Prisma

The Indonesian Indicator

**Bureaucracy
in the Third World**

**History of the Indonesian
Bureaucratic Elite**

Modernizing Bureaucratic States

Rep~~orting Develop~~ ne~~talist Regim~~es

LP3E~~S~~

19

Prisma

The Indonesian Indicator

Bureaucracy
in the Third World

History of the Indonesian
Bureaucratic Elite

Modernizing Bureaucratic States

Repressive~Developmentalist Regimes
in Asia

Religion, Ideology and
Development

Social Science Research
in Indonesia

LP3ES

19

Prisma
The Indonesian Indicator

A Note from the Editor

Bureaucracy is a Western concept of government which has been generally accepted throughout the world, including the developing countries. The formal acceptance of the concept of bureaucracy does not, however, guarantee that the practice of government within the formal bureaucratic framework will be carried out in accordance with the rational, impersonal rule-of-law implied. In fact, where cultural traditions of leadership and government have been based on inherited authority and a system of generalist administrators, such as in most countries of Asia, the bureaucratic system of government is subject to widespread adaptations and accomodations to traditional forms and values.

Development, particularly economic development, depends upon the existence or creation of an effective, impartial and predictable bureaucracy. Whether development is primarily implemented through the private sector or directly carried out by government, the government bureaucracy will have a major role in guiding, regulating and supporting both the direction and pace of development. Therefore, the study and understanding of bureaucracy, especially its form and functioning in Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries, is essential for effective policy formulation and management of development.

The articles in this issue present a number of important questions regarding the relationship between bureaucracy, government and development. In his article, Soedjatmoko presents an insightful analysis of the modern bureaucratic state with a global sweep that identifies a multitude of issues on which further research is needed if we are to fully understand the complexities of government, bureaucracy and development. Historian Onghokham provides background material by tracing the roots of the bureaucratic elite, citing the examples of the priyayis in Java and the hulebalang in Aceh, Sumatra.

The anomalies arising out of accomodation and conflict between traditional forms of government and the 'modernizing bureaucracy' are generally examined as pathological conditions of the bureaucracy, i.e. corruption, nepotism, patronage, etc. In Dorodjatun's article, it is argued that it is the excesses of these conditions which have brought about the 'failure' of governments. On the contrary, Herbert Feith in his article implies that excessively rapid development brought about by an elitist, repressive bureaucracy which fails to accomodate traditional values and forms of government may also bring about the failure of governments. Following this line of reasoning, the question arises whether a certain level of corruption, patronage, nepotism, etc. to accomodate to traditional practices may be not only unavoidable but necessary to maintain stability. The gradual eradication of these practices could therefore be seen as interdependent with overall economic, social, cultural and political development, and not something whcih can be treated separately.

Yuli Ismartono.

Bureaucracy in the Third World: Instrument of the People, Instrument of the Rulers or the Ruler?*

By Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti

Although bureaucracies throughout the world share similar structures, Third World bureaucracies may differ from those of the developed countries because they sometimes reflect traditional values and norms far from the rationality and impartiality inherent in the bureaucratic machinery. In this article the author examines problems of government bureaucracy and the development process in a number of developing countries.

Dr. Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti is lecturer at the Economics Faculty of the University of Indonesia and a Research Associate at the University's Institute for Economic and Social Research (LPEM). He is also member of LP3ES Board of Councils. Dr. Dorodjatun received his graduate training at the University of California, Berkeley, USA.

When we turn our attention to the Third World, we see that here too, as in developed countries of the West, elements of statehood are found; from Constitutions, parliaments, state administrations, legal systems, armed forces and state police, to political parties and non-governmental institutions. It is as if all that is normally found in Western countries has been duplicated totally by the Third World countries.

Based on this general overall impression, political observers in both the Third World and Western countries often jump to the conclusion that the real differences between their countries lie only in problems of quantity, not quality. Thus the main problem in the backwardness of the Third World may be, for example, government systems which are not yet completely able to reach all corners of their respective

countries, with the result that large portions of the rural population have not yet been touched by the central government. This can be accepted as the amount of civil servants and facilities available is still far from sufficient. In essence, institutional problems such as these are in the same way that the gap between per capita income in developed countries and that of people in Third World countries is. All are merely problems of quantity, of poverty and affluence.

Because of this, development efforts in the Third World are often considered to be no more than efforts to transform the existing situation from one of poverty to one of affluence, by increasing quantity within a certain time limit. Therefore, in the same way that Third World governments attempt economic development by means of planned stages, so do they attempt to employ social engineering and even political en-

gineering. If only culture were easily guided it would not be surprising to see cultural engineering tried as well. At the base of all this is the idea of quantitative increases; in the context of changing backwardness into development, progress, growth, and so on.

With this simple, optimistic, naive viewpoint Third World political circles proudly display their facilities to outside visitors in order to prove that they themselves also know what nationhood means. As if agreeing with the illusion symbolized by the "jalan protokol" or protocol routes, which are characteristically Third World, Western political circles based their foreign aid on similar ideas. They would simply give foreign aid (in fact, loans) aimed at immediately changing conditions of poverty to ones of affluence, both sectorally and, ideally, comprehensively. Such quantitative changes would then cause a chain reaction finally resulting in qualitative changes. In technical terms: after the "big push" would come the "trickle down effect", to be followed by the institutionalization process. Progress in this context could be seen by the internalization process of the quantitative change in a variety of institutions from governmental to social. Carrying this even further, the Western world has often jumped to the conclusion that all Third World countries would follow a road to progress similar to that which they themselves had taken, and that Third World countries which reached the end of this route would become developed in a way which did not differ qualitatively from their own present status.

During the decades of the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's often surprising and bitter empirical experience proved how wrong and naive this way of looking at historical problems and underdevelopment was. It became clearer and clearer in Western political circles and to observers, including tourists who only passed through briefly, that the majority of the elements which go into statehood and national life were often only a facade without substance. Parliaments in many Third World countries were not the same as their Western counterparts. Perhaps they were the same in appearance and structure but they were not in substance, nor, and this is most important, in behavior. In short there were great differences in quality. The same may also be said of political parties, politicians and statesmen, state administrations, judicial systems and the military. In recent years many Western observers have been forced to admit, in disappointment, that often they found not only qualitative differences but rather behavior which was the exact opposite of what they were used to in the West. Now, conscious of such a state of affairs, a fair number of these Westerners have dared to declare that "a large portion of Third World countries do not have the competence to develop."

One Major Difference: Government Bureaucracy

People in the West, from the top to the bottom strata, whether supporters of the government in power or in opposition or neutral to it, are already familiar with the tradition, or rather the assumption that all parts of the state apparatus can be expected to act in a neutral, rational and objective manner in carrying out their tasks. All parts of the state system are expected to be neutral in all matters of state and public life. The state apparatus is expected to be apolitical or non-political, to faithfully serve the public interest with regard to matters explicitly laid out in the Constitution as well as those

arising spontaneously from various unwritten conventions.

The main duty of a civil servant is to respect and enforce law and order with no thought of gain either for himself or for any political group. Government employees or other personnel who are unable to carry out their duties, do not understand them or are not willing to complete their missions take the risk of having to resign, voluntarily or by force. The democratic process, carried out by regular general elections, forces employees to keep to their role as public servants. In this role they must always be conscious of and sensitive to changes in the definition of public interest, to those which come from the executive, legislative or judicial branches and those deriving from public opinion.

It is reasonable therefore to expect to be able to fully trust the state apparatus to function and be efficient in working towards the goal of improved social welfare. The people have only to articulate their interests and aspirations in a clear, organized manner, specific to each problem. This is usually done through political parties or interest groups and then channelled to the executive, legislative and judicial branches to obtain programmatic, technical formulations for action.

In such a context it is understood that steps to improve human welfare would be taken simply by mobilization and allocation of economic resources, in keeping with the quantitative view of the problem. As a result, spending is increased, programs are formulated, and then funds are channelled into projects, to regions, to problems and to the client who first reported the problem. After a gestation period there should be concrete results which contribute to the solution of the problem previously reported by the political clients among the public. These results should generate more feedback, informing the project director, the public and the government whether the desired targets were reached or not. Over time, as a result of so many policies, programs, and projects, a communication network ought to evolve to support the existing political system. In addition an increasingly orderly, organized (functionally and structurally), and mission-conscious government system should appear, heading consciously towards the formation of a bureaucracy.

According to Max Weber, due to processes of growth and development, bureaucracies in the West are very formal and legalistic, remaining loyal to their constitutions and conventions. As an instrument of the state, such a bureaucracy would not take actions which side with the government in power, when the government was experiencing a crisis of confidence, as reflected by either legislative institutions or public opinion.

However, a bureaucracy will obey orders as long as the giver of orders, i.e. the government, maintains political confidence, shown by regular general elections. Further a government bureaucracy will not be intimidated by political pressure from special interest groups to the point that such pressure would be accepted as a normal, significant part of the national system.

Just how much of this ideal system is visible in daily political life in the Western world? Over time crises of confidence in bureaucracies do appear, both because the bureaucracy is accused of looking after its own interests and because it is accused of representing special interests of giant corporations or of siding with a particular political party. However in all efforts to correct these

imperfections the West always returns to its ideal of the duties of a state being carried out by a government bureaucracy. On the other hand, by systematic, long-term efforts, the bureaucracy puts its house in order internally, resulting in a "professional" civil service, which increasingly distances itself from political interference for the sake of efficiency and increasing skill.

How shocked the political circles in the West were and how disappointed was the taxpaying public when foreign aid sent to Third World countries in the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's did not result in the hoped for and planned for development. From their point of view, aid from developed countries, supplemented by technical aid, was analagous to an injection to stimulate economic growth. Some of them thought, "Possibly the problem is that the injection is not the correct one for the disease." So, the concept of a massive investment program was arrived at; a sort of big push, to offset one basic cause of underdevelopment, i. e. a large population with a growth rate that was too rapid. Over time it became clear that even with these efforts problems of underdevelopment were not solved.

Thus, another plan was presented for increasing employment opportunities more quickly, with limited funding. In order to do this attempts were made to use labor intensive technology. This was followed by the use of appropriate or intermediate technology. The results? Still unsatisfactory. This was true although Third World countries had been advised to make efforts to control population growth by means of family planning programs.

At the same time in the Third World corrupt regimes began appearing, without fail using slogans promising such things as "development", "moder-

nization" and "industrialization". It became increasingly clear that these groups were becoming richer and richer, *with or without development.* Several reports by donor agencies and countries, including the World Bank and United Nations agencies, showed a correlation between corrupt regimes and increasingly unequal income patterns. Cities in the Third World are prematurely heading towards an "affluent" pattern of consumption borrowed from developed countries, while a large proportion of the rural population is still wrestling with conditions of absolute poverty. Thus arose the observation that the development process was urban-biased and closely tied to the soft-state symptoms further linked to the symptoms of monopolies and oligopolies in strategic sectors of the economy.

Following this, probably arising from Gunnar Myrdal's 3-volume analysis, the backwardness of the Third World was seen from a wider perspective, considering various non-economic factors, including the factor of government bureaucracy. Observations of development in the Third World showed that obstacles to development stemmed directly from the state apparatus, or bureaucracy. Differing from Western industrial states, Third World state bureaucracies were seen *not* to be neutral and they would *not ever be neutral.* These political machines sometimes reflected values and norms far from rational, being neither objective nor apolitical. It is possible that such machines of state supported political domination by one ethnic, regional or religious group, i. e. primordial group; or were a part of the party in power.

In short, although a Third World bureaucracy has a structure similar to that of those in developed countries, its essence and behavior are heavily co-

lored by it primordial alliances. Bureaucracies such as this were formerly found in the West during the pre-capitalist stage of development, and experts have called it the stage of patrimonial bureaucracy. In this type of bureaucracy all relationships, both internal and external, are patron-client ones and are very private and exclusive in character.* With this type of relationship problems of exchange of political loyalty for economic resources arise within the bureaucracy. A person loyal to the patron receives economic resources, while those who are not find their sources of livelihood blocked. The most important thing is that it is not national interests but personal relationship which are weighed first in the patron-client relationship, whether as a basis for personal, group or party interests.

Development is thus also considered from a patrimonial viewpoint. For example, one area will be developed if it is loyal to the political party in power. The same is true for the building of universities, hospitals, and even places of worship.

Further, observations have shown how the influence of such patrimonial bureaucracies has penetrated to the support of corrupt practices, not concerned with the Constitution, laws or regulations of a country. In essence, patrimonialism works against all efforts to institutionalize the idea of nationhood. This means that it is easy for bureaucratic activities to deviate from the proper path. The less clearly defined the

regulations or institutionalization, the easier it is for corruption to occur. It follows that the longer such activities are allowed, the more corrupt the whole system becomes, finally resulting in a corrupt society which can no longer differentiate between right and wrong, between national and private interests, or, and most importantly, between short term and long term perspectives.

Western countries have succeeded in overcoming patrimonial symptoms through a long, hard process of development. This has been followed by the creation of rational state administrations which uphold national interests and the aims of development.

The problem facing the Third World is whether or not such a process can be copied. If so, how long will it take? Is it possible to plan ways to tame the patrimonial bureaucracy? Many more questions come to mind as well. It is certainly time for such questions to be asked, particularly as we enter the last twenty years of this century, because it is the Third World which must support a large proportion of the world's population (which will have doubled by the year 2000). Such a large population will be impossible to support without economic development. However, according to studies by various futurist groups, world economic resources are already becoming scarcer and scarcer. One study predicts that by the end of the 1980's there will be only three countries which have food surpluses, the USA, Canada and Australia, while the rest, including the People's Republic of China and the USSR, will experience food shortages. Imagine the collision between the politics of food and the politics of petroleum which will occur then, although in fact many Third World countries have supplies of

---

* This type of patrimonial bureaucracy is similar to the institution of *perkawulan* in Java, where the patron is the *gusti* or *juragan* and the client is the *kawula*. The *gusti-kawula* (lit. master-servant) relationship is one of personal ties, implicitly considered to be binding for all aspects of life over the period of a lifetime, with primordial loyalty being the basis for the relationship.

neither. Only Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia of the OPEC countries will remain capital-surplus oil-producing countries.

What is the Solution?

Results of research in the Third World show that throughout a large part of this region the government bureaucracy is not an instrument of the people. In most areas it more closely resembles an instrument of the rulers, or is itself the ruler. Thus, observers have been analysing signs of bureaucratic polity, where the government bureaucracy is shadowed by intense efforts of the rulers to concentrate their power in order to create a monistic power center. Centralisation of power here is not necessarily accompanied by an increase in power, and possibly serves only to lessen the chances of other socio-political powers intervening in the center of power. Nevertheless, such a situation can only persist due to the rulers's ability to maintain a minimal consensus between, for example, the civil elite and the military elite. He also must be able to neglect mass politics and enter directly into bureaucratic and technocratic policy applications. Such a ruler is not efficient and does not care about efficiency, but he appears to be able to ensure stability.

Optimists say that a monistic power center situation would be able to help the state and the people move quickly in economic development efforts, even though the quality of the system was corrupt. Thus such regimes are called repressive-developmentalist regimes.

The pessimists, on the other hand, say that the greedy unconcern of the rulers towards institution-building, and their concern only with the allocation of economic resources in order to retain the loyalty of a large proportion of the political actors will finally end in the decay of the state system and cause widespread demoralisation among the population.

It is as though the optimists predict that at the right moment the monistic power center will begin constructing a capitalist system based on interest groups which will found oligopolies and monopolies. So the patrimonial bureaucracy will undergo metamorphosis to become an increasingly rational capitalist one. Meanwhile the pessimists seem not to believe that such a process could occur. Their reasons include the following:

1. Corrupt practices will wreck systems rather than allow better ones to arise.
2. The Third World elite has prematurely become a group of consumers of luxury goods, with jet-set lifestyles complete with real-estate speculation in Western countries, and will never become thrifty, persevering, insightful capitalists.
3. Tightening up of the power system will eradicate more public institutions than expected, although the ability to establish new top-down institutions based on loyalty will still be limited. This will cause the elite-mass gap to increase and will eat away at the still tenuous idea of nationhood.

It is difficult to end this discussion as each side can give examples from history to support its arguments. The optimists can cite Japan under the Meiji, Germany under Bismarck, or France under Napoleon III. The pessimists can refer to Russia under the Tsar, China under the Kuomintang, and possibly Iran under the Shah or Argentina under Peron.

However, it seems that both sides forget that political systems cannot be discussed in a vacuum. The most basic problem which will face the constellation of Third World countries from

now until the beginning of the 21st century is probably that of population, which forces the momentum of development along at a rapid rate even though the ability of the population to deal with it remains low. Population is the "king" of problems as it at once involves the stomach, the heart and the brain, leaving no area unaffected. Before discussing politics people discuss society, and discussion of society must include discussion of the people which make it up.

It might be easier to study this problem if we admit that Japan-Meiji, Germany-Bismarck and France-Napoleon III are all success stories from the 19th century, while Russia-Tsar, China-Kuomintang, Iran-Shah and Argentina-Peron are examples of failures from the 20th century. Examination has shown that development efforts were relatively easier in past centuries than they are in the 20th century, especially in recent years. Firstly, the burden of population in earlier centuries was not as great as that presently borne by new countries, such as China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria or the Philippines. Secondly, as pioneers Western countries were not faced with choices of technology, much less dictated to about it, as we, the latecomers, are. Thirdly, nearly all of the pioneers were fairly homogeneous in terms of social and cultural characteristics, while new nations are forced to wrestle with the difficult problems of nation-building at the same time that they must carry out economic development.

It is easy to understand why, with the above difficulties, more new nations fail or experience serious setbacks in development compared to pioneer nations of past centuries.

Development disasters such as the one recently experienced by Iran and that nearly experienced by South Korea (and those possibly beginning in the Philippines and Thailand) should be enough to prove that there is a high probability of failure among repressive-developmentalist regimes in development efforts harnessed to patrimonial bureaucracies. Nearly all of them are forced to pay a high political price for their unpreparedness in facing economic processes which are neither rational nor efficient; which are caught in the network of corrupt clientship from the elite rulers; which are increasingly heading towards a hardening of the oligopoly and monopoly systems in their economies; and which must face increasingly unequal division of wealth within the population and between the center (gusti) and the regions (kawula). This must all be discussed openly and more carefully before a solution can be found. However it appears that each Third World country will have to formulate its own solutions to the problem, which will not be easy!

The Bureaucratic Elite in Indonesia: A Historical Background*

By Onghokham

The mechanism of modern bureaucracy is regulated by laws which function automatically. The basis of traditional states was the sacred order, described by Onghokham as part of the "history of the elite" Indonesia. The *priyayi* in Java first opposed the Dutch, then became their allies and finally submitted to Dutch rule. But the relationship of the *Hulebalang* in Aceh with the Dutch was of a different sort: alliance.

Dr. Onghokham is lecturer at the Faculty of Arts and Literature of the University of Indonesia. He is also member of the National Institute for Economic and Social Studies of the Indonesian Institute of Science (LEKNAS-LIPI). A graduate of the University of Indonesia, Dr. Onghokham received his doctorate in history from Yale University in USA. He has written extensively on the history of Indonesia, including "The Brotodiningrat Affair" in Ruth McVey's (Ed.) *Southeast Asian Transition*, published in memory of the late Professor H.J. Benda.

The governmental instrument for implementing policies in a modern state is the state bureaucracy or state *aparatur*, as it is called in Indonesia. A bureaucracy is characterized as being like a machine (rational/impersonal), without subjective elements (personal). This is an ideal state, as it is precisely these machine-like characteristics which make it effective in society. Its legality is based on the above characteristics. Its internal mechanism is regulated by laws which also operate automatically, without "prejudice". Promotions, receipts from the bureaucracy, salary or other income, personal position and the positions of the members individually, office (the outstanding feature of modern bureaucracy) particularly the hierarchy of superiors, inferiors and so on are all regulated by means of laws.[1]

A state surrenders its power to govern its people to this bureaucracy. One important aspect of this is that of finance. Allocations for office supplies differ from employee salaries. Personal income of employees (from inheritance, for example) is separate from salaries. If necessary, special funds are available to ensure the integrity of members of the bureaucracy, such as political funds, entertainment funds, and other miscellaneous funds, and these are all regulated by law as well. This financial aspect is important. If the bureaucracy is not provided with a sufficient budget for its needs, it will take with force what it cannot obtain by legal means.

Such a state bureaucracy is so effective that in situations such as Italy, or France under the Fourth Republic, when cabinet changes were frequent, the bureaucracy itself runs the govern-

---

* Translated by Wendy Gaylord Parsudi

1 Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 324.

ment. The rise and fall of a government upsets public life very little. On the other hand, the machine-like characteristics of a bureaucracy enable it to be used by any type of regime, whether democratic, fascist or dictatorial. In fact, even an enemy military occupation government can use an existing bureaucracy; a case in point being Germany's occupation of several European countries during World War II. In general the bureaucracies of the occupied countries continued functioning and began cooperating with the enemy, including the police and occasionally even the intelligence agencies. Strangely enough, after Germany was defeated and the European countries freed, in general no punitive actions were taken against most members of the bureaucracies which cooperated with the enemy, because that was considered to be the duty of bureaucracy. However, legal measures were taken against those political figures or other people who worked with the enemy.

On the other hand, administratively legal control over the bureaucracy was very strict. Modern bureaucracy has developed over the past two centuries. No matter how it has been criticized it is this modern bureaucracy which has provided the base for modern industries and institutions in twentieth century life. In choosing whether or not to have a modern bureaucracy the decision comes down to a choice between an orderly administration and one which is disorderly and amateurish (dilettantisme).

