deepened wherever possible. In all areas—science and health, food and population, education and communications, art and religion—no nation can go it alone, and an awareness of this prompts nations to undertake cultural diplomacy.

Political ideologies have in somewhat different ways provided another source of motive power for cultural diplomacy. The world Communist movement, whose champions have been from the start at war with the spokesmen for communism-in-one-country, has heralded the use of political and cultural *means* for the spread-

ing of that movement. If the leaders of the communism-in-one-country creed have temporarily gained the ascendancy in China and the Soviet Union, the dynamism of the international Communist movement remains very much alive, as is evident in countries such as Cuba and Chile. On the other side, whereas American foreign policy has over the past decade lost some of its crusading zeal, the Wilsonian ideal of support for freedom and self-determination around the world remains part of its foreign policy tradition. Indeed, it has retained its strength to the point that it has been adopted by almost every actor on the world scene, although their definitions of the terms vary.

Whether or not we are living in an age marked by the decline of ideologies—and the evidence is not compelling either way—there are serious risks in cultural diplomacy based on messianic political creeds. Political crusaders are often blind to the culture of other peoples. China views other cultures in a Marxist-Leninist, traditional Middle Kingdom, and Maoist framework. This can lead not only to a distortion of other cultures but to profoundly dangerous misunderstandings. Because of the inflexibility of this creed, China remained isolated from the rest of the world for a quarter of a century. Now it has shifted, at least temporarily, to a more pragmatic approach as Chou En Lai has invited such leaders as the Shah of Iran and the President of Zaïre to visit China. Russia in a similar way may have been blinded by ideology to the cultural realities of countries such as Yugoslavia, Egypt, and Ghana. Ideology coupled with cultural ignorance led to many of the miscalculations the United States made in Vietnam.

Cultural diplomacy is also made more difficult by too great discrepancies in power. On one side, such differentials lead the more powerful state to exaggerate its influence in the weaker state. On the other, they evoke stereotypes of the more powerful in the weaker states—Britain and France in the nineteenth centuries and the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan today. They *also* lead to the fallacy that the parties in cultural relations are cast in exclusive roles of donor and recipient or producer and consumer. Yet for

<sup>1</sup> *The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report* (New York, 1941), p. 10.



cultural diplomacy to succeed, there must be reciprocity—both sides must give and both receive. Without this, cultural relations degenerate into domination and dependency, and power differentials destroy opportunities for genuine cultural understanding.

### CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE HUMAN COMMUNITY

Cultural relations can be saved, if they are saved at all, by a resolve to recognize and accept cultural diversity. Only this can change the character and drive of cultural diplomacy. There is an unmistakable historical trend away from unilateral cultural relations toward reciprocal cultural relations, based upon respect for the integrity of human cultures and the desirability of keeping cultural relations free from political domination and power differentials. Cultural reciprocity means a two-way flow of people and ideas; every country should be both an exporter and an importer. Freeing cultural exchanges from international politics need not mean the end to bilateral programs. National programs, however, ought to be only one alternative in cultural diplomacy. New networks and linkages between peoples and nations should be multiplied, worldwide and regionally. As the report *Reconstituting the Human Community* stated:

There is reason to hope that mankind may be moving in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect among cultures, toward a realization of a new humanism which will be a fresh expression of the humane and the human. It is well to remember that history and contemporary life amply demonstrate how unsettling cultural contacts can be. But more importantly, history also reveals with startling clarity that cultural contacts have been stimulating and have led to a creative and innovative cultural flowering. For instance, cultural historians can point to the results of Japanese borrowing from Tang China and later from the West; to classical Greek culture, a product of centuries of interaction between independent city-states and the Mediterranean and Valley cultures of the Fertile Crescent; to Arab culture, itself a product of interaction among the cultures of Greece, Persia, and

India; to the Renaissance; and to American borrowing from Europe.<sup>2</sup>

At the basis, then, of cultural diplomacy for the 1970s must be a deeper understanding of cultural diversity. Whatever the limitations of cultural relativism and a world system built in recognition of such diversity, this is where man finds himself at the present moment in history. Ecological stability presupposes the survival of many species, and there is no reason to suppose that international stability is not governed by similar laws. Any worldwide institutional structure must find the machinery for accommodating diversity. We need different kinds of instrumentalities for a culturally pluralist concept of the world. It must make diversity possible on a democratic basis. All cultures are not equally strong, and the problem is how to keep the weaker, more fragile structures alive. It was fashionable in the first flush of modernization to believe that more traditional cultures stood in the path of progress and advancement. Today we know that the task is to harness them wherever possible to the attainment of new goals. Indigenous entrepreneurs at work in the context of traditional culture may contribute more, given their numbers and distribution, to employment and economic advancement than a dozen new Western-style industries which leave the masses of rural people untouched and without hope.