What do we know about the instruments of state in traditional states, for example in the Mataram kingdom (16th century)? This article will examine the problems of the instruments of power of traditional states, by which is meant states based not on laws, but on the sacred order (keramat).

Personal Links[2]

In Javanese kingdoms, both during the Hindu-Buddhist period and the Islamic period, the king was considered to be at the pinnacle of the ruling hierarchy. The king was a God-King, a concept origination in the Hindu-Buddhist period. Although the Islamic Mataram did not acknowledge the position of a God-King, by means of various rationalizations and legitimizations the king continued to maintain his magico-religious attributes and characteristics. He was a sort of God-King as interpreted from the viewpoint of the Islam in practice in Indonesia (Java) at the time.

Even though in theory the king was the reincarnation of God, in practice he could not automatically give orders and expect to be obeyed by his subjects. In other words, an intermediary was required between the king and his subjects. The king required administrators, and in Java this class was called the *priyayi* (*yayi*-younger brother of the king, in the abstract sense). The *priyayi* implemented the policy of the king and gave orders to the population in the interest of the king.

In traditional kingdoms great differences were often found between theory and practice or between concept and reality. High-sounding principles were often used only to give legitimation to the ruler and did not always result in concrete control. Not only was the king sacred (a God-King), but the princes and other state officials were as well. Magico-religious titles were apportioned according to how high or low one's position was, how great or small one's power, or how far or near one was from the ruler. The closest prince or the highest-ranking royal official received higher titles that those who had less po-

2   *Ibid.*

wer. This theory held that magico-religious power was based on position and status.[3] For example, a crown prince would be given a name showing his position, such as *Mangkubumi* ("He who holds the world on his lap"), while his father, the king, would be named *Hamengkubuwana* ("He who holds the universe on his lap") or *Pakubuwana* ("Axis of the universe"). Here the difference in status between *bumi* (world) and *buwana* (universe) is clear. A war commander, for example, would be given the title *Kusumoyudo* (Flower of War). A low-level officer would receive the title *Prawiranegara* or *Yudonegoro* (state commander), while an administrative official would be called *Sosro-negoro* (state scribe), and so on.

In outer regions local nobility had titles such as *adipati, tumenggung, kyai, ngabei,* etc. which did not always reflect sacred status but rather showed power over certain numbers of people. This was true of officials in the capital as well.

Titles originated from the king. This is where modern bureaucracy differs from the traditional state. There were personal links between the king and his functionaries in addition to objective methods of judgement, such as the legal system.

Those who became trusted functionaries—high-level officials—were war companions or personal retainers. Others who might become functionaries included local (regional) nobility who had been subjugated by the king yet were still allowed to hold office. The king's relatives, his siblings, uncles, nephews, etc. were considered with varying degrees of reservation and were frequently given positions only in the capital, i.e. in the *keraton*. In this way,

they could be kept under close observation as it was generally from among these princes that uprisings and competition for the throne broke out. Nevertheless, in general the dynastic family did take part in the government. Some of the princes were chosen to hold positions in the outer territories, because in the end it was not only the princely officials who caused problems of political control but rather all officials.

In using officials as functionaries of the monarchy, power was also delegated to them in accordance with their magico-sacred titles. However, here lay the greatest problem for the capital *(keraton)*, the necessity of ensuring some form of political control. In other words, the loyalty of the officials towards the king himself had to be guaranteed. Various methods were used to do this. Ideologically folktales, other teachings or wayang stories were used to praise the virtues of loyalty and to describe the results of the king's wrath at traitors (the story of *Hang Tuah*, for instance). Rebellious traitors were struck by misfortune, if not directly from the king, certainly from God. Ceremonies were often held where "rebellious" officials were reminded of the fate in store for traitors (the tale of *Keris Mpu Gandring* is one example; or that of *Batu Sriwijaya, The Sriwijaya Stone*, in which the stone reminded the *Datuk* that they ought not to be traitorous and that they might be required to undergo the ceremony of drinking water which had been poured over the Sriwijaya Stone).

More concretely the king often kept members of the families of high officials or local rulers in the *keraton*. Sometimes the reason given for this was that these family members, young *priyayi*, had to receive training in the capital, and that new officials would be chosen from among them, or that the king's

---

3   C. Geertz, *Islam Observed*, The University of Chicago Press, 1975.

sons-in-law would be chosen from among them. Living in the *keraton* for a young *priyayi*, the child of an official was pleasant. He did not feel like a political hostage, guaranteeing the loyalty of this father. Only if suspicion fell on his father did the young lord become aware of his predicament.

This characteristic of personal links between officials and local rulers with the king himself was often further guaranteed by means of marriage into the ruling dynasty. The *keraton* appeared to have had an almost limitless number of sons and daughters of royal blood. In reports from the early nineteenth century, when the Mataram kingdom still controlled nearly all of the interior of Central and East Java (not the coastal areas), it is surprising to see that it was not only the *bupati, adipati, tumenggung* and *ngabei* or *priyayi* who had blood ties with the royal family either through their parents or by marriage with royal princesses, but also influential village heads and *kyai* (religious scholars) or *perdikan-desa* (villages which were tax-exempt and labor-exempt because of their services in other areas).[4] Marriage alliances with the ruling dynasty did guarantee local positions for the *priyayi*, forged the most visible type of personal links between the king and his officials, and so finally more or less guaranteed their loyalty to the king.

Feodal Structure of the Monarchic Bureaucracy

The tools of the traditional monarchy have been discussed in general, i.e. that between the *priyayi* and the king himself there was a close relationship strengthened by such ties as magico-sacred levels, politics, hostages or dynastic (family). This differs from the modern bureaucracy where law and rational thinking are the basis for relationships. Now the officials themselves will be discussed, i.e. their social status, functions and other aspects. Here two groups of bureaucrats from the traditional monarchies will be discussed, i.e. the *priyayi* in Java and the *Orang-Kaya* in North Sumatera.

Priyayi

In traditional Javanese kingdom the *priyayi* were the direct *kawula* (lit. servant, vassal) of the king. The mass of the population were not *kawula* of the king, but submitted to and obeyed every official they came into contact with. In general the king paid little attention to the masses, for he only took the *priyayi* into consideration. Naturally a set of attitudes arose among the *priyayi* towards their own peasants, who were considered to be subjects under the *priyayi*. Therefore the *priyayi* had complete right to the riches and labor of those lower than themselves.

This oppressor mentality of the *priyayi* was strengthened because most of the dynasties *keratons* were established by the use of force, war or rebellion. Local rulers also emerged by subjugating others. Other than that, war and subjugation were nearly eternal aspects of the life of traditional kingdoms. If not used for expansion, force was used to subjugate particular groups within the kingdoms, eventually becoming the method of solving problems in daily life.[5]

War and conquest caused the emergence of a group of *priyayi* who were

4   Madiun local archives from the 1830's. ANRI (Arsip Nasional RI).

5   Soemarsaid Moertono, *State and Statecraft in Old Java*, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1968.

war commanders. Each *priyayi* for example, was given the right to a number of *cacah* (peasant families). This meant that the peasant population was divided into *cacah-cacah* or peasant families, which were not only considered as taxable units (providing both tribute and labor), but also made up military units (required to follow the *priyayi* appointed as their *Tuan*, or master, in battle). The *cacah* or peasants were bound militarily to the *priyayi*.

Within the circles of the king and the *priyayi* as the conquering group arose a similar outlook and mutual interest in the masses. For the benefit of the rulers (power holders) the view evolved that their power over the population was valid in the economic field as shown by tribute paid and in social status as shown by the ties of "voluntary" labor exacted. As the tax collectors and organizers of "voluntary" labor, both for themselves and for the king, the priyayi functioned as a tool of the royal administration. The royal administration here cannot, however, be considered to be something which was fixed. The amount of tribute and labor provided was variable and always was adjusted to fit the situation. It could be bargained over, which meant that the rulers would demand far more than reasonable amounts, and that those paying paid an amount far less than asked for. The impression gained from reports is that the amount received by the king via the system of tribute and "voluntary" labor was not very great. The largest portion went into the pockets of officials before reaching the king.[6] The main reason was that the accounting system of the Javanese kingdom was not controlled from the capital, but rather each official was autonomous, and

it was considered normal for each official to receive a "percent" or small portion of the tribute collected by an official, for example. Autonomy in the case of financial matters meant that each official was not paid a salary by the capital in cash. Payment for carrying out the duties of his position was also not made from above. There was no separation between personal and official requirements. Officials had to generate their own income from the *lungguh* (appanage; a number of *cacah* on a piece of land). Every peasant who had to deal with officials, including those who had rights to a *lungguh*, had to give the officials a "percent". However, a peasant who had rights to a *lungguh* also had to pay various princes or officials of the *keraton* before he could deliver his tribute or labor to the king.[7] Nevertheless, in principle the tribute still finally had to reach the hands of the king. What finally did fall into the king's hands was only a small fraction of the original and one characteristic of the traditional kingdoms was a chronic lack of money. In addition, the system of autonomous finances for officials led to the growth of a system of unofficial levies. One could say that with the system of autonomous finances the officials paid for themselves and their posts by means of levies on the population, wich at that time were not illegal, but legal.

Another element which stood out in government systems of the past was the large number of intermediaries before one reached the desired person. Three factors caused this situation. Firstly, everyone wanted to profit from state affairs. This was one important source of livelihood. Secondly, every official measured his prestige and social

6 *Ibid.*

7 *Ibid.*

and political status by the number of retainers surrounding him (today these would be called his staff). The retainers of an official had to find as much supplementary income for themselves as they could. Meanwhile, the officials, who did not deem it necessary to support their retainers because the retainers lived by receiving a "percent" of the tribute etc., could increase the number of retainers to nearly unlimited amounts. Those who suffered most from this system were the tribute-payers and those who had to perform labor for the ruler, i.e. the peasants in the villages. Thirdly, the large number of middlemen surrounding a ruler was also the result of the *priyayi* attitude, i.e. that they were above all wordly matters and therefore must act indifferent to whatever occurred among their inferiors. By means of their attitude of indifference and distance the *priyayi* were guarding their prestige in the eyes of the peasants, because the *priyayi* themselves did not know the sacrifices demanded from or burdens put upon the shoulders of the peasants.[8] This was also the reason that the lowest classes or people from outside the area or even foreigners—i.e. Chinese or Arabs—were often used as instruments of exploitation. Such foreigners were more efficient. The *priyayi* could be more open towards them because they were not required to save face.[9]

At the end of the 18th century it was reported that in the Mataram kingdom several *demang* and *bekel*, i.e. tax-collectors at the village level, were Chinese. It was said that they were able to collect more money and exact more

labor from the peasants than local residents were. These *demang* and *bekel* were non-*priyayi* officials. Normally, if they were not held by foreigners, the positions were held by prominent people in the villages who were appointed by the *lungguh*-holder *(priyayi)* or the king to be collectors of tax and labor. Later the position of village head probably grew out of this position.

It was stated above that the *priyayi* made up one class, but in fact this class was limited by the dependence of the *priyayi* on the king's whims. In principal the position of a *priyayi* or an official was not inherited, but rather depended on the king's desires, although practice and principle often differed. Even more important was the hierarchy in the carrying out of duties which should have been completed by an official. The retainer who actually did the tasks gained power over his superior and the official's function was taken over by the retainer. The same principle was in effect among the *priyayi* officials themselves, for instance the duties of a *patih* (vizier) might be taken over by an active *bupati* of the *keraton* court. Such shift of function and power were caused by the lack of a definite administrative line and finally depended on individuals in the government of the kingdom.

Orang Kaya

Neither the priyayi as a group nor the Mataram kingdom were the only examples of traditions of Indonesian government. Other kingdoms existed, including those of Melayu, Aceh, Bugis, etc. We cannot review all of them here. Mataram will be compared to Aceh, a kingdom in North Sumatera which was also large and approximately contemporary to Mataram, i.e. early seven-

---

8   Onghokham, "The Inscrutable and the Paranoid: An Investigation into the sources of the Brotodiningrat Affair", in *Southeast Asian Transitions*, ed. R.T. McVey, pp. 110 ff.

9   J. Crawfurd, "Report on Kedu", Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia.

teenth century.[10] However, differing from Mataram which was agrarian in character, Aceh was a maritime kingdom.

Whereas in Mataram the ruling group was called the *priyayi*, in Aceh this group was called the *Orang-Kaya* (meaning men who were *Daya* or *Jaya*, a term closest to the current terms of "official" or "elite"). The term *Orang-Kaya* was also used for the power-holders in Sulawesi, in Sumateran kingdoms and in general in Indonesia. This did not mean that in all places their positions were the same an that of the *Orang-Kaya* in the Acehnese kingdoms. Differing from the *priyayi* in Mataram, the Acehnese *Orang-Kaya* did not collect taxes or have the right to exact labor from the local peasants. Feudal ties with the peasants were practically non-existent, except in the case of war. Aceh was a maritime and trading state. Control of trade was the aim, from the sultan to the *Orang-Kaya*, who were also known by the term *Hulebalang*. The *Hulebalang* controlled local trade and often controlled the mouths of rivers and other small ports. This control gave the *Hulebalang* the right to levy a 5 percent tax on all imports and exports, and an even higher tax on pepper and areca nut. The *Hulebalang* also often paid for the planting of pepper and other export commodities. In this manner they controlled the trade in export commodities as well as having the right to the duties from them.

The *Hulebalang* were actually no more than war commanders, capitalists and local traders.[11] They did not surrender

10   A. Reid, *The Blood of the People, Revolution and the End of the Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatera*, Oxford University Press, K.I., 1979.

11   D. Lombard, *Le Sultanat d'Atjeh Au Temps d'Iskandar Muda 1607-1639*, Paris, 1967.

tribute or provide labor to the sultan, or to the central government. From the 18th century the sultans appeared to be no more than "puppets". If the sultans tried to sign trade agreements with foreign companies such as the (Dutch) VOC the *Hulebalang* forced them to invalidate them. From the rule of Iskandar Muda (1907-1936) power slowly reverted to the hands of the elite, something which did not occur in Mataram despite the fact that there the control of the capital over the regions also underwent a ch ange.

Aristocracy Versus Monarchy

One problem faced by the traditional kingdoms, both Mataram and Aceh, was that of conflict of interests and competition for power between the king and the *priyayi* or *Orang-Kaya*. Both the *priyayi* and the *Orang-Kaya* were quite powerful and were difficult to control. Officials were autonomous and independent both in financial terms (did not receive fixed salaries from the capital; income was a result of their own efforts), and in the political arena, having power over their retainers or their peasants. Competition for power between the elite and the king, whether at the central or regional level practically could not be avoided.

In Mataram rebellions often occured both in the regions (Trunojoyo, 1672) and in the capital, for example from within the royal family itself (Diponegoro, 1825-1830). In this case it seems that the rebellion of the *priyayi* or princes against the power of the king often centered on a leader who wanted to bring down the dynasty or replace the king, so that the rebellion would upset the entire life of the kingdom. Steps to quell a rebellion could finally only be taken by the king with the aid of the VOC and at a very high price.

The regions of Mataram were eventually forced to be granted freedom and regional rulers then allied their interests with the Dutch, or, as the Dutch said, "placed themselves under the protection of Dutch power". For the Dutch who only wanted to obtain agrarian products, it was the same whether they obtained them via the Mataram king or via the coastal *bupati*. Therefore, the Mataram kingly alliances which originally aimed at strengthening the position of the king and the capital against that of the princes, priyayi in the capital and the regions, finally caused the kingdom to disintegrate into separate areas. Firstly this occurred in West Java, then along the north coast and finally the East and West Mancanegara (outer provinces) were freed from the control of the monarch.

Differing from the process in Mataram, the *Orang-Kaya* in Aceh had a variety of powers over the center from the beginning, such as the influence to choose new sultans, etc. The third and largest sultan of Aceh, a man of the same period as Sultan Agung of Mataram, Iskandar Muda, was forced to murder all of the *Orang-Kaya* and to appoint new ones from among his own retainers when he wanted to reign as an absolute monarch. These new *Orang-Kaya* were closely supervised and kept on a tight rein throughout the period of this rule. Nevertheless, the radical measures taken by Iskandar Muda did not alter the consciousness of mutual interest of the Acehnese *Orang-Kaya*. After the death of Iskandar Muda in 1936 the *Orang-Kaya* regained their right to choose the new sultan of Aceh. The *Orang-Kaya* went so far as to choose several female sultans rather than males in order to guarantee that the throne was not occupied by a powerful person, and so the sultanate was turned into a puppet institution in the hands of the *Orang-Kaya*.

In Aceh it appears that the political process set into motion by the conflict between monarch and elite did not revolve around a charismatic leader such as Trunojoyo or Diponegoro, who desired to replace either the dynasty or the king. It ran by means of the actions of one group againsts the monarch, and by a bargaining process over the division of power between the two groups. The result: the monarchy remained intact until the Dutch attacked in 1870, ending with Dutch military occupation in Aceh until 1942. In Java, on the other hand, the political process caused the integration of the power of the *priyayi* with that of the Dutch.

What actually caused such a great difference between the political processes in Aceh and Mataram? One tentative hypothesis is that the difference in political processes was possibly due to the differences in each state's objectives. Aceh appeared to be concerned only with control of trade, with the exception of the period of Iskandar Muda; while Mataram lived off the tribute and labor of its peasants. In Mataram only the monarch's position gave absolute power. The existing structure was feudal in character with personalities between people being of great importance. In Aceh, however, competition between the *Orang-Kaya (Hulebalang)* and the sultan, particularly in the field of trade, made the political process there seem like a competition between traders. The *Orang-Kaya* had as their objective only the usurping of the sultan's position as holder of monopolies in trade and in other areas such as duty-collection, etc. Without a change of dynasty or sultanate the *Orang-Kaya* could generally attain their objectives because even tribute to the sultan did not have to be paid. The sultan had only his title, but

his position was in fact no different from that of any other *Orang-Kaya*. In short, in order to make an extreme and general differentiation, one could say that competition between the *priyayi* and the king in Mataram revolved around power, while in Aceh competition between the *Orang-Kaya* and the sultan was dominated by competition in trade and fund-raising efforts.

The Acehnese *Orang-Kaya* were in fact more than businessmen and traders, for they were also the military elite which took over the functions of the traditional elite. In the war duties of the *Hulebalang* can also be seen an important aspect of the elite of the traditional kingdoms, i.e. that both the *priyayi* and the *Orang-Kaya* were, at the most basic level class of military elite. One important function of this elite was to wage war and porovide military leadership. This is what separated them from the run-of-the-mill peasants.

This differs from Europe in the Middle Ages. At that time the elite in Europe had a monopoly on weapons because of their armor, horses and fortresses. In Indonesia armor was not highly developed. Monopolies of the military elite lay in different areas. Nevertheless there were monopolies, for instance, of elephants. The most powerful military weapons in Asia during that period were guns and cannons, usually owned by the king. The *priyayi* also owned powerful magico-sacred weapons such as sacred heirloom *keris,* or heirloom spears or others not owned by the peasant farmers.

In the final analysis the military superiority of both the *Orang-Kaya* and the *priyayi* over the peasants was possibly due to better leadership.[12] The secrets of military leadership such as the formations of battle lines, among other things, were known only to the elite aided by religious leaders or astrologers. Military formations were often based on astrology and astrologers could forecast the best times for battles. Military superiority in the minds of people of that period was magical and sacred in character, and the elite had these qualities. Military and civil positions were not differentiated[13] during that period and a position in itself guaranteed economic status in political/economic terms and in other ways to the members of the traditional elite.

Consequences of Weaknesses in the Traditional Structure

Above we have shown how difficult it was to supervise the operations of traditional kingdoms, both Mataram and Aceh. Consciousness of the difficulty of controlling a wide area possibly gave birth to a concept of regional power differing from our conceptions of the area of a state. The extent of area of the throne and the king was important. The center of the kingdom was important. If any outlying areas were considered, at most these were territories immediately surrounding the *keraton,* called the *negara-agung,* areas exploited by and governed directly by the *keraton.* It is true that Mataram had areas other than the *negara-agung,* such as the east and west *mancanegara,* i.e. areas bordering the coastal *negara-agung* (north coast) and areas abroad, but such territories were only seen as an influence on the greatness and security of the central *keraton.*[14] The *keraton* broadcast its influence over the

12 M.C. Rickleffs, *Yogyakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi, 1749-1792,* London, 1974.

13. Soemarsaid Moertono, *op.cit.*

14 B.R. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture" in *Culture and Politics in Indonesia,* Claire Holt ed. with the assistance of B.R.O.G. Anderson and J. Siegel, Ithaca, New York, 1972.

areas mentioned above, and the farther an area was from the *keraton* the less influence the *keraton* had and the less dangerous that area was.[15]

This was also the reason that Mataram could let territory after territory fall into Dutch hands, as long as the *keraton* received VOC aid and was guaranteed security. In the end Mataram did not control the coastal areas, and other areas which did not affect the greatness of the *keraton* freed themselves from the *keraton* as well.[16]

Due to the difficulty of supervising and governing outlying regions battles fought by the kingdom were rarely aimed at annexing territory. Conquered territories were generally forced to surrender hostages, including the local elite and the royal princes or others with dynastic ties to the *keraton,* and were forbidden to trade or to produce goods by the royal monopoly of the conquering kingdom. Nevertheless direct government by the conquering kingdom over the conquered kingdom or area never occurred. The apparatus of traditional kingdoms was too weak. Tribute and labor were a different sort of subjugation.

The weakness of the governmental apparatus of traditional kingdoms resulted in a different method of dealing with territories which the king considered to require subjugation, and it caused a great deal of suffering at that time. Battles were fought with the aim of totally destroying the enemy territory and eradicating it from the world map. To accomplish this the town of the enemy ruler was destroyed while the crop-bearing lands were burned to the ground, and the local population was transported to the victorious *keraton.* The enemy captives then became slaves to fulfill production and labor requirements, for the traditional kingdoms were always faced with a lack of manpower. Sultan Agung, for example, destroyed Surabaya and attempted to stop all forms of opposition from Madura by interning all 40,000 of its inhabitants.[17] Various areas of Semenanjung Melayu such as Pahang, Perak, etc, submitted to Aceh which had a monopoly on pepper production in those areas, but when control began to diminish Iskandar Muda ordered the areas destroyed. Aceh did not want the pepper production of the Semenanjung Melayu area to fall into the hands of Aceh's trade competitors. Pepper plantations were burned to the earth, and 22,000 people were taken prisoner and transported to Aceh, but only 1,500 reached Aceh alive.[18] At that period so much manpower was required that the suffering and lives of individuals lost was of no account.

Terror of this sort was not only carried out against enemies outside the *keraton,* but was often also aimed at opposition within the *keraton* itself. A mass murder of political followers and their families could occur with no warning or, alternatively, executions or trials in court could occur. Murder could be committed against a high official or a prince; or in a less harsh situation any official under suspicion could be arrested and exiled.[19] The kingdom's policy of terror was a part of the effort to instill a fear of the state's ability to crush its enemies, both internal and external. This policy was designed to conceal the real weaknesses of the state apparatus. Terror carried out by the traditional kingdoms in fact showed

15 M.C. Rickleffs, *op.cit.*
16 H.J. de Graff, *Sultan Agung,* The Hague, 1958.

17 D. Lombard, *Loc.cit.*
18 M.C. Rickleffs, *Modern Javanese Historical Tradition,* London, 1978.
19 *Serat Centini*

that there were other weaknesses in the organizational structure of the kingdom. The state was apparently only able to mobilize its apparatus for a single action and objective within a short, specific period of time. The kingdoms could not give rise to apparatus which could be supervised constantly. They depended too much on human, personal factors and not on objective factors; because the rules had great individual autonomy, each with his own power. They made up a caste which was turned into an instrument of the kingdom and not something impersonal such as the modern bureaucracy.

Espionage

The personal factors of the instrument of state gave rise to another policy, i.e. the intelligence system (espionage). If there was one part of the governmental system of all these kingdoms which was fairly efficient it was the system of obtaining information through the use of spies. The whole *priyayi* and *Orang-Kaya* apparatus was kept in check by having people spy on every person within it. Information on the actions, discussions, and, if possible, plans of the *priyayi,* princes, etc. was always in demand. The moves a person made and the guests he received from outside had to be reported; and family ties among *priyayi* or religious leaders, their wealth, valuable goods, production of weapons, etc. were constantly monitored.[20]

Information from spies had several weaknesses. Firstly, information was limited to personal matters, and did not include methods of governing, as that was not the objective. Secondly, information obtained from spies had to be used very carefully and diplomatically.

Personal factors such as revenge, the surrendering of information piece by piece in order to appear diligent and alert, and the like often were factors in the reports of spies who tried to tell the ruler what he wanted to hear. In other words he worked to confirm a suspicion of the ruler concerning a certain *priyayi* or prince. In short, the information provided by spies could hurt rather than help the king if not handled wisely. The espionage system could easily support the rise of a system of repressive tyranny and thus cause rebellion and opposition among the *priyayi.* The weapon of espionage was in the end liable to boomerang and hurt the monarchy instead. In the history of the Dutch East Indies government, not just once or twice but often a *residen* or other Dutch official lost his position because of abuse from and blind trust in the information given by spies; possibly because the spies intrigued extremely craftily.[21] The use of spies thus created an atmosphere of suspicion, something which was, in fact, a major element in the government of traditional kingdoms, and increased the suspicion of superiors towards inferiors, often causing the distegration of the government apparatus.

The espionage corps was not specialized, and its members were not recruited from any one group such as the *priyayi* or the *ulama.* Rather, anyone could become a spy, a "democratic" element, if one could call it that, in the traditional kingdom. However, a spy did not have the authority to act on this own. He was only a source of information, not an implementor of policy. Servants, personal staff or *priyayi,* concubines, masseurs, etc. with no limitations due to social class, could become spies.

20 Onghokham, *op.cit.*

21 B. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies,* The Hague, 1957, Vol. I.

Information often came not from official spies, but from someone who for one reason or another gave information to the capital. Information from this type of informer may have been given because the local population feared the capital, or hated the local ruler or for similar reasons.

In addition to espionage the capital often sent missions to regions ruled by an official of the capital, a trusted prince or minister. These people were often ambassadors *(ministeriales)* only and were always trusted men. These ambassadors of the king did not only oversee the local *priyayi* and report on them, but also occasionally were given the right to take action concerning a local official. The position of these ambassadors of the king was thus slightly more powerful than that of the spies.[22]

Ideology and Religion

So far we have reviewed the traditional kingdom and its physical aspects, i.e. the instruments of the government and the class attitudes of such instruments, as well as the consequences of the weak structure of the kingdom on the concept of territory, and the method of warfare and of control over the whole structure by means of espionage and terror towards the opposition. Now we shall discuss two aspects which are no less important, i.e. ideology and religion. These two elements are inseparable from the traditional kingdom, possibly from every state, both traditional and modern. In traditional kingdom ideology functioned as something which was applied from the top for the population, while in modern states ideology is the property of the whole society and its expression is an automatic reflex (example: in modern staes

the badminton team's victory automatically arouses great enthusiasm, or war gives rise to a spirit of nationalism without orders from above).

Ideology in the traditional kingdom tied the lower classes of the population to the upper (the king) classes and centered on the king, the throne and the *keraton*. The greatness of the king and the *keraton* were the main factors. Various writers have discussed the greatness, the wisdom and the sacredness of the king. If was said that treachery would befall a person who was treacherous. Only two choices were given, the greatness of the king and his court or great chaos. Possibly there was some truth in this. The king and the life of the court were the peak of the civilization of the kingdom.

It was in the *keraton* that artists created a variety of arts and provided entertainment; and also where ceremonies of state took place. Thus people say that the traditional state was like a state in a drama or a country on the state, i.e. political life and the concept and structure of ideology were acted out in public ceremonies and were presented visually to the people.[23]

It is true that the choice between the existence or absence of a king and his court was the same as the choice between civilization and chaos for the elite. The court guaranteed a good, civilized life. Nevertheless, the elite also got involved in politics and often got so involved as to bring disaster upon themselves. Here lay the weakness of traditional kingdoms which suppressed ideology as an instrument of control without developing any other concrete instrument of control.

Religion was also connected with ideology as it also had structure, and had religious leaders or *ulama* who

22 C. Geertz, *op.cit.*

23 Soemarsaid Moertono, *op.cit.*

brellas, specific batik cloths, kabupaten, ceremonies, etc. The position of the *bupati* was also guaranteed and was inherited insofar as possible in terms the ability, education and suitability of the successor.

Until the end of the Dutch East Indies rule, the *priyayi* still functioned as the political supporters of the Dutch East Indies, while important ceremonies of the priyayi were used to cover up colonial occupation. The priyayi were nonetheless increasingly tied to the Dutch East Indies bureaucratic organization which expressed the loss of their political power in the eyes of the Dutch.[29] However it was exactly this characteristic of being a political instrument which was unable to make the *pangrehpraja* into an effective tool against society, because finally reality won in the battle against the darkness.

29 See Onghokham, "The inscrutable and the Paranoid: An Investigation into the Sources of The Brotodiningrat Affair," in *Southeast Asian Transitions*, ed. R.T. McVey.

Political Systems and Development: Reflections on an Asian Research

By Soedjatmoko

Problems in adjusting to the needs of nation building and econo-mic development can often lead towards a system the author refers to as the modernizing bureaucratic state, in its various combinations of civilian and military, rightwing and leftwing manifestations. This article examines the effects such modern bureaucratic states may have on the political and economic systems of a number of develop-ing countries.

Dr. Soedjatmoko is rector of the newly established United Nations University located in Tokyo, Japan. He is a former Ambassador to USA (1968-1971) and Social and Cultural Advisor to the National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS) in Jakarta. He is also Member of the Board of Directors of the International Institute for Humanistic Studies (Aspen, Colorado), Board of Trustees of Ford Foundation (New York) and the Club of Rome (Italy). He has pu-blished numerous articles and is editor of *An Introduction to Indo-nesian Historiography* (1965).

Any discussion on the state of the po-litical sciences in Asia, and the direc-tion they should take, will inevitably have to be conducted against the back-ground of the major, and sometimes even cataclysmic, events which during the last 30 years have taken place in the Asian region. Among these are the break-up of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh, China's sudden lurch from narrow ideological purity to prag-matic modernization, Iran's popular re-volution and the threatening collapse of Cambodia as a nation and as a civiliza-tion.

Events of this magnitude have left po-litical scientists and development theo-rists deeply aware of the distance that still has to be covered before develop-ment economics and political science become adequate in providing the sys-tematic knowledge, the concepts, and the analytical tools that will enhance our understanding of the dynamics of social change, and the predictive power to which the social sciences have always aspired. With hindsight it is now clear how much, in its preoccupation with growth and its stages, and with the pro-vision of capital and skills, development theory has paid insufficient attention to institutional and structural problems, and to the power of historical and cul-tural factors.

Likewise, only belatedly did political development theory realize the centrali-ty of the problem of power, in develop-ing countries, its generation, its use and expenditure, its maintenance and its limits. It has now also become clear that power is not always multipurpose. Some kinds of power for instance, be-cause of the way it was generated, its structure, its style, are better capable of managing solidarity making, while others are more suited for development of some kind. A critical assessment of

the state of the art in Asia will therefore have to take into account the impact of the development efforts undertaken in most of the countries in Asia, on the political system, the increasing dominance of centralizing and authoritarian tendencies, leaving freedom embattled in many places. In much of the Western literature there emerged the assumption that authoritarianism was a necessary and inevitable condition for development, and the concern for freedom was quietly dropped from the agenda of economic and political development theory alike.

In light of the great changes that have taken place in Asia, but also in Latin America and Africa, we now have to ask ourselves what these events should teach us about the interaction between political systems and development, and its impact on the dynamics of freedom and oppression. This question forces us to broaden the canvas on which economics and the social sciences in general are trying to reconstruct social reality. The breakdown of the first generation of post-independence political systems in many countries and the traditionalist backlash against modernization, obviously also require analysis of much greater depth, and a much clearer recognition of the power of the historical forces which at one point or another have changed, or are changing, the shape and the workings of our societies and our states. There is obviously also a need for a much better understanding of the political dynamics inherent in the development process, the political implications of the choice of development goals, of the means to achieve them, of the social and ethical dilemmas that have to be faced in the development process, almost each step of the way. It is no exaggeration to state that even the concept of development itself has now become problematical, and we are witnessing the search for more humane and equitable alternatives to the conventional notions about development.

The First Generation Political Systems

Such an assessment should take as its point of departure, the demise of the first generation of political systems after the attainment of independence, in most, though not all, of the developing countries in Asia. This first generation, patterned after the Westminster of continental European forms of parliamentarism, turned out to be incapable of dealing effectively with a number of problems. Right from the beginning, extraordinarily heavy demands were put on these young systems, stemming from the ethnic, religious, or language pluralism which characterized most of the new states. They were confronted with a legacy of deep internal cleavages, conflict and even rebellion, arising, in part from the arbitrariness of colonial boundaries, but also because of colonial preference for one ethnic group above the other, and their use at times of one against the others. In several cases conflict of this type were aggravated by external claims and subversion.

In addition, the colonial economy tended to develop only those resources which suited the needs of the metropolitan power, thus leaving behind a structure of economic and social inequality. These inequalities also left their imprint on the composition of the indigenous colonial elite, which in turn was often reflected in the composition of the leadership of the nationalist movements for independence.

It is therefore not surprising that the early years of independence saw the emphasis on nation-building, a process which had taken Europe centuries of

war, absolute kingship, and internal violence, on welding ethnically and culturally disparate groups, each often with a strong sense and pride in their own uniqueness, into a single nation. This was done through the building of national organisations and institutions, within an overarching national framework of national solidarity.

This accounted for pressures towards the concentration of power in the executive, and often towards a single political party. Whether such pressures could be resisted in favor of a pluralistic system, often depended, apart from ideological predilections, on the mode in which independence was attained. Such pressures tended to be grater in the wake of successful revolution. They tended to be weaker when independences had come as a result of a political settlement, not preceded by too much political violence.

In some cases, these centralizing tendencies were reinforced by real or perceived external threats, or by armed domestic conflict resulting from separatist or centrifugal tendencies, buttressed by the easy availability of arms, and especially of explosives. The easy fabrication of explosives made it for a brief period seem relatively easy for determined minorities to compel governments to consider their demands.

In addition, it became increasingly clear that the nation would not be viable, or capable of maintaining its integrity in the face of external threats, except at higher levels of economic output. This meant economic development, including the transformation of a dualistic lopsided export oriented economy limited to a few comodities, totally dependent on the metropolitan economy and with a communication system which only served the needs of the metropolitan power, into a national economy.

It also meant overcoming the structural imbalances, between central and periphery, among regions, between city and countryside, between the modern and the traditional agrarian sector, and between the foreign and the indigenous sector.

On top of these pressures on the political systems, additional pressures were generated by the dynamics of the development process itself. These were the inevitable result of the scrarcity of development resources, the priority needs of the central government, the unevenness of the development process itself stemming from different aptitudes for development among different ethnic groups, thereby upsetting sometimes very delicate social balances, and of course the differences in resource endowment in the various regions of the country.

In addition, most development models had a built-in imbalance in the terms of trade between the urban and the rural sector, to the disadvantage of the rural areas. Development policies often reflected a natural urban bias which tended to strengthen the position of the urban elite. Foreign investment, trade and aid tended to reinforce this. In many developing countries this led to a pattern of industrialisation which catered to the consumer needs or the elite instead of those of the majority of the population. Difficulties in overcoming structural obstacles to the consolidation of fragmented domestic markets into a single one, further reinforced this tendency. It led to a self-reinforcing type of economic distortion with serious long term political implications, for it made impossible to integrate traditionally neglected, marginalized segments of the population into the mainstream of national life.

The viability of the first generation of political systems after independence,

depended therefore on its capacity for nation building, its capacity to develop a national consensus on the goals and the means of development, as well as on the restructuring of the economy. The latter depended very much on the pattern of distribution of productive assets, and on the social stratification resulting from it. In addition, the level of industrial development inherited from the colonial period and the quality of the country's resources endowment, very much determined the available latitude for such structural reform and for the basic reallocation of limited resources this required.

The difficulties in adjusting to the requirements of nation-building and economic development, were further aggravated by increasing population pressure on resources, a rapidly growing youth cohort reflecting a lowering of the median age in many Asian countries. Heightened expectations, as well as a high degree of politisation of the rural and urban masses, in various countries, led to additional pressures towards centralization and authoritarianism and towards the replacement of what was essentially a conciliation system by a performance system: the Modernizing Bureaucratic State, in its various combinations of civilian and military, rightwing and leftwing manifestations.

The Rise of the Modernizing Bureaucratic State

The tendencies in this direction were further reinforced by the re-emergence of traditional notions of authority, as the first generation of political leaders, with usually strong attachments to western democratic ideals, were replaced either through attrition or through political violence, by a younger generation shaped by war, military occupation, and in some cases, revolution, and

whose social vision was almost entirely shaped by the collective memory of the remnants of a patrimonial state in colonial society. In fact, the trend towards authoritarianism and centralization embodied in the modernizing bureaucratic state (MBS) may have a great deal to do with the political culture that constitutes the environment in which this particular type of state has emerged. There is a striking similarity between the notions modern officialdom holds in the modernizing bureaucratic state, and the strongly hierarchical societal conceptions underlying the patrimonial state of olden times. These had been shaped by traditional notions of divine kings and authority relations, specifically the permanent nature of the subordination of the governed to the governing.

One also senses the continued prevalence of traditional concepts of power, which were, either divinely or cosmically sanctioned, or considered a reflection of a ruler's state of inner perfection. Often, traditional languages served through the socialization of the children-to perpetuate hierarchical perceptions of society. The weak position of the productive middle-class within the patrimonial state in the MBS may also have something to do with the aversion to trade on the part of the ruling class. The style of governing in the patrimonial state where the king's utterances were final, to be unquestioningly obeyed and implemented, often, though certainly not in all cases, seems reflected in the operating style of the MBS and its emphasis on national discipline.

The Bureaucracy

In most developing countries in Asia, either because of the weakness of a pro-

ductive middle class, or because of ideological preference from the right as well as from the left, the government bureaucracy became a major, and in some countries even, the main instrument of development.

It was next to the armed forces the most effective national organization, encompassing the whole country and including most if not all, the different ethnic, racial and religious groups. It would be a mistake to overlook this important integrative function of the bureaucracy. The developmental role assigned to the government bureaucracy however, led to a concentration of power in the bureaucracy, eroding the strength of the political parties and the press, which eventually often ceased to be effective countervailing forces which could maintain some degree of social control on the bureaucracy.

As a result bureaucratic internal control mechanisms proved to be too weak, and waste and corruption became rampant, unchecked by external balances. It also led to the overbureaucratization of the countryside, making that sector even more dependent on the urban sector and bureaucracy as well. This process was facilitated by the fact that the government in many countries was already the largest single employer, enjoying great traditional prestige, and absorbing a large part of the descendents of the governing elite in the traditional patrimonial or colonial state. With such an uncontrolled selfserving bureaucracy, decisions soon tended to be taken on the basis of bureaucratic convenience rather than on the merits of the case. In some countries this reached the point where the bureaucracy itself became a major obstacle to further development. Especially at the stage where peasant initiatives, peasant organisations and private entre-

preneurship become crucial elements in the later stages of development.

The Military and the Modernizing Bureaucratic State

In an important sense, the role the military have assumed in development should be seen as an extension of bureaucratic power, or rather, as a reflection of the need of the bureaucracy to maintain its effectiveness. The rise to power of the military, if not a natural consequence of a long and violent struggle for independence, often came as the result of fears and conflicts within the civilian body politic. These reflected deep cleavages within the policy running along ideological communal, or geographical lines. The intervention of the military was in some cases warmly welcomed because it helped to maintain precarious balances, or to stabilize new balances within the country. The gravitation of power towards the military in some cases also had to do with the existence of external threats to the security of the nation. Once in power however, that role developed its own dynamics based on the corporate interests of the army, and of its individual members.

It did so by reserving particular segments of economic activities to itself or to its individual members, thus giving the army a stake in the perpetuation of its role through continuous efforts at "de-politicising" civilian society. In such cases, what was left in the way of political life was often simply civilian manifestations of competing factions within the armed forces or more specifically within their intelligence services.

It should at the same time also be said that the armed forces were often relatively the best organized institution in the country, and their entry into the development field opened up a source of

managerial man-power of considerable quality. It was often also the most modern organisation, more decisive, better trained, especially at the middle and lower levels, than the civilian bureaucracy, whose ranks had been blasted through the political patronage of successive political parties in power. Over time vested interests of this kind added to the rigidity of the political and economic system.

Not in all modernizing bureaucratic states has this shift of the focus of power towards the military taken place. In some cases, the concept of civilian rule was too strongly rooted, and the military too far removed from the traditional center of power to make a rapid shift in that direction possible. In other cases, the armed forces simply did, for a variety of historical reasons, not have the nationalistic credentials to claim power with any degree of legitimacy. Sometimes political fragmentation turned out to be so pervasive and complex that there was no way in which the army could hope to build a civilian supporting coalition or to achieve civilian acquiescence. They had to accept that, as long as the level of political violence remained low, the political process rather than coerciveness had to be relied upon for an adequate degree of national cohesion and purpose.

In Columbia, Latin America, a long period of political violence was ended, when the two major contending parties finally agreed on a formula for both sharing and alternating power over a period of 14 years, while maintaining regular elections. At the end of the agreed period, the two political parties would each compete on their own again. During that period the foundation for political stability and economic growth became well established, and

up to this point civilian rule has continued. Mexico has developed a different system in which, again after long periods of political violence and revolution, the armed forces, the labor movement, the bureaucracy and the intellectuals were fused into a single party, the PRI, although several smaller parties remained in existence. The overwhelming majority position of this party did manage to ensure stability for more than 35 years, and effectively prevented the concentration of power in the armed forces only. A host of other problems have since emerged, which now threaten the prospect of long term stability, but these are, for the purposes of this part of our analysis, irrelevant. The central point which emerges from this discussion is the obvious, but not always perceived, one, that the most crucial problem in the return to civilian rule is the need for a firmly and freely conceived consensus among the civilian political forces.

Government Enterprises

The importance in the MBS of the government's own role in development, is reflected in the rapid growth of the public sector. Government enterprises in a number of developing countries have become the largest element in the modern sector, surpassing the foreign and domestic private sectors, even in countries which show no trace of governmental interest in socialist ideologies. They are essentially further extensions of the bureaucracy, with special links to top level civilian and military bureaucrats. The rapid growth of these government enterprises often outstrip the governments capacity to control them. In many cases, some of the larger government enterprises determine pretty well on their own their re-investment or diversification policies, building, their

own economic empires within the state. They have become a convenient source for extrabudgetary funding for election purposes or the funding of particular pet projects. In short, some of the most powerful of them have almost become a state within a state, beyond accountability to either government or parliament. They have become an important political factor by themselves. It has taken some governments considerable effort to bring them under some degree of control.