Perhaps what is needed more than anything else is an examination of past concepts of universality and an inquiry into the reasons why they have so often proved inadequate. Too often universal systems are mere facades behind which the strong can dominate the weak. It may also be true that universalism has been posed as an either-or alternative to national and regional groupings. For the great bulk of mankind, universal systems have appeared too remote and too rationalistic. The urgent need in fashioning new structures is to work out new social systems, whether nationally or internationally, that harmo-

<sup>2</sup> *Reconstituting the Human Community*, a report of Colloquium III, held at Bellagio, Italy, July 17-23, 1972, for the Program of Inquiries Concerning Cultural Relations for the Future, sponsored by the Hazen Foundation (New Haven: Hazen Foundation, 1972), p. 14.



nize diversity and universality, that have room for the many and the one. It will be painful at both ends of the dialogue to acknowledge that both approaches have validity. Universalists must not view local cultures as anachronisms, but as organic structures with integrity and responsibilities all their own. Nationalists and regionalists must accept growing worldwide interdependence and make their interests compatible with broader goals. They must understand and accommodate themselves to the workings of continuous counterpressures against the weight of their own ideas and interests within the wider system. Up to now, universality has foundered on the shoals of ideological warfare and controlling strategic concepts, yet if those problems which span the worldwide community are to be solved, ways must be found to transcend parochialism and shortsighted local interests.

For beyond the immediate utility of particular national cultural policies, man—faced by staggering and overburdening problems whether he perceives them on the basis of strength or weaknesses, affluence or poverty, long experience or newly emergent status—seeks new arrangements and solutions. If the issues are environmental, the Stockholm Conference on worldwide environmental problems has demonstrated there are no purely national resolutions. If they involve technology or the application of scientific discoveries, new varieties of the major food crops or more successful forms of immunization in the protection of health, the sharing of knowledge is indispensable. In every sector the quest is for a more humane society, and in this the search knows no national boundaries. Understanding this, we may succeed in lifting the discussion above the merely utilitarian.

What favors mankind in the last third of the twentieth century is that no one any longer believes a single society has all the answers. Wherever one turns, the health of every society is under question. The developed societies cannot ignore the fact that their highly touted national development has raised as many problems as it has solved. No society can boast that the results of its progress have spread throughout the system.

Thus Stuart Hampshire, in a book review in the *New York Review of Books*, has observed:

So faith in technology may result in ever better methods in Massachusetts General Hospital and ever greater medical poverty in outlying places which lose their few remaining doctors to the centers where progress is made. Or, more frivolously, the journey from London to New York becomes shorter and from Oxford to Cambridge longer and longer, until after a few years of "advance," the first will be shorter than the second. The superhighway and airport come nearer the village just as the train and bus services are phased out. The older technologies had their corresponding social forms; as they are replaced by the new, those who live at the bottom of the scale of opportunity are left out of the social progress.<sup>3</sup>

It is this type of cultural and scientific crisis which makes the predicament of the developed countries at least comparable to that of the less favored nations. There is a degree of questioning going on in every society that should make all aware of common problems. In the United States the intellectuals and the young are asking the questions; in the Soviet Union intellectuals such as Sakharov are speaking out—whatever the price. China, having heard the invitation to make a thousand flowers bloom, found the discontent and uncertainty so widespread that it stamped out dissent in the Cultural Revolution. Everywhere people are asking, "What kind of society do we want?" "Why is it we have fallen so short of our goals?"

All this makes the present era rich in opportunities which must be seized, including the opportunity of building new structures for cultural relations. Nations must respond in the changing context of their own specific problems. They cannot free themselves from older traditions and forces, but neither can they be oblivious to new patterns and tendencies. What is needed in the search for a new universality is a creative act, as each nation from its position in history confronts and responds to the challenge of cultural relations—and continues to do so.

<sup>3</sup> Sept. 21, 1972, p. 12.