The Transnational Corporations and the Modernizing Bureaucratic State

The modernizing bureaucratic state of the right have, on the whole, been quite hospitable to the transnational corporations, and close links are usually established between these corporations and the bureaucratic elite. Because of their capacity to bring in capital and to mobilize additional resources, and also because of their capacity to provide employment, the transnational corporations have undoubtedly contributed to the economic growth rate of most countries. It was also hoped that these corporations would act as channels for the transfer of technology and know-how, as well as management skills. These hopes were only partially met, and this has led to demands on the part of Third World countries for more direct, and for more effective ways of transferring science and technology. Considerable resistance against the continued role of the transational corporations has also developed because of the distorting impact on the economic growth patterns of the host country. As a result of their capacity to present more effective and increasingly large claims on domestic financial resources, as well as their tendency to turn joint

ventures into wholly owned subsidiaries, and because of superior marketing techniques, which create excessive and distorted consumer's demands among the elite as well as the poor, enhancing the structure of economic dependency, was seen to be further strengthened. The various notorious cases of corruption and political interference have naturally added to this kind of resistance.

In various developing countries attempts have been made to bring the operations of the transnational corporations more in line with development policies and interests of the host government, through government regulations regarding increasing domestic content of their product, indigenisation of personnel, including the management staff, and even nationalisation of the subsidiaries. Their ineffectiveness have led to Third World demands for a New International Economic Order, and to insistence on an international code of conduct, more effective ways of untied science and technology transfer, and even to ideas about Third World representation in the control of transnational corporations.

Technology Choice and Power Distribution

Apart from a more effective and independent access to science and technology, which would reduce economic and political dependency, the domestic use and development of science and technology has proven to have important implications for the political development of the country. The tendency of both government bureaucracies and the private sector always to look for the latest technology in industrial production, sometimes in the genuine belief that the latest is the best, but also because of a degree of over protection of labor, which made firing a bureau-

cratically difficult problem, has led to a general preference for capital intensive, labor saving machinery, thus increasing unemployment pressures. Also, more efficient modern production techniques, especially in the textile, food and beverages industry, destroyed many small enterprises, using local materials and providing local employment. The introduction of mechanisation in agriculture has thrown many people out of work, especially women, without providing alternative work opportunities.

Each piece of technology is part of a social system. It effects the social system into which it is introduced through changes in the pattern of ownership and control, and of the clientele served. Each technological choice therefore affects the pattern of power distribution. A technological jump from simple technology to capital intensive, high technology, might take a particular production process outside the control of the original small producer. It would tend to shift the balance of power between urban and rural areas even further in favor of the urban center. The importance of intermediate technology lies among other things, in the possibility of the villager to maintain ownership and control, while preparing himself and his organisation for the next step on the technological ladder. On a macro scale, the development of nuclear energy would tend to strengthen centralisation, while softer forms of energy would be more conducive to decentralized patterns of development. Technology may be used in different ways, with different consequences for the distribution of power. A cold storage plant in a fishing village will have a different economic and especially social and political impact, if it is owned by someone in the big town, or by a cooperative of fishermen. In electronic communication, radio and TV tend to strengthen centralisation, although the same technology, with proper policies regarding local programming and control, might be used to increase popular participation, local initiative and influence. Video-cassettes on the other hand may help decentralisation.

It also makes a great deal of difference to the patterns of growth and the distribution of power, whether the major thrust of the scientific effort is directed towards the rapid development of scientific capacity to enable the country to hold its own in dealing with the outside world, and in meeting the increasing demands of the urban elite, or whether it is mainly directed to problems which beset the majority of the population, and how these conflicting directions are conciliated. The social and political implications of science and technology policies therefore are legitimate concerns of the political scientists in developing countries. Also because in the final analysis, autonomous development is a function of indigenous intellectual, scientific and technological creativity.

Limits of the Modernizing Bureaucratic States

A political science research agenda for Asia, dealing with political systems and development should clearly include the points touched upon so far. It was in the rise of the modernizing bureaucratic state that four major influences came together: the desire for rapid economic development, unhampared by the bickering of shortsighted or self-serving politicians; the unilinear thinking of technocrats; the mission oriented mind of the military, and traditional notions about authority and state. They all mutually reinforced their com-

mon inclination towards centralisation of power. A research agenda should deal with the impact of these influences on the evolution of the state, a classification of the various types of the modernizing bureaucratic state, the role of the bureaucracy, the military, the managers of state enterprises and the nature and dynamics of bureaucratic politics, as well as the impact of their interaction with external economic and technological forces on economic and political structure. However, although the modernizing bureaucratic state has been capable to provide for relatively long periods of political stability and economic progress, recent history has also shown its weaknesses and its ultimate instability, its possible pathological deformations, the process of increasingly greater concentration of power, on an increasingly narrow base, with increasingly less effectiveness, and the possibility of its collapse or overthrow. An adequate research agenda should therefore enable us to study the modernizing bureaucratic state in a much more dynamic fashion, with a view to identify where the **limits** of the modernizing bureaucratic **state lie**, and which factors will determine whether it will evolve into a more democratic system that is at the same time capable of overcoming its structural rigidities, or whether it will respond to its inabilities with increased conformism, oppression of dissent, violation of human rights, ultimately leading to the erosion of the political middle, polarisation and the mutual escalation of political violence.

It seems possible to argue that the modernizing bureaucratic state reaches its critical point-located differently in each country—when economic development has reached the stage where initiative, risk taking, organization and self management of the peasantry becomes essential for maintaining the momentum of the development process. Second, when it finds itself incapable to broaden its from-the-top-down development approach so as to include a from-the bottom-up approach, and from a growth model to an equity model, thereby actively involving the countryside in the development process and integrating large marginalized segments of the population into the mainstream of national life.

Third, when it finds itself incapable of risking the autonomy and academic freedom which scientific and technological development needs in order to meet constantly new requirements for development on the part of government, as well as of private enterprise. Fourth, when the failure to come to grips with structural reform leads to social and political tensions beyond the capacity of the political system to accomodate them. Fifth, when the problem of corruption, waste, abuse of administration power and internal rot within an uncontrolled bureaucracy, has become so great that attempts at eradication would erode the existing power structure.

Failure to overcome these critical points may signify the beginning of a long process of increasing political pathology, which may lead to the end of the regime, while successful adjustment would democratize the MBS.

Political Change and Succession

The ultimate test of legitimacy and viability of a political system including the MBS, is determined by its capacity to handle peacefully political change and the problem of succession. All political systems experience swings in public opinion, which may reflect the

desire for course corrections, the emergence of new interest groups in the course of the development process, insisting on better representation, or shifts in basic political orientation and values which often accompany generational change in rapidly changing societies. With its emphasis on bureaucratic conformism, and its inclination to bureaucratize society and to try to depoliticize the masses, the modernizing bureaucratic state has great difficulty in handling such changes. One notes the careful manipulation and massive mobilisation, which tend to turn elections into an important legitimizing ritual of controlled change in which new personalities rise mainly after prior cooptation. Elections become anxious but manageable "rites de passage."

Much more difficult to manage however, is the problem of succession. By its very nature, the modernizing bureaucratic state discourages potential alternative leadership from emerging, or from gaining the necessary political and organisational experience, training and exposure. Also all unresolved problems the nation faces tend to come together in the succession issue. It has made it extremely difficult for political leaders to relinquish power voluntarily, because of the absence of identifiable candidates, but also because of the reluctance of vested political and economic interests that have developed around him, to face the risks of new and unknown leadership.

Some developing countries however, have managed to institutionalize the succession process. Mexico is one example of this. It has done so by constitutionally limiting the presidency to one term, and by a selection procedure within the majority Partido Revolutionare Institusionale involving all the component groups, as well as former presidents. The election campaign then simply serves to expose the candidate to the general public, while the actual voting becomes the occasion to legitimize and celebrate the selection. There are of course other possible ways. The point here is that in the effort at taming or democratizing the modernizing bureaucratic state, the succession problem constitutes a central problem, the solution of which requires a great deal of ingenuity, as well as the development of the mechanism which would make it possible for potential candidates to emerge with impunity, and for them to gain experience, training as well as exposure, in order to make possible both change and continuity. This is therefore one problem area which will require considerable study and comparative research.

It may also be advisable in this connection to study various concrete cases of unsuccessful attempts to bring about structural changes, at shifting from a growth to an equity model of development, in short at taming the modernizing bureaucratic state. One is reminded of the failure of Uruguay and the Argentine in their efforts to shift from growth to equity. The polarization and the ensuing escalation of violence and counter-violence by revolutionary groups as well as extra official security organs; of Mao Tse Tung's attempts to prevent a modernizing bureaucracy from consolidating its power, by unleashing the cultural revolution; Mexican President Echeverria's attempts at the end of his term, to push through a program of land reform, and its subsequent invalidation by the supreme court; the continued incapacity of Brazil to break out of its, in many ways, successful self reinforcing industrial growth path, in order to be able to deal with the problems of extreme poverty and backwardness in its north-eastern

region, and its present attempts at democratization as a means towards creating the conditions that would enable her to do so, without upsetting political stability; Nyerere's attempts in Tanzania towards decentralisation and the difficulties he is facing, not so much in breaking up a bureaucratic governmental structure, but in effectively decentralizing a single party bureaucracy.

Transitional Politics

Any analysis of transitional politics concerning the MBS should also take into account the special problems involved in the return to a democratic orbit. There are the perceived threats to vested economic and political interests, as well as institutional rigidities, but also the foreshortening of political vision on the part of opposition forces, only bent on bringing down the regime, and unprepared to face the post-revolutionary period when the very same problems which led to the rise of the MBS in the first place, will confront them too.

Peru at one point, Allende's Chile, and other countries as well at some points in their history, have shown for example how the extreme left's insistence on ideological purity and consistency, combined with a lack of clear assessment of the power realities of their international political environment, evoked sharp and destructive domestic and external responses. Several of these cases also show that the potential virulence of unbridled bureaucratism has little to do with wether the regime in question has a leftist or rightist orientation. There is therefore little automaticity in the many changes required to stabilize a return to a democratic orbit and the difficulties encountered seem to call for clearer insights into, and systematic understanding of the dyna-

mics of redemocratisation, if a quick relapse into authoritarian patterns is to be avoided.

The State of Revolutionary Theory

The high incidence of political radicalisation at the periphery of the MBS, of polarization of the body politic, and the drift towards political violence, forces the Asian political scientist also to look much more closely into the present inadequate state of revolutionary theory. Revolutionary theory has in the last 30 years undergone many changes. It has moved a long way from Lenin's general propositions, to Lin Piao's notions about the countryside closing in on the cities, to the failure of Che Guevara's rural guerilla warfare, to the resort taken to urban guerilla warfare, not as a means to bring down the government, but as a means towards the radicalization of the middle-class. This, it was hoped, would open the door for successful general guerilla warfare. There is probably no sadder commentary on the present state of revolutionary theory than the resort by its practitioners to urban terrorism and the exports of arms.

Several factors may account for this. One is the overwhelming power of the State through the possession of, and access to unlimited means of violence, of greater destructiveness than ever before, and use of modern communications. Another is that history has now shown that in developing countries violence may lead not only to the downfall of governments, but to societal collapse as well, drowning in the process the original revolutionary purposes. History has shown how close to the surface in many societies in Asia violence lies, and how easily it is triggered.

Asia's peasant societies have a long tradition of both endemic and spasmodic rural and communal violence. History has also shown the ease with which violence, once triggered and for whatever reason, tends to spread like wild fire fuelled by primordial loyalties, traditional, communal, racial and religious tensions which in much of Asia linger below the surface of village harmony and social graces, unconnected with the original purpose for which violence was triggered,

At the same time, events in Iran and Nicaragua have shown that popular revolutions can be successful despite the armed power of the government and the inadequacies of revolutionary theory—something for the political scientist to ponder in humility.

Towards a Democratic Theory of Structural Transformation

If we now look back for a moment at the theories of political development of the 50's and 60's, the underlying assumption then was that economic growth would lead to the development of a middle-class, and that this in turn would democratize developing societies. The task of political theory was to bring out the structures and institutional arrangements which could facilitate this process. The course history has taken in most of our countries in Asia has turned out to be a different and much more complicated one. The problem which we face therefore, is not only to try to draw up a research agenda that would help give clear directions for the further development of political science which would increase its relevance to our own situation, but to go beyond it. It would seem that what we are looking for is the identification and understanding of the minimum political requirements for dealing more effec-

tively and more humanely with the problems of massive poverty, injustice and unemployment, for ways which would enable us to bring about the structural changes necessary to provide employment and to meet other human needs, but above all, for ways which would break the shackles of restrictive political and social structures, and thus release the full creative potential of all the people who are now at the bottom of our societies.

In some ways, these processes have already started, in part by design, in part self generated. Political theory is now called upon to help us better to understand these processes, and to illuminate the choices before us in terms of humankind. basic values. There is a need therefore for a democratic theory of structural transformation. It will necessarily be based on the premise that there is a limit to each political systems'capacity to manage and conciliate conflicts, and that it is important to identify those limits, even though these limits are not invariable. They are a function of a number of factors, including the availability of information, the existence of communications, the threshold of tolerance, and fear, as well as of historical, geopolitical, and external influence and manipulation, all different for each society.

Such a theory should also help us understand the dynamics of structural change. It should have operational significance in the sense that it will provide us with conceptual handles on the problems of structural change, in such a way that the society remains viable and effective at the lowest level of coercion. It is also based on the premise that human freedom is determined by the manner in which the conflicting requirements of change, stability and justice are balanced, and that moderate po-

litics in processes of structural change is only possible when a political system's capacity to bring about necessary adjustments voluntarily, can be enhanced.

What are the structural changes we are talking about? In the first place the redressing of the imbalance between the urban and the rural sector.

Secondly, the elimination of absolute poverty will require a massive reallocation of resources. In those areas in which resource endowment and economic growth-rates are incapable of reducing unacceptable inequalities through the redistribution of income out of economic growth, redistribution of productive assets may be necessary.

In addition, the redirection of industrial growth towards meeting the needs of the majority, and towards reducing expendency from external economic and political forces.

It is obvious that structural changes of this magnitude require a fundamental redistribution of economic, political and social power. It is quite likely that such structural changes can only be brought about by an elite capable of constantly changing its composition, accepting into its fold representatives from those segments of the population whose interests, for better or for worse, are bound to be affected by the decisions taken in order to enable them to participate in the decision making process at all levels, nationally and locally. This may require an open system that allows upward mobility and a broad range of entry points into the elite. It requires political institutions for the political conciliation and management of the contradictory demands of development from above and from below. It also presupposes freedom of organisation, especially among the socially, economically and politically weak, and the kind of economic growth pattern which includes their participation, and allows them to share equitably in its fruits.

It requires enabling legislation, but above all, the rule of law. In addition, in as much as active and voluntary popular participation, and the dynamisation of the countryside, are likely to bring to the surface traditional patterns of group loyalty and conflict, it requires the development of a greater capacity for conflict resolution, not only at the governmental level but especially outside, in the non-governmental sphere. We should pay a great deal more attention to the dynamics of radicalism and to the radical mind. Also to how braindrain effects economic and political development capability, and how the social sciences can learn better to understand the social and political implications of transcendental perceptions of society inherent in religion. Studies of this kind are bound to reopen many option regarding political organisation which we thought to have been closed, overtaken by history.

The International Environment

The search for a democratic theory of structural transformation will have to take place in a period of great change and conflict. The slowing down of economic growth all over the world, the rising oil prices, the closing-up of industrial nations of the North in fear for the further industrialisation of the South, the reduction in aid levels to be expected, and their likely linkage to access to resources, and continuing population increase, massive population movements within and across national boundaries in the search for security, work or food, but also pushed by war, or by drives towards ideological or racial homogenisation in some countries, are bound to put the political systems

of developing countries under great strain. On the other hand, twenty years ago it would have been proposterous to think that it would be possible for Asian countries to escape the painful choice between capitalism and a communism, except by adopting a non-aligned stance in world affairs. The fragmentation of the international system and the redistribution of power across the globe—processes which may well continue for another decade—now makes it possible for us to be more positive, and to wonder whether out of our struggle against poverty, oppression and injustice, there might not grow alternative trajectories of modernisation and industrialization which in the end, may lead to new types of modern, non-western civilisations taking their rightful place, on an equal footing with western industrialized society, in a pluralistic world. The tragedies that have befallen a number of our countries, and which still may occur in others, show how narrow the path is between destruction and survival, and how difficult the road towards cultural and societal self renewal in freedom.

It would be an expression of intellectual hubris to overestimate the difference political science and political theory could make in historical processes of this magnitude. But even if they could provide some light, however weak and uncertain, along this difficult path, it would be worth the effort.

Where do we now stand? In terms of theory we are in the middle of the search for alternative development strategies. The search has already thrown up a number of promising new concepts with important operational implications, like development from below, and participatory development. Still, at best they only constitute elements of an alternative development strategy. They are not in themselves such alternative. Our concern and involvement with the poor has taught us other things as well, among others: the management of social development and rural institution building have changed our concepts of planning and implementation. We now are beginning to understand that no plan and no policy is correct which does not take into account the social environment on which it is meant to impact, or which neglects to consider the particular qualities, strength and weaknesses, as well as the internal dynamics of the agents of its implementation. Planning therefore can only be effective if done as a result of democratic interaction between planners, target groups, and implementors. Involvement with the poor has also taught us the role of social learning as an essential element in the development process which involves not only local communities, but also government bureaucracies, new institutions as well as traditional ones. Enhancing the learning capacity of nations, of institutions and of communities, and the role of communication in it, may well be one of the most critical factors in the development process.

But most importantly, we are now beginning to realize that the very concept of development itself may blind our vision and understanding of what we are really concerned with. Our concern with the capacity of nations, communities and individuals to learn, to adjust and to renew themselves may not lead to an alternative development theory, nor to alternative theories of political development. We will have to learn to think in terms of economic-political theories of societal growth instead.

Repressive-Developmentalist Regimes in Asia: Old Strengths, New Vulnerabilities

By Herbert Feith

In attempting to compare a number of countries, which have achieved a high rate of economic growth over the past decade, Herbert Feith has offered the concept of "repressive-developmentalist" regimes. His arguments for including a number of seemingly dissimilar countries, Singapore, Iran, South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia under this rubric provides material for discussion. This paper was presented at the New York Conference of the World Order Models Project held on June, 1979.

Dr. Feith teaches at Monash University, Australia and in 1967 was visiting lecturer at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta. He received his doctorate at Cornell University with a thesis entitled *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia,* which has been published. He is also co-editor with Lance Castles of *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965* (Cornell University Press, 1970).

The first half of 1979 has seen the toppling of three of the 20th century's worst tyrants, Pol Pot, the Shah, and Amin. There are popular victories to celebrate here, but also grave grounds for hesitation. For two of the three tyrants were overthrown primarily by foreign invaders. Moreover one of the invasions, the Vietnamese one of Kampuchea, made a major contribution to bringing us to the brink of world war and has left Kampuchea a battleground for what may well be a long, Spain-like proxy war. It is certainly a time for systematic thought about the international politics of repressive regimes.

In this paper I am attempting a survey of the international politics of repressive regimes of one type in one area of the Third World, Asia. I do not contend that the forms of repression which characterize my "repressive-developmentalist" regimes are more execrable than those of other types, whose places in my own provisional (Third World only) taxonomy I have suggested in Chart I. What I do hold is that this regime form deserves a central place in discussions of repression as a world phenomenon and discussions of core—periphery relations in the non-Communist world.

The paper had its beginnings in an attempt to look at Suharto's Indonesia in comparative perspective. It has also grown out of a more recent interest in Brazil, Iran and South Korea, three fairly large countries where a single regime form (has) prevailed for about 15 years, and where economic growth has been very fast.

I want to argue that Brazil, the Shah's Iran and to a lesser extent Park's South Korea epitomize a trend in a world politics which brought something new into being. Suharto's Indonesia, Marcos Philippines and Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore are among the Asian regimes which have moved in a similar direction,

CHART I – TYPES OF REPRESSIVE REGIMES IN THE CONTEMPORARY THIRD WORLD

	Examples	Characteristic targets of repression	Characteristic forms of repression	Characteristic justifications
1. Communist-ruled				
A. Revolutionary	Pol Pot's Kampuchea Ethiopia, Afghanistan	landlords, rich peasants, professionals, particular ethnic and religious communities.	mass arrests, executions, reeducation centres, forcing city people into cation	revolutionary transformation, mation vigilance, reeducation
B. Populist	China, 1966-1976.	professionals & other upper elements of urban middle classes ?	indoctrination, demands for enthusiasm, forcing city people into villages	building a new man, self-reliance
C. Developmentalist	North Korea		tight surveillance, indoctrination	modernization, self-reliance, military strength.
2. Highly integrated into the global capitalist system				
A. Counter-revolutionary	Chile, Argentina	workers, students	mass arrests, executions, disappearances, torture	stability, recovery, vigilance, discipline
B. Developmentalist	Shah's Iran, Brazil, Sth. Korea	students, workers, some religious groups	tight surveillance, preventive detention, torture	stability, fast development, catching up.
C. Developmentalist / Racist	South Africa	students, workers	tight surveillance, torture, assassinations	White-Christian civilization, fast development
D. Personal/Atavistic	Somoza's Nicaragua	students, workers, urban middle classes	arbitrary terror	little effort to provide legitimation
3. Not communist-ruled or highly integrated into the global capitalist system				
A. Populist	Burma?	upper elements or urban middle classes	indoctrination, denial of contacts with outside world	Burmese way to socialism
B. Personal/Atavistic	Amin's Uganda Macias' Equatorial Guinea	Urban middle classes, particular ethnic & religious communities	arbitrary terror exercised through a practorian guard, large scale murder, public executions	exercised little effort to provide legitimation

but they are less clear-cut exemplars of the type. Taiwan, Thailand, Bangladesh and Pakistan all have affinities of one or other kind with the regime form I am discussing, but I prefer to leave them out of this discussion.

Fascism"' "totalitarianism", 'Counter-revolutionary dictatorship"—none of these terms quite fit what is distinctive about Brazil, South Korea and the Shah's Iran. The omnibus "authoritarianism" is too broad and mushy. Guillermo O'Donnell's "bureaucratic-authoritarianism" is much better, but strikes me as too mild.[1] And, like Barrington Moore's "modernization from above[2] Philippe Schmitter's "defensive modernization",[3] "modernizing autocracy" and "neo-Bismarckianism", it does not capture the newness of the phenomenon. F.H. Cardoso's "associated-dependent development"[4] is better in that respect, and so is Schmitter's "delayed-dependent industrialization",[5] but, as concepts intended to cover a large variety of Latin American societies, these are less specific about regime forms than I seek to be. On the other hand "corporatism" is specific about political arrangements at the expense of economic and ideological features. "Neo-fascism", "quasifascism", "techno-fascism" and Eqbal Ahmad's "deve-

lopmental fascism" are all suggestive, and lead to interesting arguments about the historical analogy. But it is hard to deny that the new regime form is different from classical fascism in many ways—not least in its ideological features and its characteristic class formations. I am intrigued by Richard Falk's "Brazilianization".[6] But I currently prefer the clumsy "repressive-developmentalist regimes."

Repressive-developmentalist regimes are strong-state regimes engaged in facilitating fast capitalist growth, some of it industrialization in the era of the transnational corporation. Warmly hospitable to transnational business, and dependent on it in many ways, they nevertheless avoid becoming its compradore vassals. Their political form is characterized by a heavy weight of power I am using the Lasswell-Kaplan distinction between weight and scope of power[7] and a strong drive to eliminate or subordinate all potential centers of countervailing power. Their characteristic ideological form has three elements, the developmentalist-technocratic, the nationalistic, and the militaristic. And they have a strong disposition to expand the capacities of their bureaucratic apparatus, using that expansion to facilitate school-based social mobility.

The class coalitions which bear regimes of this category (or, perhaps better, regimes which clearly approximate this ideal type) may be predominantly

1   Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, (Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1973).

2   Barrington Moore, *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 228-253, 433-452.

3   Philippe Schmitter, "The Portugalization of Brazil?" in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil*, 1973.

4   Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications" in Stepan, *op.cit.*

5   Schmitter, *loc.cit.*, p. 184.

6   Richard A. Falk, "A World Order Perspective on Authoritarianism", mimeo 1978.

7   Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society*, (Newhaven: Yale University Press, 1950). The distinction is between the deprivational impact with which a government bears down on members of a society and the range of activities—economic, religious, social, cultural, scientific, sporting, etc.—over which it asserts monopoly control.

bourgeois or predominantly bureaucratic-professional, but they are characteristically dominated by urban rather than rural elements. And the processes of restratification over which they preside tend to undermine the power of landed interests. Like the repressive regimes I am labelling counter-revolutionary—my best examples here are Chile and Argentina-they emerged as a result of victory over popular forces of workers, peasants and middle class elements. Unlike these, they have already outlasted the circumstances surrounding their birth. Some, like Suharto's Indonesia and Brazil were born out of a major showdown with coalitions of left-wing and nationalist groupings (and out of major crisis in capital accumulation). Others, like Park's South Korea, the Shah's Iran and Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore, came to assume their repressive-developmentalist form gradually, in ways which involved a series of minor contests with popular forces rather than a climactic initial one followed by others of far smaller proportions.

Often brilliant performers in the GNP and Ph.D. races, the repressive-developmentalist regimes have enjoyed a good deal of ideological lustre in the 1970's. Indeed they have made a major contribution to redeeming the prestige of dependent capitalism in the Third World, after Thieu, Lon Nol and Mobutu. The number of their Third World imitators and would be imitators continues to be large, even since the fall of the Shah. And in the advanced capitalist countries many politicians and businessmen admire their sense of power, momentum and clear direction and their talk of ruggedness, national discipline and nuclear power. They envy their rulers' unfettered control, their freedom from strikes, and their capacity to suppress incipient middle-class challenges, from environmentalists, feminists, and advocates of new or divergent lifestyles.

I see four reasons for taking these regimes as an object of study:

1. They have become a major focus of the international debate on repression and human rights. In this respect they can be grouped with South Africa, Chile and Argentina, as well as with the USSR, North Korea, Pol Pot's Kampuchea, Ethiopia and Amin's Uganda. For those of us who are concerned lest the human rights cause should suffer from conventionalization in which case criticisms made in its name can easily be placated in tokenistic fashion—it is important that there should be clarity about the politico-economic and cultural-ideological contexts in which repression serves as a central constituent feature of a state's organization. And for those of us who are concerned lest the human rights cause be dismissed as merely a weapon in the armory of Western states-either for diplomatic advantage against the USSR or as a means of maintaining the status quo in First World-Third World relations—it is important to explore the scope for further cooperative interplay between the primarily First World-based internationalist forces fighting against repression and the primarily Third World-based internationalist forces fighting for a New International Economic Order and against racism.

2. They direct attention to wider problems of world development, because they epitomize centralizing, top-down strategies of modernization which most capitalist economists and technological optimists continue to praise—with "I told you so" allusions to post-Mao China—but which more and more leaders of intellectual opinion, in the Third World and elsewhere, have come to regard with hostility, for their effects on employment, community, cultural vita-

lity and environmental quality (to say nothing of liberty and equality).

3. They present a set of comparable strategic question for their local adversaries: How strong are these regimes? How brittle or malleable? Under what circumstances and by what forces can they be reformed, transformed or overthrown? What types of assistance can be hoped for from the outside world in this respect: from the custodians of Western liberal traditions (the *New York Times*, the *Guardian*, *Le Monde*, the International Press Institute, the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International etc.), from radical groups in First World states, from Russia or China, from institutions embodying the egalitarian and distributivist consensus of the Third World (the Group of 77, the Non-Aligned States, etc), U.N. agencies or other Non-Territorial Actors? What forms of opposition can be excepted from outside: from the CIA or the Pentagon, from China or Russia to spike the other's guns, from sellers of arms and nuclear technology, from particular groups of press barons or particular groups of transnational corporations, or from bodies like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund? And under what conditions is it possible for exile groups to play crucial roles in the politics of opposition? Specifically, what are the lessons to be learned from the toppling of the Shah?

4. Arguments about these regimes may throw light on speculative questions about pariah states as possible delineators of alliance patterns in an era of fast ideological transformation and multiplying arms races. The Iranian crisis has highlighted the close cooperation which existed between the Shah's Iran and South Africa and Israel, particularly regarding oil, arms and political intelligence, but trans-Atlantic cooperation between South Africa and the Southern cone countries of South America remains murky. Are there then real prospects of a "5th World" alliance of pariah and quasi-pariah states? What forms of support could an emerging alliance of such states expect from Prussian, reactionary, backlash and technomaniac elements in the advanced capitalist world? Could it also expect support from China? Is there a potential here for something like a new Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis? Is it reading too much into the Zaire crisis of mid-1978 to see Brzizinski and Deng as future co-patrons of a Buenos Aires-Pretoria-Tel-Aviv-Seoul axis? And where would Brazil, Indonesia and Nigeria—as Third World states with an option of avoiding pariahhood—stand in relations to such an axis?

Five Principal Features

Let me now proceed to a quick sketch of the way in which the repressive-developmentalist regimes operate. I shall speak mainly of the Asian states in the category and discuss their operation in terms of five closely inter-related features: economic growth, political repression, statist and developmentalist ideology, bureaucratic streamlining, and its limits and distinctive forms of restratification. (And the generation maintenance of a distinct cultural ethos).

The five Asian regimes I am here concerned with—the Shah's Iran, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore—have all produced high rates of GNP growth. Growth rates have been extraordinarily high in Iran, South Korea and Singapore. In Indonesia and the Philippines they have been lower, but high in comparison with the period before the inception of the current regime, in 1966 and 1972 respectively. In

all five countries transnational companies have been principal motors of this growth. Fuels, minerals, timber and plantation crops have been the main magnets in the case of Iran, Indonesia and the Philippines, cheap trained and disciplined labor the main source of attraction in South Korea and Singapore.

There are clearly major contrasts of resource structure and basic economic configuration among these economies. If one looks at them in terms of exporting and manufacturing, Indonesia is overwhelmingly an extractive economy, with oil accounting for over 70% of export earnings (since the triping of oil prices in 1973). Its light manufacturing sector has grown very rapidly in the last ten years, as Japanese and other foreign companies have built import replacement industries, but it has scarcely begun to have any heavy industry and has been unable to break into manufacturing for export. Iran is an overwhelmingly extractive economy—it is of course one of the two giants of OPEC, where Indonesia appears as a pygmy. But it has also developed a larger manufacturing sector, with quite a bit of heavy industry and some manufacturing for export. The Philippines profile is rather like one of Indonesia without oil—except that it exports more plantation crops (sugar, pineapples and copra) than minerals, and that its manufacturing sector, which reached and import substitution ceiling in the late 1960s, has recently begun to have an export platform side. As for South Korea and Singapore, they are states with few natural resources whose economies have come to be heavily centered on manufacturing for export.[8]

Though the TNC/s have been central as motors of fast economic growth in all of these countries—as providers of capital, technology, and access to overseas markets—state enterprises have also grown into major elements of their economies. The characteristic pattern is one where the state and the foreign companies cooperate closely, despite many elements of tension. Though the number of private national firms has risen rapidly in several of the five countries, the relative position of private national capital has been reduced. Some private national firms have been incorporated into state or TNC conglomerates; others have been forced into dependence on them, others again have been driven out of business.

If the state has serviced the TNCs—by building roads, harbours, airports, telecommunication facilities and industrial estates, and by providing a ready supply of cheap, disciplined workers—the TNCs for their part have contributed to enormous (and easy) expansions of government revenue. And these have worked most of the development magic of which the admirers and enviers of these states speak. They have produced major expansions of universities, secondary schools and hospitals in all of these countries as well as various other urban facilities such as libraries, research institutes, museums and sports stadiums. They have resulted in dramatic increases in the income of civil servants and armed forces members in most of these countries—Singapore is an exception—not only salary increases but much expanded subsidies for houses, cars and holiday bungalows, and in the

---

8   For a highly stimulating discussion of four types of economic structure in dependent capitalist countries, and the "state projects", types of crises and "military projects" which are characteristic of each, see Robin Luckham, "Militarism: Force, Class and International Conflict", I.D.S. Bulletin (Institute of Development Studies, Sussex University). Vol. XXX 9, No. 1 (July 1977), pp. 19-32, and especially the chart on pp. 28-29.

case of higher ranking members of expense account trips and entertainment allowances. They have made it possible to buy a lot of new military equipment. And some of these states they have also paid for a significant expansion of welfare expenditure for lower class people in the cities—Singapore's public housing and Tehran's urban water supply system for instance.

Political repression has accompanied economic expansion in all these five states, as both cause and effect. A markedly heightened level of repressive control was a precondition for the TNC investment and governmental reorganization which has made fast growth possible, and fast growth has made it possible to expand the machinery of repressive control.

While there is wide diversity among the historical situations which gave rise to the five regimes, they tended for many years to grow more similar to each other in the structure of their political arrangements. Three stages can be distinguished:

1. Destroying the remaining power centers of the defeated enemy, characteristically a coalition of left-wing and nationalist forces. This normally involved banning their parties, trade unions, peasant organizations and associated ethnic associations, arresting their leaders and cadre members and taking over newspaper sympathetic to them.

2. Establishing tight control over the coalition of supporting elements, reducing the freedom of all groups with a potential for mass organization, expanding the role of military officers within the government apparatus and purging the armed forces of potentially unstable elements.

3. Once tight central control had been established, the ruling group's problem became one of maintenance, of vigilant management. It now had to deal with the new dissatisfactions developing from politico-economic change and social restratification, in particular with new forms of inequality perceived as illegitimate, and new evidence of the power of foreigners, their goods and their lifestyles. At the same time it knows that networks of potential resistance remain. There are religious organizations which this group has found it impossible to dismantle, organizations whose pliant top leaders are basically unaccepted among their members. There are regions where ethnic and/or religious resentment is particularly high, regions where armed rebellion actually exists or could easily emerge or re-emerge. And there are undependable big city universities, where disloyal staff members, protected by prestige and international connections, are often ready to play on the fearlessness of their students, who may conceivably dare to launch illegal demonstrations in circumstances where their catalytic and snowballing potential is vast (for reasons which may have to do with the urban masses or urban middle class groupings, or, more probably, both).

In this third phase, the modulations of repression are complex and controversial. One particularly controversial aspect is the question of which groups are the principal butt of repression. It is sometimes argued that the repressive-developmentalist regimes do not need to waste their resources of political management on the maintenance of control over the urban or peasant masses because these are readily kept in line by reserve armies of unemployed, and by the distribution of material and prestige benefits to local leaders who command traditional loyalties. But there is no denying that these regimes do fear some groups of workers and peasants. All of them have done a great

deal to expand and streamline their systems of surveillance in the villages and the poorer areas of the cities and towns.

By contrasts, the upper middle classes of the major urban centers, the classess which have thrown up most of the resistance figures who are the focus of overseas attention, are treated relatively gently. I would not want to belittle the deprivations which are experienced by professional people who are denied an opportunity of professional employment because they once dared to speak out against the government at a time of short-lived political relaxation. Nor would I gainsay the suffering of students whose whole educational experience is shadowed by fear of being spied on by fellow-students. But it is normally easier for a member of these latter groups to get himself out of jail than it is for an arrested worker or peasant. And it is the higher class people of the urban centers who are the principal beneficiaries of the "anomalies" of the system of repression in these countries, the oases of freedom to which outsiders frequently point to draw a sharp distinction between regimes of this kind and totalitarian ones. I am thinking of particular university-linked research institutes where views which are radically hostile to those of the government may be freely expressed in small public gatherings, of arts centers where there is occasionally similar freedom to express opposition ideas in public situations, and of the availability of a great variety of overseas journals and Marxist paperback (in English) in some Tehran bookshops in the years of the Shah.

Basically, these regimes distinguish between the lower classes, urban and rural, which are firmly and effectively excluded from political participation of any kind, particularly by tight bans on political organization, and the upper lasses, to whom a measure of

open public life is reluctantly conceded, and whose prestigious and well-connected members are occasionally free to canvas support for sharply critical comments of a kind which may make a serious dint in a government's legitimacy. So , while segments of the upper classes are often the principal *targets* of repressive activity in regimes of this kind, the lower classes are usually their principal *victims*—in terms of changing patterns of income distribution and employment opportunity as well as because of the powerlessness which results from political demobilization.

This contrast between principal targets and principal victims is partly one between direct violence and structural violence,[9] between repression as a set of conscious actions against people seen to be threatening the established order and repression in the wider sense of a set of institutional arrangements maintaining the vulnerability of the many. It is also a contrast between reactive and punitive measures taken against challengers, often in situations of crisis, and routine preventive measures of surveillance and restriction which are part of a general pattern of rulership. Finally it is a contrast between forms of repression that are readily visible and comprehensible to outside observers and other forms which may or may not be outwardly visible but whose impact on the lives of their victims is understood only by those with intimate access and a gift for social imagination.

An equally controversial and more puzzling question is that of what the longer-term trends are with regard to severity of repression. On this question

9   On Structural violence see Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 6, 1969.

three main schools of interpretation vie with each other:

1. Some, who may be called technological optimists, contend that the level of repression in these regimes tends to decline slowly after a certain point. They allude to the fact that the number of political prisoners held in most of these states has gone down in recent years, and argue that it does not help a country's efforts to attract new foreign investment to have a name for torturing its opponents. This is sometimes coupled with the idea that the fast growth of a heavily professional middle class can be expected to have softening effects on the forms of government in the long run. In general this optimistic expectation is held by persons who see these regimes as fundamentally stable and unthreatened.

2. Others, who may be called technological pessimists, argue the opposite case, that levels of repression continue to rise even after a regime has consolidated itself by subordinating all centers of extra-governmental power. They argue that the changes characteristic of this phase involve a shift to more sophisticated methods of asserting control, such as are taught at a variety of schools and centers under the International Military Education and Training Program of the US government.[10] But these techniques, they say, far from lessening the oppressiveness of government power, increase it, reducing arbitrariness but also closing loopholes. Their appropriation is regarded as serving to increase the power of the intelligence and political police agencies of the government, the Gestapo's, NKVD's, CIA's and FBI's of these regimes, and making these more powerful vis a vis other components of the governmental apparatus. Some of those who hold this view tend to see the repressive-developmentalist regimes as immensely strong. Others see them as cornered, desperate and brittle.

3. Perhaps the most widespread view is the cyclical one, which sees these regimes as oscillating between phases of relaxation (or "decompression", to use the Brazilian rulers" contribution to mechanical imagery) and phases of crackdown and intensified repression. Some of the cycles referred to in this context have to do with events outside these countries, such as UN debates or considerations of Foreign Military Sales legislation by the US Congress. Others are longer and less clearly calendrical cycles and relate to illegal demonstrations and riots. The argument goes that minor relaxation is periodically attempted as a result of image difficulties in various sections of the outside world and of the influence of intra-regime critics who hold that the current level of harshness is not only unnecessary but positively dangerous, because it means that the leaders of the government have no reliable way of knowing what is going on in the minds of the people. Relaxation however prompts the activation of a variety of deep grievances, and so there are increasing difficulties of political management. Eventually a series of demonstrations or riots occurs, after which there is a crackdown and the cycle begins again. (Alternatively there may be major divisions in the army, with the dominant faction of the general staff seeing intensified repression as inviting disobedience in the soldiery and thus opting for a placatory approach to the demonstrators. This is the course General Yahya Khan pioneered in Pakistan in 1969, thereby bringing an end to 11 years of Ayub Khan rule. General

10 On this program see Michael T. Klare, *Supplying Repression* (New York: Field Foundation, 100 East 85th Street), December 1977.

Kris Sivara was playing the same role in Thailand in 1973, when he ended a 15-year period of dictatorship, by Field Marshal Sarit Thanara and his successors, Thanom and Prapas. And the Iranian generals who switched their loyalty from the Shah to Shahpur Bakhtiar in January 1979 were doing something very similar.)

In this view riots are central to the vulnerability of a repressive-developmentalist regime. Their principal locus may be in one of a number of urban groups—students, other middle class groupings, workers or the sub-proletariat (of casual and household workers and petty traders) or in a particular religious community—but their tendency is to spread across class lines (and occasionally religious ones as well). They are seen to be triggered by the fortuitous combination of two, three or more of a number of factors which may turn smouldering resentment into open challenge. These factors are of many different kinds. A full list would include poor harvests, a sharp rise in the rate of inflation, an intensification of pressure on workers (perhaps as a response to a worsening of the problem of overseas debts), a humiliation administered by a neighbor state, the disclosure of a scandal involving high government figures, a particularly blatant form of election rigging, a clumsy, anger-provoking blow by the government against a religious leader or other figures of high prestige, and many others.

The repressive character of these regimes is both reinforced and complemented by their ideological themes. All of them stress the moral claims of the state: national discipline, national unity, the importance of stability for national development and the mischievousness and divisiveness of politics. Their nationalism is often infused with neo-

traditionalist appeals, except in the case of Singapore. It is fairly consistently anti-populist in all five cases, though a minor populist element has emerged in several of them in connection with experiments with state parties and youth movements. But these experiments have tended to fizzle out. The rulers of the repressive-developmentalist regimes are strong believers in hierarchy, administration and management and suspicious of political enthusiasm. And, with the partial exception of President Marcos, who is by far the most charismatic of them, they are bad at appealing to the young. Indeed their interest in so doing is small.

All of them treat their armed services with great deference. Their public language suggests that the services are not only the bearers of a heavy responsibility as guardians of the state but also models of pragmatic task orientation and efficient performance, which other sectors of the society would do well to emulate. In Indonesia and South Korea, there is great stress on the armed services' contribution in the past, in protecting independence and particularly in saving the state from communism. In Indonesia the history of the achievement of independence has been rewritten to stress the centrality of the army's role. The 1945-49 period, which was previously described as "the revolution", or "the national revolution", has been redesignated "the war of independence". In all of the five regimes there is a heavy emphasis on the prevalence of dangers in the current international environment and the importance of continuing vigilance against subversion.

The ideological theme which most clearly reflects the circumstances in which these regimes came into existence is developmentalism, the idea that the task of the state is to achieve fast development "to overcome our

backwardness and catch up with the advanced countries". Granted that all of them were established as a defensive reaction against the political mobilization of lower class elements, and that all of them set about early to create an attractive environment for the operation of foreign firms, it is not surprising that they found it important to engage in ideological battle against populist anti-imperialism, socialism and the Left-wing nationalism of such figures as Iran's Mossadeq and Indonesia's Sukarno. They found their principal weapons for this in the American social science literature of the early 1960's on modernization and the challenge of development.

The establishment of a new anti-popular-politics dispensation thus came to be justified in terms of the need to stop wasting time in fruitless wrangling, to break through the deadlock situations that "politics" had created and to get on with the job of development. Development was described as a matter of the appropriation of modern technology, regardless of whether this was introduced by a foreign firm or a local one or the government.

Once fast growth got under way, government spokespeople began speaking of it with great zest, and this has been their principal source of pride ever since. The governmental ethos of these regimes is one of aggressive impatience with whatever stands in the way of material profress, and of disdain for various features of First World social life which are seen as soft, hippy, trivial, wasteful, individualistic or decadent. Government leaders are often men who are fascinated with new technologies and techniques, missiles, lasers, computers, microwave communication, satellites, survey research and psychotests. The Shah was reported several years ago as saying that he saw computers as

the future answer to the participation problem.

In recent years some of the public language of these regimes has followed international trends in declaring that development is more than fast growth. In fact there has been a lot of talk since the middle 1970's about the importance of equitable distribution, the generation of employment opportunities, self-reliance and basic needs, and even about popular participation in some of these states. Much of this has been tokenistic. The leadership groups of all of them have remained convinced that little can be achieved without fast growth in GNP. And they have remained committed to the idea that development requires tight central control and the political exclusion of the "tradition-minded" masses.

A fourth common feature of the regimes I am discussing is bureaucratic streaming. All of their rulers have placed "technocrats", normally graduates of First World universities, in very prominent positions, giving them not only liaison roles in relation to the IMF, the World Bank, foreign aid agencies and foreign firms, but also scope to make far-reaching changes in many of the operations of government. As a result there have been major expansions in the apparatus of planning, supervision and research, usually producing both greater centralization and greater efficiency. Cooperation between high-level professionals in the military and civilian branches of government has been closed, as has cooperation between these people and their counterparts in the corporate sector and in the prestige universities. All of these forms of cooperation have been smoothed by the operation of a variety of management courses.[11]

11 For highly interesting discussions of "technocrats" and associated groupings in re-

The actual effectiveness of administrative performance has varied greatly beween the various regimes, and I see little point in attempting overal generalizations about that here. But it is probably necessary to stress that governmental operations in most of them have remained heavily patrimonial, Singapore is probably the only significant exception here, though some would argue a case for South Korea as well.[12] This means that the way in which policies are implemented is pervasively characterized by sharp and hidden conflict between bureaucratic empires and the frequent exaction of tribute to boost slush funds, as well as by a great deal of corruption for the private consumption of the bureaucrats and their families. Needing to play off the rival heads of bureaucratic empires against each other, and to find large extra-budgetary sums for their efforts to buy in people who would otherwise undermine their power or sabotage particular policies, the rulers of these states frequently have no alternative to putting loyalty before performance. The attempts of the "technocrats" and others to regularize the operations of government have thus often foundered on the hard rock of bureaucratic rivalry or because of the superior claims of considerations of regime maintenance. In the cases of Indonesia and the Philippines, nepotism

gimes of this type in Latin America see G. O'Donnell op.cit., and Schmitter and Cardoso in Stepan, loc.cit.

12 Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of the Prismatic Society (1966) remains a highly enlightening study of this kind of politics. See also Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialims and Empire-Building in the New States", World Politics, Vol. 20 (January 1968), pp. 194-206. The current Iranian manifestations of patrimonial politics and administration are discussed in M. Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (1971).

and inertia have also been major impediments to the streamlining efforts of these groups.

Finally a few words about restratification. Here again it is the role of high level professionals about which generalizations come relatively easily. Their power, prestige, wealth and morale has grown in all of these regimes. It is harder to generalize about the local business classes which have benefited from their politico-economic restructuring, not least because of the special roles of the ethnically distinct "pariah business" groups in Indonesia and the Philippines (and to a lesser extent Iran). The rise of palace millionaires seems to be a common feature of all of the regimes except Singapore's, and should be seen as merely the most conspicuous feature of a process whereby families associated with high figures in the state apparatus have benefited from licenses, contractorships and other forms of privileged access to business opportunity.

However the importance of bureaucratic access has been partly offset in all of these regimes by the talent-seeking and regularizing thrust, by the efforts of major segments of each regime to show to the upper urban and middle classes that people with (school-) demonstrated ability rise fast. All of them have provided major increases in the living standards of the salaried, and more generally the secondary-schooled. As a result inequalities between these groups and the rest of the urban population have increased markedly. However there is a contrast here between situations in which labor shortages have begun to exert upward pressure, at least for particular groups of workers—Singapore, South Korea and to a lesser extent Iran in the years of the Shah— and Indonesia and the Philippines where large reserve armies of workers have

prevented urban real wages from rising significantly.

Great as the variety is among the four countries which have rural areas, and within those countries, there has been a general tendency for urban-rural inequalities to grow wider. In the rural areas themselves changes have been fast. In Iran and the Philippines the power of some previously strong landed groups was broken as a result of centralizing land reform programs. New investment in large-scale estate agriculture, much of it by transnational agribusiness firms, and the increasing utilization of high-yielding and artificial-fertilizer-using varieties of grains in village agriculture has forced many peasants and tenant farmers off the land and aggravated the dependence of most of the rest on a minority of village officials and rich farmers, who in turn have become more dependent on urban and government connections.

At this point many of my readers will be suspicious if not annoyed: What really is the point of this exercise in strained comparisons, which necessarily resorts to vague generalities in ways which make light of the realities of particular countries, their history, their levels of industrialization and the specifics of their class structure, to say nothing of their cultures? If one is generalizing about a group of states and regimes as diverse as this one, might it not make just as much sense (or as little) to take the whole of the peripheral-capitalist world as one's field of interest, or the whole of a particular geographical region of it? To put the question in terms of the recent history of politics as a university discipline, is this attempt to compare five regimes not a case of going back to the comparative politics of the 1960s, with its love of taxonomies and broad generalizations, which treated so many of the legacies of history with cavalier disregard, had no political economy dimension and usually left the dynamics of transnational inter-action out of account? "Comparisons between Indonesia and the Philippines yes", my putative critic is saying. "Comparisons between South Korea and Singapore perhaps. But among the five of these regimes? Including that of Iran, with so different a history and so unique a pattern of recent economic transformation? Surely you are not going to be attempting inferences about the other regimes of your group from the fall of the Shah?"

My answer is that these five regimes have a great deal in common in terms of the situations out of which they were born. Here I am not thinking particularly of the domestic situations of class confrontation, or confrontation between class-cum-ethnic coalitions, although there are of course some major similarities there, involving blocked processes of capital accumulation, heightened levels of inflation, and rapidly mounting levels of violence, both directly political violence and the kinds of urban criminality which flourish where armies and police forces are hamstrung by political division.

I am thinking more particularly of the international political context of the mid-1960s. I conceive this as having four main dimensions, a politico-military one, involving a particular phase of the Cold War, a political economy one involving a particular phase of the development of American and global capitalism, an intellectual-ideological one involving the hegemony of "modernization" as the answer to the problems of the onon-industrialized or only marginally industrialized world, and one to do with a particular phase in the politics of generating cooperation among Third World states.

Looking at the mid-1960s in terms of the politico-military dimension of international relationships, one sees it as a period in which much of the political dispensation established in the 1940s was still intact, in particular American military superiority and a rigid form of Cold War alignments. It is true that Soviet-Chinese hostility was already a major part of international politics, but this axis of conflict was still overshadowed by the Washington-Moscow one, whose dimensions were so horrifyingly highlighted by the brink phase of the Cuba Missiles Crisis of 1963. It was also of course the period of rapid build up of American military strength in Vietnam. For President Johnson, the problems of empire maintenance in the Third World, the problems of checking the threat posed by enemies like Castro and Ho Chi Minh and Communist-leaning mischief-makers like Soekarno, Ben Bella, Nkrumah and Sihanouk, were intimately connected with the problems of America's adversary relationship with the USSR. What was important in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as Johnson and the Brightest and Best saw it, was to be generous to governments in which realistic and pragmatic modernizers were playing a central role and to treat governments headed by irresponsible and Communist-leaning agitators with the contempt they deserved—which might well encourage their local adversaries to unseat them. In political economy terms the mid-60s was still part of the post-1945 era too. It was a period of vigorous boom. But it was also a period in which the European challenge to the competitiveness of American business was becoming worrying. And it was a period in which many of the leaders of world business were becoming increasingly concerned by prospects of resource scarcity. These factors combined to produce a major new phase of capital export, initially mainly from America, but later from Western Europe and Japan as well. Inasmuch as it came to be invested in the Third World, this capital found its outlets in operations of two main types, extractive ones involving oil, natural gas, minerals and timber, and export manufacturing ones in "industrial estates" and "Free Trade Zones". From the point of view of the American TNCs who pioneered this historically unprecedented move into manufacturing for export in cheap labor areas, the promise was that this would create an effective counter to the Western-European or Western-European-cum-Japanese challenge.

The intellectual-ideological aspect of the world situation of the mid-60s as it bore on the Third World has to do with the intellectual ascendency of America and of its social science and particularly of the new American modernization theory. The late 1950s and early 1960s had been a period when the comparative study of the "developing areas" was an exciting frontier area for researchers in various kinds of social science departments in the US. This was the period which led to the publication of such books as W.W. Rostow's, *The Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist Manifesto* (1958), Edward A. Shils, *The Political Development of the New States* (1959), David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (1960), Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (1960) and John J. Johnson (ed.), *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (1962) and the essays by Samuel P. Huntington which were later expanded into *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968).

The ideas of these books and many others of similar thrust were communicated to Third World intellectuals and opinion leaders very quickly and proved immediately appealing to a segment of them, particularly young professionals. Third World graduate students at American universities were strongly attracted to this new post-nationalist way of thinking about their countries' problems, which of course accorded them highly important roles; it was people like these who later became Brazil's "Los Chicago Boys" and Indonesia's "Berkeley Mafia". And so were most of the many Third World officers who studied at American military academies. Also important was the role of American graduate students and other academic researchers living and working in Third World countries who befriended capital-city intellectuals and swapped ideas with them about their society and how changes in it should be understood. Interaction at that level may help explain the fact that a number of younger intellectuals in Third World capitals had a sense of participation in the new US derived social science project.

The fourth aspect of the world situation of the middle '60s has to do with the lack of unity among Third World states and the weakness of the autonomist and disEuropeanizing forces.[13] This was an era when the optimistic spirit of the Bandung Conference of Asian

13 The idea of the disEuropeanization of the world as a process characterizing the political and intellectual history of the non-West since the early part of the twentieth century seems to go back to Helen Carrere d'Encausse and Stuart R. Schram, *Marxism and Asia* (English edition, 1969), p. 5. Rex Mortimer has drawn attention to the concept in his "Asian Marxism and the disEuropeanization of the World", mimeo, University of Sydney, 1979.

and African Nations of 1955 was dead, not least' because of the China-India war of 1962. It was a period when the Non-Aligned Movement was deeply divided, principally between the conciliationist forces of Nehru and Tito, who argued that the movement should concentrate on softening the conflict between the Cold War giants. and the confrontionist forces of Sukarno, Nkrumah, and Ben Bella who saw the movement's main task as fighting against colonialism and imperialism. Raul Prebisch's UNCTAD initiatives had begun, but in the mid-60's they looked almost as unlikely to achieve meaningful changes in the status quo of First World—Third World relations as Sukarno's ill-fated attempt of 1964-5 to breate a conference of the New Emerging Forces as a counter to the still US-dominated United Nations.

In retrospect it is scarcely surprising that a lot of thoughtful political intellectuals of the Third World countries I am discussing associated themselves with the forces of Americanization in their country. In part at least they saw themselves as in a situation where "If you can't lick 'em, join em." It is not merely that many of them had studied in America or attended conferences there, and internalized current American notions of the nature of the "developing' world's problems. It is also that many of them saw the radical emancipationist strains of their countries' nationalism as having run out of steam, now spending themselves in quixotic agitationalism of a kind which ignored the realities of the world's politico-economic situation, ignored the reality of their countries's need of capital and skills, and would therefore do nothing for the mass of the poor in their societies, or even for these societies, cultural health.

How have the RDRs in Asia responded to the challenges emerging from this?

1. Tactical and propagandistic responses: denouncing local dissidents as unpatriotic for communicating their grievances to foreign news agencies, accusing the US of being the worst human rights violator of all, hiring public relations agents, inviting sympathetic journalists and biographers, working through bi-national chambers of commerce, lobbying conservative legislators, etc.

2. Streamlining the apparatus of repression so that dangerous adversaries are neutralised more efficiently, with fewer arrests and fewer persons held for long periods as preventive detainees. Less torture, more complex computers.

3. Increased efforts to diversify connections with First World states, particularly for purposes of arms buying and arrangements to manufacture arms locally in cooperation with a TNC, also for purpose of nuclear power plant acquisition.

4. Policy measures designed to compensate for prestige losses resulting from repression (repression with aggravated inequality, cultural loss, etc.) eg. South Korea's imaginative reafforestation scheme, Singapore's car-pooling legislation.

5. New experimentation with pseudo-representative bodies.

But also some responses which suggest that the RDR regime form as such is coming under challenge:

a. Placatory or "me-tooist" shifts of ideological emphasis: government talk of Basic Needs, of participation, of the will of the people, of Third World solidarity, et.c.

b. Toleration of more free organization in middle class groups, in Indonesia and the Philippines.

c. Diminished harshness of treatment of dissidents.

Responses of this kind may be costly. In the case of Iran in 1978 the relaxation introduced in response to challenges provided the opposition challengers with free space to organize the snowballing movement which forced the Shah into exile.

Strengths of the RDRs

1. Greatly increased capacities of their apparatus of control, because of bureaucratic streamlining and technologies of computerised surveillance, social surveys, etc.

2. Sense of confidence born of manifest achievements.

3. The urban upper middle class's fears of opening a Pandora's box: communist resurgence, violence, religious fanaticism, civil war, foreign intervention, etc.

4. The continuing importance of statist nationalism and "the challenge of fast development".

Vulnerabilities

1. The very success of these regimes in establishing tight control and expanding the group of the tertiary and secondary schooled has undermined one basis of their initial political strength, that is the small upper and upper middle class' fear of the mobilized masses. In the new situation middle class confidence is much greater. Middle class demands center on regularization of government performance, elimination of nepotism, the rule of law, etc., and cultural and political freedom for middle class members; but these demands often lead to wider ones for democratization, inasmuch as particular middle classes are unfrightened by the possibility of mass resurgence, or as middle class individuals are willing to take risks.

2. The commodity-fetishistic character of cultural life has long produced alienation among students, artists and the less narrowly professional intellectuals, also in religious communities. Many in these same groups have always seen the RDR as morally flawed by its connections with foreign business and by the foreigners-imitating lifestyles of its top officials. Today important international pressures are at work to make it less dangerous for them to speak out.

3. The RDRs' attempts to establish political institutions have generally had little success. These institutions have kept an artificial, top-down character, attracting mainly careerists and the very effluxion of time has aggravated this tendency.

4. The problematic character of their legitimacy arrangements has been evident in the difficulties they have had manipulating elections. The increased scope for free political expression which the regimes have been obliged to accord to attract opposition groups into participating in electoral contests have made it possible for these groups to puncture the regimes, claims to have popular endorsement, eg. Indonesian elections of 1977, Philippine elections of 1978. This should be understood in the light of Juan Linz's general argument about the difficulties authoritarian regimes have in achieving legitimacy in the current climate of world ideologies (see Linz in A. Stepan, *op.cit.*, and also "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes" in F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science,* 1975, Vol. 3).

5. Internal problems within the armed forces. Repression tends to shift the locus of political and ideological battles into the coercive apparatus itself. Chiefs of staff, afraid of indiscipline in the lower ranks of the officer corps, resent being asked to involve their forces in too much riot control activity where they see that the demonstrators and rioters have popular support. Some rulers have responded to this by providing the military as a whole with large caste privileges, but this is costly inasmuch as the military comes to be seen as associated with the regime's special-privilege-protecting character.

6. Phases of accelerated economic expansion can aggravate a regime's vulnerability, by heightening conspicuous consumption by the super-rich and encouraging capital flight. Particularly great vulnerability is characteristic of slump and slowed growth phases following immediately after phases of very fast growth.

Religion, Ideology and Development

By Abdurrahman Wahid

The conflict between religious factions and governments is today as prevalent in political life as it was during the past. Today, in the developing countries this conflict is further compounded by differences in aspirations and interpretations of the development concept occuring between governments and religious groups. This article attempts to look at such conflicts by citing some examples in countries of Asia, the Middle East and Latin America.

Abdurrahman Wahid is founder of the 'Ciganjur' *pesantren* in South Jakarta. *Pesantrens* are Islamic educational institutions with live-in students. The author himself attended *pesantrens* and continued his studies at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt and Baghdad University in Iraq. He writes a regular column in *Tempo* magazine as well as a number of publications in Jakarta.

Throughout the ages, the relationship between religion and national ideology has provided much material for thought, particularly in connection with the urgent issue of development. As such, there is a considerable tendency to merely arouse interest without producing fundamentals for collective reflection, especially when the topic is approached purely for the purpose of seeking superficial relations between religion and state ideology, as is frequently the case when conveyed by government information officials in developing nations today.

In order to avoid such pitfalls, this writing begins by advancing the reasons for the relevancy of discussing the above topic. In the writer's opinion, the uppermost reason lies in the increasing indications of large obstacles to the development process, due to vast misunderstandings between those assuming responsibility for national ideology and leaders of religious movements. This misunderstanding has so pervaded the relationship between religion and national ideology that political life in most developing nations has become unstable. A great deal of energy is expended for the sole purpose of restricting the influence of religious movements which are considered as potential enemies of national ideology and therefore a great imposition on development. Sooner or later, such politically restrictive measures against religious movements could swell to such proportions as to slow down, or even halt the development efforts they were originally meant to protect.

This harsh reality is covered in political rhetorics so as to avoid creating disturbances which could aggravate the situation further. These rhetorics are accompanied by multiple actions designed to weaken the religious movements.

On the one hand, religious movements are "subdued" by being provided with large amounts of state aid intended for ritual service purposes; on the other, those religious movements politically aspiring to correct the government's policies are disabled, usually by creating rival movements with immense facilities from the state apparatus. Among the religious movements this move is known as "cutting steel with steel."

The creation of such alternative movements is possible to impede, within the hierarchy of the religious movements, due to their possessing an extreme cohesiveness and a high level of organization comparable to that of the government. Consequently, direct confrontation between those in power and the religious movements is inevitable, whether those movements voice the aspirations of the majority of the nation, such as the Catholic movements in several Latin American nations which defend the campesinos' rights; or those voicing the minorities' aspirations, such as the Muslim movements in the Philippines which strive to defend the traditional rights of Muslim tribes in the southern part of that country against the oppressive and corrupt central government.

Such direct confrontation may come in the form of either large-scale or small armed conflict, or in unequal physical clashes between unarmed non-violent religious activists (however militant), and security forces complete with the latest monitoring and detecting equipment (including physical torture for purposes of interrogations). The religious movements are not always on the weak side, especially when they are able to form coalitions with other political sectors, as was evident in Iran.

Passive resistance from the religious movements, in which arms form no part (notwithstanding the possibility of terrorist actions from within their ranks), in several cases succeeds in diverting the path of the nation from its original course. Turkey today comes to mind in this case. The emergence of militant (yet peaceful) opposition towards the erosion of religious values through modernization assuming a formal appearance of secularism, which brought about extensive instability in the political relations between the forces represented in its parliament, ultimately ended in the overthrow of the parliamentary cabinet by a military junta proposing the recovery of a situation described as being "headed towards anarchy". In the same manner, the Ikhwanul Muslimin movement in Egypt has been repeatedly successful in compelling the government to alter its policies, although they were able to force nothing on President Anwar Sadat concerning direct talks with Israel.

Clearly, once the religious movements decide to put forward alternative proposals to the government's policies, they rarely detract from their course, despite the risk of bringing down persecution and oppression upon themselves. Examples of this are the opposition leaders in South Korea who like Kim Dae Jung based their moral-political movements on the Christian faith; and leaders of the Turkish National Salvation Party headed by Necmettin Erbacan. Such opposition has long been evident as during the struggle for independence from foreign domination, and in the period of development against what is known as "veiled domination" by multinational companies, military allies and similar groups.

The determination of alternative movements basing their aspirations on religion arises from their ability to formulate ideas from religious sources, so that their convictions possess a dimen-

sion of eternal struggle and ideals. Each sacrifice performed represents merely a part of the entire ceaseless struggle. Each successive failure serves as a brick to make up the precious structure of their ideals, nurtured with blood and sweat. Their concept of martyrdom puts the consequences of persecution and physical oppression in a different light altogether from that intended by the perpetrators. In many developing nations, the continuing struggle for aspirations in the face of intensive hardships, as a phase in the "self-discovery" of every alternative movement, brings with it a vicious circle of escalating resistance against the governments's security measures. Escalation in the conflict between the religious movements on the one hand, and the government on the other, with the consequent infliction of further burdens on development, forms the basic problem generally facing the developing nations.

Certainly, several attempts are made to conceal this basic problem under the guise of other "basic problems", such as the extreme difficulty in changing traditional ways of life; the negligible capacity in developing natural resources through self-efforts; the lack of technology to establish the necessary socio-economic infrastructure on a scale and level sufficient for the purposes of development, and so forth. Still, however basic these technical problems may be, they do not bring up the sensitive situation that is generated by misunderstandings occuring between national ideology and religions for the last two decades in many developing countries. In any case, any attempt to cover up the true situation would be of no avail, for it would only serve to postpone any solution, while risking the dangers of social explosions. This attitude of closing one's eyes towards the basic problem will merely create a long-term unmanageable conflict.

A review of problems in the relationship between religious aspiration and national ideology in most developing nations must be centered on the growth of that very ideology, the process of which has not been fully established yet. Such a focus would help to bring about a deeper understanding of the origin of the aforementioned problems, so that any solution proposed would be based on actual situations, and therefore be acted upon accordingly.

These problems originate from the unstable progress of the national ideology. Theocratic and secular ideologies have always been in conflict with each other, a situation in which formal compromise is usually unable to end. A case in point is Pancasila as the national ideology of the Republic of Indonesia. During the critical moments approaching the attainment of official independence from the hands of the Japanese, the secular aspirations of the nationalist movements and the non-Islamic religious movements were seriously at odds with those of the Islamic groups.

Even after a formal solution had been reached in the form of a national ideology known as Pancasila,[1] the conflict continued to rage as each side attempted to "safeguard" Pancasila from the danger of "deviation" by political adversaries. These efforts rested primarily

---

1 Up to the present time, no official state institution has made a study of the role played by the Islamic groups in the formulation of Pancasila, an indication of our biased knowledge of an ideology accepted by all parties. The formulation of our national ideology represents a process of mutual concessions between two parties, and no party can claim sole credit for its existence, however glorified that party may have become in later days as the formulator of the national ideology.

on political measures intended to dominate the governmental and state apparatus as far as possible. The "safeguarding" of the national ideology from possible "misinterpretation" has always taken the form of assuming control of the government and its requisites, and putting it to "effective use" for formulating a "true interpretation" of the national ideology, as was apparent during the period of the struggle for independence (1945-1949), the period of liberal democracy (1950-1959), the period of guided democracy (1959-1966) and since 1966 the New Order. Currently, these efforts materialize in the form of the ceaseless P-4 edification programs. In fact this did not prevent the emergence of political adversity against an MPR bill upon which the P-4 programs are based, during the last general assembly. Opposition arose out of a fear that the bill would facilitate further "misinterpretation" of the national ideology.

The development of Pancasila as the national ideology as described above is not a unique case. In many countries, the beginnings of national ideologies, and their subsequent growth and establishment, were formed through intensive dialogue between opposing parties. Some took the form of open forums discussing interpretations of the constitution, such as occured between the Federalists and the Republicans (particularly Hamilton against Jefferson) in the United States during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, and later between the Confederates and the Abolitionists, on the question of slavery, during the middle of that same century. But these dialogues may also take the form of silent bargainings, such as occurred in Indonesia during the sixties and the seventies, and possibly continuing into the eighties. The tug of war currently taking place in Indonesia

between theological and secular interests is part of such silent bargainings.

The dialogue surrounding national ideology assumes varying temporary solutions at different stages before ultimately arriving at a more or less mutual agreement. Sometimes the results take the form of large scale bloodbaths, as for instance the American Civil War during the last century, the Biafran War in Nigeria, and the "war for independence" in East Pakistan against West Pakistan's "occupation", ending in the birth of the new nation known as Bangladesh. However, more frequently what takes place is the elimination of any standpoint considered anti-constitutional, for example actions dealt against separatist movements like the DI (Darul Islam), RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan), PRRI-Permesta and OPM in Indonesia. Elimination can be physical, as in military actions against suspected separatist movements, or it can appear in the prohibition of certain beliefs through a legislative process, as for instance the caste "ideology" of conservative Hindus in India, the Masjumi and PKI (Indonesian Political Party) political movements in Indonesia (the latter was accompanied by another large-scale bloodbath), and the Ikhwanul Muslimin movements in some Arab countries (Egypt, Syria and Iraq).

Such actions were not always successful in putting down suspected separatists. Two such outstanding examples, each presenting a different type of solution, are the cases of Iran and Pakistan. In Iran, the attempt to curb religious movements was at first to accuse them of being reactionaries, backward, traditional and conservative. When this failed, they were then accused of deviating from the path of modernization and progress, and being ignorant of the "white revolution" launched by the late Shah Reza Pahlevi. While not directly

accused as separatists in the physical sense, the movement led by the mullahs was branded as "spiritual separatists". Following a tense struggle since 1964 which reached its peak during 1977-78, this "separatist movement" turned out to be the victor in this long drawn-out conflict. The victory which applied religion as a "rival ideology" to the existing national ideology, as Mohammed Ayub of the Australian National University puts it, has clearly left its imprint on the development of religious thinking in the last quarter of this century.

Pakistan's case also indicates the use of a somewhat different solution towards the separatist problem. In the beginning, the religious movements were at the fringes of power, and claimed as "separatist movements" threatening the progress of development in the various periods of government since Ayub Khan seized power through a military coup. The height of their "persecution" was reached during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's time. Bhuto's politics, which featured a blend of populism and nationalism, were received by the leaders of the religious movements as an attempt to create a "rival ideology" to the religious ideology agreed upon for over 25 years (albeit in various forms of state formality). Ali Bhuto's provocation proved costly, as the formation of a coalition between the hard-line military and the religious movements indicated. This coalition, which was in the nature of maintaining the status quo (borrowing another phrase of Ayub's), represents a type of provisional solution differing from the Iran case, in which the religious movements revealed a capacity to ward off subjugation by entering into a coalition with other parties more tolerant towards their ideology.

The three types of provisional solution described above, i. e. the prohibition of "separatist movements", the victory of a doctrine formerly considered separatist, and the inclusion of the "separatist movement" into a coalition government consisting of status-quo elements (such as the military), clearly indicate the wide range of responses towards a continuing ideology crisis. The approach taken by some Muslim kings towards religious movements, affected partly by the Iranian case and partly by their own increasing problems, can be seen in Morocco, Jordan and Malaysia as one example of a temporary solution from a wide spectrum of variations.

The crisis surrounding national ideology and the appearance of various types of temporary solutions(at times without arriving at a final conclusive solution) clearly indicates the sensitive situation faced by nations founded during this century. Attempts to cover up the actual situation merely serve to hinder the search for the necessary solutions. The main problem lies with the religious movements' perception of the consolidation of the national ideology as being harmful to the transcendental values they believe in.

The activity of creating a rational and technical national infrastructure often results in an attitude of evading this perception. This attitude, due partly to political opportunism and partly to an inability to open up a political horizon acceptable to all parties, proceeds to an extent wherein the religious movements create alternative concepts to the official interpretation of the national ideology. By that time it would be too late to present a rational and balanced response to this heretofore undetected challenge. Two unfavorable alternatives remain: to confront the alternative groups directly (such as Marcos' drive against the Catholic movement propos-

ing a concept of "humane development" in the Philippines), or to adopt an entirely unsatisfactory opportunistic compromise (such as the one currently taking place in Pakistan).

In such conditions, the temporary solutions achieved bring with them the seeds of future fundamental disagreements. Coalitions due to "marriages of convenience" are short-lived, as tensions rise when each party must determine a response to the challenge of an alternative concept towards the national ideology. The flight of a number of dynamic religious thinkers such as Fazlur Rahman and A. Kazi from Pakistan, in the long run will only serve to create problems for the government of Zia ul Haq. Their return would anger his partners in the governing coalition, but allowing them to remain abroad would complicate matters, for they could prove to be the source of arriving at a creative solution to the most decisive issue: the formulation of mature and rational relations between religion and the state.

The opportunistic approach made by President Anwar Sadat towards the principal group of the Ikhwanul Muslimin movement in Egypt several years ago could not withstand the challenge brought about by the coming together of Israel and Egypt and its culmination in the Camp David agreements. The Ikhwanul Muslimin's opposition towards the Egypt-Israel peace accord forced Sadat to take harsh measures against the movement. Thus the attainment of simple objectives as coalitions between religious ideals and basically secular authority are undergoing much trial in countries such as Salvador, Morocco, Tunisia, Malaysia, Indonesia and Bangladesh.

The input of a "development phase" frequently brings new problems into the already shaky relationship between religious ideals and national ideology, thus adding to the instability. Several aspects of development such as its aims, patterns, funding, and implementing apparatus, together or separately bring points of contention into a faltering dialogue between basically secular authority and religious movements.

The general aim of development in developing nations during the last decade, which is the increase of productivity through material incentive, has been the target of much criticism by different (and sometimes opposing) parties, as between cosmopolitan intellectuals and Marxist-Leninists in several countries. However, it is generally the vocal groups in various religious movements which consistently cultivate opposition towards the formulation of such development aims. Their concept of human values as being the highest ideal in life, leads them to reject outright such materialistic aims in development. As the aims of development involve the strategies to be applied, other sectors are included in their rejection, so that in a short while the entire concept of development as composed by those in power is opposed.

In a situation where the dialogue between two opposing parties can be conducted openly in free discussions, an articulate rejection of the basic development concept will culminate in the proposal of a rival concept, which may become an issue in the next elections. When the dialogues take place in the form of silent bargainings, opposition appears as criticism thinly disguised as catchwords. In Indonesia this takes the form of demands that development be aimed towards producing "man in his entirety".

The pattern of development adopted can also become a point of contention. Questions arise as to the appropriateness of encouraging the productive sec-

tors to develop themselves, and in this manner raise the standards of less productive sectors; the sufficiency of a centralized planning pattern for the actual needs of development, in view of the uniformity of approach which could create unmanageable bureaucratic obstructions in the future; the elimination of social inequality by encouraging the strong sectors. Numerous other questions could be put to the authorities who formulate and execute planned development. Religious movements frequently create problems for the authorities, not only by proposing rival concepts in development patterns, but further by trying out these rival concepts constantly and meticulously on a large scale.

At a time when for reasons of national stability a number of governments ignore the demands for land reform, religious movements carry out their own programs, as has been done by Archbishop Jose Maria Pirez of Joao Pesoa in Brazil, Bishop Mansap in Thailand, and Swami Agnivesh from the Aria Samaj movement in the Indian state of Haryana. The alternatives they put forth, although varying one from the other, serve to aggravate a situation which must shoulder the burden of social unrest caused by the marginalization of land where the cities' poor lives, and the centralization of ownership and control of land in the countryside. For instance, religious movements support the isolated tribes who oppose the construction of the Chico dam in the Philippines, a greatly needed project for the supply of electrical energy. Many other initiatives are produced by the religious movement, all in the nature of alternatives towards the development pattern implemented by the government.

The matter of financing development, as new input towards an already unsteady situation in relations between national ideology and religious movements, brings its own problems. One of them is massive foreign aid, the results of which are apparent only in the extravagance among the upper circles, and the control of production sources by multinational companies. The religious movements naturally refused to accept these "unavoidable facts", as planners of development in developing countries put it. In the same manner, they questioned whether the funding of micro field development projects should be obtained from "above" through credit allocated by the government, or from "below" through community self-help and initiative; whether cooperatives be founded with direct external credit, or rather pre-cooperatives be set up with funds accumulated from members.

The development apparatus itself can also be a point of contention between government implementors and religious movements. Once again questions arise as to the right of this apparatus to determine development priorities, when in the eyes of the religious movements it continually commits fundamental errors in identifying these priorities; whether an apparatus unable to grasp the basic demands for justice can answer for errors in the planning and implementation of development; how basic decisions can be left to this apparatus when its very structure contains many weak points which renders it vulnerable to manipulation in perpetuating social inequality and injustice.

The above discussion presents a clear picture of the numerous complications in the relationship between implementors of the national ideology (institutionalized governmental power) and the religious movements, which could result in the further deterioration of the situation. Superficial relations are unable to conceal an undercurrent of

unrest, and the apparent calm covers an uneasy peace which is the main point of the issue.

This self-portrait can be revealed in several sequences: the notion of a "deviation of the national ideology" on the part of the authorities and on the part of the religious movements; the handling of such "deviation" according to the authorities and according to the religious movements; and different methods in "selling" their respective proposal. This dynamic introduction of a self-portrait can bring us to the discovery of a solution based on actual facts, and not on "situational estimates" which are the product of inaccurate intelligence agencies.

The governing power in developing countries have a tendency to regard attempts to search for alternatives towards their interpretation of the national ideology as a deviation of that very ideology. Similarly, there is a strong inclination to treat alternative development programs as deviating from the course of a development program which forms a "national concensus". On the other hand, the movements proposing the alternatives, primarily the religious movements, are of the opinion that the real deviators are the governing powers who divert the constitution from its original course as agreed upon during its incorporation as the basis of the national way of life. Misuse of power, the abuse of human rights and the suppression of incentive in seeking alternatives provide concrete evidence of such deviation.

As a result of this difference in opinion, the solutions proposed also differ widely. On the one hand, the governing power is burdened with a responsibility to shelter the national ideology from every kind of agitation, both actual or potential. The majority of the nation, in particular the executors of government,

must be protected from possible contamination by the "deviation of the national ideology". Movements which can represent a menace to the national ideology must be monitored and if necessary dealt with. Only these methods can prevent the halt of development, despite the risk of disintegrating national unity.

The alternative movements primarily demand a number of conditions which would ensure the purity of the national ideology and the entirety of the constitution. The first condition is the initiative to present the people with a means to participate in directing the course of the nation, by upholding human rights and democracy honestly and sincerely. The willingness to provide freedom with which to discuss this matter openly and honestly forms a starting point towards maintaining the purity of the national ideology and the entirety of the constitution. This willingness to uphold democracy will result in the emergence of a process for determining development priorities which would be appropriate for the needs of even the lowest stratum in the community. This condition can be achieved only if governmental power is answerable to public institutions outside its domain, which would include an honest and universal voting system.

The strategy to "sell" their respective method of maintaining the purity of the national ideology also differs widely between the governing power and the alternative movements. The formulation of an ideal concept of national ideology in the form of instructive material, indoctrinative information campaigns, and the appointment of official attributes towards national ideology, represent the main body of the governing power's "selling" strategy. These indoctrinations, ranging from the late Nasser's Arab socialism to Marcos'

concept of "togetherness" are widely distributed, as with the P-4 programs currently being undertaken in Indonesia. Efforts to secure the national ideology through such an indoctrinative approach have, of late, been applied in the perspective of handling poverty, the struggle to establish a just international economic order, and the solidarity of the Third World nations.

On the other hand, the "selling" strategy of the alternative movements is placed more in the framework of strengthening efforts to establish institutions which would be able to defend, and if necessary, fight for their own rights. The task of these institutions is to search from among their cultural heritage for traits which can be developed in the interest of organizing a true concept of development. In this field, experiments and pilot projects must repeatedly be implemented so that each success and failure can lead to the establishment of a model development which will have been tried on the field. The religious movements will attempt to seek elements of development in their respective religious teachings, and confront them with basic problems that man face.

The struggle to establish justice, to realize democracy, and to develop the individual's basic abilities in overcoming his problems, obtains its concepts from religious faith. Thus it is not surprising that a tug-of-war should take place between the governing power's indoctrinative concept to ensure the purity of the national ideology, and the formulation of the purity of that ideology from formal religious teachings. The transcendental character of religious teachings compels the movements to emphasize the ascendancy of God over human power, which naturally the governing powers find inconvenient. On the other hand, the appointment of formal attributes to strengthen national ideology may raise its position to the level of religious teachings which are regarded as sacred. To the alternative movements, the sacralization of national ideology through the establishment of formal attributes possess great dangers to the purity of religious faith.

Several general conclusions can be drawn from these discussions, the veracity of which must be further studied. The first conclusion is the existence of a considerable imbalance between national ideology and the religious faith of wide-scale movements in developing nations, arising from the as yet unfirm position of the national ideology. This situation is still rendered in the framework of temporary solutions unsatisfactory to all parties and containing potential conflict for the future.

The following conclusion, which should be further noted, is the strong bond between religious aspirations and other aspirations nominally outside the area of religion (for instance the upholding of justice, the growth of democracy, the preservation of nature, and the development of a populist economic structure). It is precisely religious teachings which form the inspirational source for "non-religious" aspirations among the religious movements proposing alternatives to the monolithic governmental system.

Another conclusion is a strong orientation to realize aspirations in actual small-scale working programs situated at the lower levels of religious movement choosing to seek alternatives to the existing governmental structure. It is precisely this orientation which forms the bond between religious and non-religious aspirations mentioned previously. This bond has been encouraged to such an extent that a new form of movement has emerged which links religious teachings with Marxist-Leni-

nist ideologies in several developing countries, such as is found in one or two Catholic movements in the Phillippines and Latin America, and the Hindu Aria Samaj movement in the Indian state of Haryana. An example which can be put forward is the Marxist rhetorics exhorted by the Iranian mullahs during their period of resistance towards the former Shah Reza Pahlevi.

The handling of the basic misunderstanding between the governing powers as the implementors of national ideology, and religious movements must take into account these realities if a total and conclusive solution is to be reached. Aspirations arising from a desire to maintain the purity of the national ideology and the entirety of the constitution, must be fully appreciated, even though they may be at variance with the official interpretation as formulated by state institutions. A willingness to protect and if necessary to assist lower-level programs, with a possible result of tremendous changes in the government's development policies, must be adtopted and developed at all levels of the government apparatus.

Out of such a global proposal, which can be made concrete through a number of basic decisions, it may be possible to achieve a conclusive solution to the main problem, that is the fundamental misunderstanding between state ideology and religious aspirations in many developing countries, including Indonesia. It remains to be seen whether we will be able to accomplish this.

also received his Ph.D. with a thesis entitled *Continuity, Politics and Public Order.*

One of the striking characteristics of social science development in Indonesia today is the great faith which is placed in the value and efficacy of social research. For almost a decade every government ministry has had a research and development wing to undertake monitoring and evaluation of government development projects, as well as projecting and planning future trends and programs. Officials seem anxious at least to go through the motions of commissioning research and citing the authority of research findings as one justification for their policies. While no systematic study has been undertaken, observers of social science activities amongst ASEAN nations suggest that in Indonesia there is a far higher commitment by government departments to social science research than elsewhere in the region. Funds for research are apparently more readily available here than in any other country of Southeast Asia. There seems to be an accepted premise that social science research is *ipso facto* a "good thing" and that the more of it there is, the better.

Throughout the preoccupation with research, there has been little attention to the system which is used for sponsoring and generating research activities in Indonesia. Although there are frequent complaints in the donor community that the results of most research projects are extremely disappointing,

this has been almost entirely explained in terms of poor training on the part of those conducting research. That there may be equally important systemic reasons for this has not specifically been considered.

The purpose of this short essay is to attempt to outline the ways in which social science research is conducted in Indonesia. The intention is to examine how research is financed and executed, and by whom this is done. From this it is hoped that we will have a clearer understanding of the research environment in which we operate, so that if we wish to continue our preoccupation with research, we will at least do so with a better appreciation of the system with which we must deal.

Who does research?

In many ways, the system in Indonesia is simpler than other countries because of the overwhelming domination of government departments and government-linked bodies. A taxonomy of research institutions is thus relatively easy, and recent changes in the university structure and organization (discussed below) have simplified this even further. However, while a taxonomy is relatively simple, there is at the same time a large number of different organizations interested in social science research, and it is often difficult to get a clear picture of how they interact with one another and what the general trends and priorities are at present.

1. Government departments. During the late 1960's and early 1970's almost every government department (ministry) established a research and development wing to undertake what was intended to be policy—oriented research to help monitor and inform government policies. Some of these bodies have developed a considerable in-house capacity to organize and undertake research. The research body (BP3 K) at the Department of Education and Culture (P dan K) is perhaps the best example. Others, however, have relied upon outside agencies, primarily tertiary educational institutions, to perform the bulk of their research tasks, or else have turned to international agency funds to secure the research assistance of foreign experts. The Department of the Interior (Departemen Dalam Negeri) and Department of Transmigration (Departemen Transmigrasi) are both examples of this. These government bodies are the main sources of social science research in Indonesia, at least in terms of funding if not in terms of conducting research.

2. Semi-autonomous government bodies. In addition to research and development there are a few semi-autonomous government bodies with a specific mandate to undertake a wide spectrum of social science research. Under the umbrella of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), the two best known institutes undertaking social science research are the National Economic and Social Institute (LEKNAS) and the National Cultural Research Institute (LRKN). In addition, there are smaller and less widely known institutions such as the National Language Development Institute which include social science research amongst items on their agenda.

3. Tertiary educational institutions. Until January, 1980, every state university and teacher training institute (IKIP) had at least one or more research institutes concerned with the social sciences. In many of the older universities, particularly those which were formed out of a number of pre-existing faculties, there were also faculty-based research institutes which were frequently better known and stronger than the university-based ones. A recent ministe-

rial decree, however, will bring about fundamental changes in this system over the next year. From February, 1981, each university or IKIP may have only one university-based research institute. Under this institute there may be up to five research centers concentrating on different disciplines or areas of research. The intention of this reorganization is to prevent the growth of a large number of competing and overlapping institutions, and to impose a coherent and standardized system upon the various universities and IKIPs. At present many universities and IKIPs are engaged in the difficult process of combining different institutions and determining their staffing patterns and research priorities for the years ahead. This is obviously a process which requires considerable political skill as well as academic judgement, and in most institutions it is not yet clear what exactly the new pattern will be.

4. Private institutions. There are very few private social science research institutions in Indonesia. Of the five best-known institutes, two are associated with private universities (the Social Science Research Institutes of LPIS at Universitas Satya Wacana and the Research Center or Pusat Penelitian at Atma Jaya), while the other three are independent (the Institute for Economic and Social Research Education and Information or LP3ES; the Institute for Development Studies or Lembaga Studi Pembangunan; and Centre for Strategic and International Studies or CSIS) but tend to rely on specific sources of funding. Beyond these five, there are perhaps a handful of other private institutes but they are not generally regarded as quality institutes. In addition, there are (primarily in Jakarta) a number of private commercial organizations specializing in market research or management training, and social science research can be expected to receive some marginal attention from them. But again, they are not regarded as significant institutes in undertaking social science research.

Who pays for research?

From the above comments, it should not be surprising to find that almost all research is supported by government funds. In part this can be explained by the fact that universities in Indonesia are viewed as government bodies, and they are increasingly under the direct control and supervision of the Minister of Education and Culture. However, government departments are the largest consumers of social science research, and this is by far the more important factor in explaining the central position which the government occupies in the research system. Activities which are funded by various government department and agencies are intended to relate more or less directly to on-going government programs and policies. Research is not supported because of any liberal commitment to the value of research as an activity, or to the importance of stimulating thinking about development problems in general. Government departments are not patrons of the social sciences, but rather they are ostensibly avid consumers of social science research products.

In general, this predominance of government funding may not be unique to Indonesia. However, it is important to notice that government funding in Indonesia is project-oriented rather than problem-oriented. That is, funds are made available for research tied to specific government development projects. Benchmark surveys, feasibility studies and evaluations are the most common form of research requested. Almost never are funds made available

to conduct general research into a more broadly conceived development issues, such as the generation of off-farm employment. The government, insofar as it is genuinely interested in social science research, seeks information on specific projects rather than education about development issues in general.

Not only is government research project-oriented, it is also budgeted on annual cycles. Once a research project has been decided upon, its conception and design are greatly influenced by the fact that the project must be completed within the financial year. Continuation of funding beyond the current financial year is not necessarily guaranteed, and the project is designed accordingly, whatever the academic requirements. This constraint is further compounded by frequent delays in the release of government funds, especially to provincial level offices. Projects may be delayed weeks or months, and inevitably this works to the detriment of research where timing is crucial.

In addition to government departments, a significant number of research projects are funded by international agencies. These would include UN agencies, the World Bank, and bilateral agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Australian Development Assistance Board (ADAB). Again, this support generally is forthcoming because of a direct interest in specific projects rather than a desire for a broader understanding of development strategies and alternatives. (In this context, it is interesting to note that there is little evidence that social science research is in fact as useful as one might hope for policy makers. However, as will be seen below, there are perhaps some systematic or structural characteristics which account for this, aside from problems about the skills and training of those undertaking the research project.)

Privately funded research is almost non-existent in Indonesia. One frequently meets university lecturers who have endeavored to carry out their own research projects with their own funds, or perhaps with some assistance from the university. Almost always, however, it is simply impossible for them to complete these projects. Either the direct costs of the projects itself are too high, or else the opportunity costs of seriously pursuing individual research are prohibitive.

One implication of this aspect of the social science research system is that university lecturers and others are seldom able to pursue their own research problems and to develop their own intellectual interests. Insofar as research is both a desirable and necessary stimulus to professional social scientists, this means that Indonesian professionals are constantly forced to occupy themselves with projects and problems which have been imposed upon them from outside. They have little control over their own intellectual agenda. When this is coupled with the relatively tight control which the central government ministry maintains over university and IKIP curricula, it is possible to appreciate with greater clarity the difficulties faced in sustaining a sense of vigorous intellectual life and enquiry.

The role of research

In one sense, the role of research should be obvious: to increase the stock of knowledge. That is, the final product might be conceived as the most important aspect of research. The ways in which that product is (or could be) utilized in formulating government po-

licies might emerge as a major preoccupation. For example, a concern to make use of the findings of research projects is a major rationale for government funding for research in Indonesia. Research, then, might be seen as utilitarian, practical and policy-oriented. Whether or not this aspiration is achieved in fact is another matter, of course.

Interestingly, this is not an issue which appears to have attracted much attention in Indonesia thus far. Although the establishment of a research and development wing in each ministry suggests that government departments have a strong commitment to good quality and useful policy research, there is little evidence to indicate that research utilization is a major concern. In this sense, government departments might be said to have a great faith in the importance of research, but relatively little interest in its judicious use in policy making. That is, the importance of research may well lie in a variety of functions which it performs apart from its quality. For example, the mere fact that research has been undertaken may provide an acceptable legitimation for a given project or policy. Or the requirements of foreign donor agencies that a project be proceeded by research can be met through a commissioned study. In any case, seldom are researchers able to point to specific ways in which their projects have affected government policies, and there is little sense of a critical examination of the quality of research by those who fund it. I have yet to hear of a report which has been returned for further work and redrafting on the grounds that it did not meet a certain minimum standard. The impression one receives is that research reports are exhibited but not examined. For this reason, an important element of quality control appears to be lacking in the present system.

The apparent weak interest of research (or inability to judge quality) on the part of the government is supplemented by another aspect of the research system. Because government departments commission the vast majority of the research, the final research product becomes an official possession. In contrast to many other nations, there is little opportunity to expose the products of commissioned research to a community of professional social scientists. Therefore there is both relatively little quality control exercised by the major consumer of research, and relatively little control exercised by the professional producers of research.

However, it is also important to understand research from another perspective in order to appreciate the way in which it is carried on and the significance which it has to professional social scientists. Participation in research activities is of great importance as an income-generating activity. For most academics, their base salary (gaji pokok) is not sufficient to provide them with the level of income which they feel they require. A mid-career social scientist with a foreign Ph.D will earn around Rp 60,000–80,000 as his base salary as a civil servant. All additional income must be derived from activities outside his primary job. This may include outside teaching, consultancy, or writing. However, research activities in one form or another are a significant sources of secondary income for most Indonesian social scientists.

Apart from direct monetary benefits, a researcher also gains other important advantages through his participation in a research project. Almost all professional social scientists in Indonesia are civil servants in the Department of Education and Culture. Promotion is in part determined by length of service,

but also by participation in certain specified activities such as seminars or workshops, upgrading courses, and research projects. Mere participation is enough to ensure that one receives the necessary credit for an activity. No distinction is made between an active participation and perfunctory one. This, coupled with an apparent lack of interest in the quality of research on the part of government departments and a weak professional community of social scientists in general, means that there is relatively little incentive to strive to produce good research findings.

The opportunity simply to participate in research projects, then, often becomes more important than the research product. Conscientious social scientists will strive to do a good job as/when they can. However (as will be discussed below) there are systematic reason why this is extraordinarily difficult to do. The important point is that research is contracted and paid for, and credit for participation given, regardless of the quality of the research product and its usefulness to the contracting agency. Research, then, comes to assume a function quite distinct from its contribution to the stock of knowledge, or value in framing government policies.

The contract system

It is instructive to examine the ways in which research is contracted, and the system by which it is executed in order to gain an appreciation of the manner in which social science research plays an important role as an income-generating activity. While there may be some differences between research contracted by a government agency and research contracted by an international agency, the system is broadly similar. A full understanding of that system

goes some way towards explaining why it is that the quality of social science research in Indonesia is so often disappointing.

Once the contracting body has decided upon a specific topic, it must seek an appropriate group to carry out the research. While the numbers of possible agencies are perhaps limited when compared to countries such as the United States, there is clearly still some choice to be exercised. Because access to research contracts is important in terms of generating additional income, inevitably there is a certain amount of competition for these contracts. In this sense, contracting for research is little different from government contracting for school supplies, construction equipment or building materials. In all these cases, government agencies have scarce funds which they are able to distribute at their discretion, and this economic aspect of the research project is a major concern. It should not be surprising, therefore, to find that the awarding of research contracts is often characterized by the same kind of bargaining and other financial arrangements that are common in other spheres of government activities.

It is also instructive to understand the way in which members of a research team are selected once the contract is awarded to a particular institution, especially university-based research centers which undertake the bulk of the social science research. Rarely do such institutes have full-time staff apart from the Director and one or two administrative assistants. Therefore teams are named for specific projects, and are dissolved once that projected is completed. This selection is normally at the discretion of the institute Director. Frequently, the project will be outside his disciplinary speciality and consequ-

ently he is not in any case in a position to determine eligibility on purely academic grounds. This is a pattern which will be confirmed nation-wide in February, 1981, when all research must be coordinated by a single institute in each state universities and IKIPs.

This power of certain key officials in universities to determine the make-up of research teams is often a sore point, particularly amongst junior staff members who may not feel that they are being given a fair chance to participate. Decisions about who will join a specific project are reputed to be influenced by considerations of university politics and other non-academic criteria. In some areas, the criteria may indeed not be venal. Individuals may be invited to join a project because they have not had a chance recently, and those determining the make-up of the team wish to provide some kind of equitable access to the income generating advantages of research. In a sence, this is an entirely understandable and laudable criteria, but it is almost certain to result in less than desirable quality research products.

Once a team has been selected, it is then necessary to allocate specific responsibilities, and hence distribute specific incomes arising from those responsibilities. Here again, both venal and laudable criteria may intrude upon what should ideally be an academic decision. Every research proposal which I have seen divides research into the following categories: design, data collection, tabulation, analysis, and writing-up. This is a series of categories promoted by government departments through specification of a particular format for all research proposals. All proposals will have a specific cost associated with each of these stages and frequently one finds this budget more detailed, precise and lengthy than the rest of the proposal discussing the objectives and research strategy of the proposal. In larger projects, each stage will list the names of individuals who will be responsible for carrying out the activities listed under that stage. Thus one has a very neat way of distributing the income generated by the project, and it is administratively simple to determine how much each individual should receive from his participation in the project.

A closer examination of this system, however, raises some disturbing points for those who are concerned about the quality of the research. No matter how sensible the division of labor may be from an economic point of view, it results in a system of executing research which is almost bound to produce poor results. In larger projects, for example, frequently there is very little continuity in the membership of the groups associated with relatively senior professionals, and they are likely to reappear at the write-up stage of the project. Collection of data, however, is regarded as relatively junior task, and this is often left to a completely different group of individuals. Similarly, tabulation of data is seen as mundane and menial and senior professionals are unlikely to be associated with this aspect of the research.

Survey research is particularly popular amongst Indonesian social scientists, and the contract system may be a partial explanation for the fact that almost every research project relies heavily upon survey techniques. More than any other kind of social science research technique, survey research is amenable to the division of labor which is encouraged by the contract system. Survey research not only provides a veneer of legitimation through its reliance on ostensibly hard data and its manipulation of numbers, but it also is extremely

compatible with the income-generating function of research.

One consequence of this division of labor is that there is in many cases no single individual who has continuous, day-to-day experience with the project, from research design through data collection, tabulation, analysis and writing up. Frequently, those who collect the data are not informed of the purpose of the project, the thinking that led to the research design, or the potential significance of the data which they are collecting. Those tabulating the data are not necessarily aware of the problems encountered in the field or contingencies which may effect they way in which they go about their task. Those analyzing the data and writing up the research project often deal with the project at second-hard, so to speak, treating the information which they receive as if it were secondary data and not the product of a process over which they might exert some control. Therefore, one frequently finds research reports are of a very uneven quality, with little sense of focus or continuity. Segments of reports do not hang together because they never really were together as part of a single process of conceptualization, design, and research.

Second, those involved in these projects must receive little academic benefit from the experience. No: only is the project primarily important to them as an income generating activity, but also the way in which the system is organized almost guarantees that it can never be anything else. I have frequently interviewed individuals who have participated in the data collection stage, and have found that they have never understood the purpose of the project, never learned the results of their activities, and never saw any impact of the project beyond the receipt of their own honorarium. In these circumstances, it is hard to see how they could either enjoy or learn from their experience.

Third, the research team is a "team" in name only. There can be, in such a system, little or no sense of participation in a common intellectual enterprise. There is little incentive or opportunity to discuss intellectual issues because one is simply allocated a specific and isolated task which is separated from any sense of intellectual enquiry. Research thus becomes an individual effort, despite the apparently collaborative nature of the research team. This is important in terms of the lack of a strong professional identify amongst Indonesian social scientists, and is a consequence which goes beyond the specific project in question.

Conclusion

In the past, much has been made of the need for more and better social science research in Indonesia. Lack of sufficient skilled manpower has been cited as the major constraint in achieving more and better research which will truly be of use to the government in planning and evaluating its development programs. However, while a lack of skilled manpower must be acknowledged to be a serious problem, the above remarks suggest that there are grave systemic constraints as well. A significant increase in trained social scientists, even if accompanied by an increase in research funding, cannot be expected to lead to better research if these structural issues are not addressed. Just as economic poverty is now commonly explained in structural rather than resource terms, so also the poverty of social science research might be better understood as being derived

from a specific system of conceiving, contracting and executing research which makes quality an almost hopeless achievement. In this sense, instead of bemoaning the lack of good social science research in Indonesia, we should perhaps be encouraged that at least some good research is produced by dedicated scholars working against considerable odds.

Politics Based on Sui Poa or Calculated Benefits

By S.I. Poeradisastra

This volume is a welcome addition to the sparse collection of literature on the Chinese minority problem in Indonesia. Dr. Leo Suryadinata, who has long been involved in this field, has published a number of books, including *Peranakan Politics in Java, 1917-1942* Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore University Press, 1976). *Political Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese* 1900-1977 is reviewed by S.J. Poeradisastra, an essayist and literary critic, and former editor of Indonesia magazine (1953-1958). From 1960 to 1965, he was professor of Literature at the University of Indonesia. He is currently member of the Board of Film Censors and regularly appears in Radio Republik Indonesia's "Cultural Review" program.

To researchers of the Chinese minority problem in Indonesia, this book proves very useful in alleviating much of their task. The articles found in this volume were collected by the editor from various Chinese Malayan, Dutch, Indonesian and Chinese language newspapers, periodicals and treatises which today are mostly unavailable. A clear picture of the political thinking of the *peranakan* (mixed-blood) Chinese, and the *totok* (pure-blood) Chinese is obtained from these articles. During Dutch and Japanese rules respectively, each group carried their own way of thinking, their own values, socio-economic interests and ethnic myths, each differing widely from the other.

However, to the layman, the lack of socio-historical background provided by the authors presents an obstacle in fully comprehending the subject matter. For instance, background on the advent of the three groups, Sin Po, Chung Hua Hui (CHH) and the Partai Tionghoa Indonesia or Indonesian Chinese Party (PTI), is very sketchily described. Consequently, it remains unclear why a *totok* Chinese would understandably oppose the Dutch-oriented CHH, or

why a Western educated *"puthauw"* (a term denoting one who is disloyal to the Chinese culture) would in turn be unsupportive towards Sin Po. Yet Kwee Kek Beng, who graduated from the HCK, the Dutch Chinese SPG, supported Sin Po, although in everything else he was a true Dutchman.

The articles are both repetitious and overlapping. A subject discussed by one author is repeatedly pondered over by others without always being more edifying. The overlapping seem to arise from a desire to retain the originality of each article, and as such becomes a necessary evil.

One merit is Suryadinata's footnotes, which are not only explanatory, but points out some authors' errors. For instance Kristoforus Sindhunatha states that CHH was founded in 1932, when it was actually in 1928; Dr. Onghokham believed that Kung Yu Wei was dispatched to the East Indies by the Chinese authorities of the Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty, when in fact he had escaped capture in China following his eminent involvement in the Hundred Days Reform (1898).

Sin Po

Some uncertainties found in the articles, for instance, concern the Sin Po group. Sin Po was first published in 1910 on the occasion of two significant events. The first was the sanctioning of the Dutch Fealty Law for non-Dutch residents on the 10th of February 1910, which was linked to chapter 163 paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Indische Staatsregeling, which included the Japanese in the European category, whereas the Chinese were classified as the lowlier "Foreign Easterners" together with the Arabs and Indians. The second event was the rise of Asian nationalism in the forms of the Turkish Youth Movement,

the Chinese May 10th movement in 1904, Japan's victory over Tsarist Russia at Port Arthur in 1905, and Sun Yat-sen's New China movement with his San Min Chu I. These two factors resulted in anti-colonial sentiments, in this case against the Dutch and for Chinese nationalism. Thus the emotional characteristic in nationalism was apparent. To the Chinese, however, the inclusion of the Japanese as Europeans was a particularly grievous offence. In the first place, the Chinese considered their language and culture to be superior to that of the Japanese. Secondly, the Japanese in the Dutch East Indies at that time were in fact socially and economically inferior to the Chinese. Many Japanese men in Batavia then were peanut vendors, while Japanese prostitutes were not as highly paid as their *totok* Chinese counterparts, especially the Kongfu. Even so, why were the Japanese regarded in a higher stature than the Chinese? The Chinese were truly bewildered by this incongruity, and the ethnic discrimination of the Chinese as compared to the Japanese became a source of discontent.

These sentiments became double-edged and were directed towards both the Ch'ing dynasty in China, and the Dutch colonials in the Indies. It was for this reason that Sin Po turned its sympathies towards the nationalist movement. Few were aware that nationalist activists were to be found amongst the Sin Po correspondents, of whom several had been dismissed from civil service positions for political reasons. W.R. Soepratman was a Sin Po journalist, and the music and lyrics of the anthem "Indonesia Raya" appeared for the first time in the October 29, 1928 edition of Sin Po.

All this was to be expected if one recalls that Sin Po was founded by the first graduates of the school opened in

1901 in Molenvliet Oost (now Jl. Hayam Wuruk). At that time, the teachers of THHK were anti-Manchu Chinese nationalists. Ang Jan Goan, a former President Director of Sin Po, in 1959 once recounted to me that during the Ch'ing dynasty, the Chinese, as subjects of the Manchu rulers, were compelled to wear their hair in the *"tao-chang"* (pigtail) style; the nationalists, in opposition to this ruling, cut off their pigtails. However, as the East Indian Dutch were in cooperation with the Manchu Chinese consulate, the THHK teachers, in order to avoid trouble, put on false tao-changs for street wear, which during school hours they took off.

In this manner the nationalist influence of the THHK graduates was felt in Sin Po, and until the advent of Kwee Kek Beng as editor in 1923, Sin Po was basically anti-Dutch. Kwee himself revealed his pro-Dutch sentiments only at the close of his term (1945-1949).

One Western-educated Chinese nationalist close to Sin Po, Dr. Kwa Tjoan Sioe, of whom Suryadinata insinuates as being Comintern, became anti-Dutch following a controversial experience. This man had a Dutch wife, and during that time certain places were barred to colored persons, for instance Deca Park in Koningsplein Noord (Merdeka Utara), the Capitol theater and restaurant in Sluisbrugplein (Pintu Air), the Bataviaasche Golf Club (in Rawamangun), and the Cikini Swimming Pool. One time Dr. Kwa and his wife visited the Cikini Swimming Pool. His wife was allowed admittance but he was turned away, at which both instantly departed. When his wife died, he married a nationalist intellectual from Shanghai who wore the cheongsam dress on all occasions.

During such an atmosphere the *totok* Chinese and those oriented towards China including Western-educated *peranakan* who only learned the Chinese language later, such as Dr. Kwa opposed Dutch sovereignty. It was Dr. Kwa who forged strong ties with the nationalists at the beginning of the August '45 revolution primarily with Soekarno and Sjahrir.

Chung Hua Hui

In 1904 the Dutch established the HCS (Holland Chinese School) followed later by the HCK (Holland Chinese Kweekschool). Technical, Law and Medical schools in Holland and later in the Indies, of which many Chinese descendants gained entrance after the First World War, were producing the first batch of Dutch-oriented graduates. They were marginal men whose Chinese values had practically disappeared, and whose origins could be traced only in their names and religion. Some had become *tun poa* (one and a half rupiahs in the Hokkian dialect) Dutch, who petitioned for equal rights with Dutch citizens to the Governor-General, through the use of stamped paper valued at one and a half rupiahs.

At first the civil and Trade Laws were declared applicable to the Chinese (LN 1917-127 jis. 1919-81, 1924-557, 1926-92); followed by the Civil Registry Law (LN 1917-130 jo, 1919-81) in May 1, 1919. The first act was the result of requests by Dutch wholesalers and importers who felt that this method would facilitate commercial relations with the Chinese and enable trade agreements to be formed.

The CHH became a political meeting place for devoted Hollandomaniacs, whose attitude towards the Indonesian freedom movement was extremely reactionary. Despite their loyalty, however, they remained under a racial discrimination which placed pure Europeans at the peak of the ruling society's social pyramid, followed by the mixed-blood

Indo-dutch, the foreign Easterners and the indigenous respectively.

It was primarily the CHH's pro-Dutch attitude which generated the indigenous people's antipathy towards the Chinese. Even after the proclamation of independence the CHH remained opposed to independence. And yet the *totok's*, primarily those in Medan such as Wang Ren Shu, Tan Boen Tjwan and Goh Sek Liu were actively supporting the freedom movement with words, actions and money. Tan Boen Tjwan, for instance, smuggled arms for the Republic.

The CHH's attitude in turn roused fanatic reactions from such persons as Ir. Sofwan (a high official in the PLN at the start of the revolution) in Banten and Tanggerang. This and further Dutch provocations resulted in disruptive incidents in Tanggerang, Panipahan and Bagan Siapi-api.

The Chinese Indonesian Party (PTI)

This party was founded in 1932 by Liem Koen Hian, Dr. Tjoa Siek In, Mr. Ko Kwat Tiong, Siaw Giok Tjhan, Oei Gwee Hwat and others. The main reason ·for its appearance was the unwillingness of the nationalist parties differing from Douwes Dekker-Tjiptomangoenkoesoemo-Suwardi Suryaningrat's Indische Partij or National-Indische Partij to accept members of foreign ancestry. It was only in 1937 that Gerindo during its congress in Palembang was willing to admit members of Chinese, European and Arab ancestry, when the PTI and the PAI (Indonesian Arab Party) had already been established. It is amusing to note that the PTI encouraged and aided the founding of the PAI under Abdurrahman Baswedan (as recounted to me by Oei Gee Hwat on March 1947).

Indonesian nationalism in the PTI was obvious, but despite leftist elements within, the PTI as a party was moderate and cooperative. As Suryadinata notes, proof lay in the fact that Mr. Ko Kwat Tiong sat in the People's Council (Volksraad).

Assimilation — Integration

The second part marks the period following the August 1945 Proclamation, termed as "The Post Independence Period", of which 136 pages are devoted to discussing solution. *io* the Chinese problem in Indonesia. In terms of a sociological concept the problem is really simple. The difficulty lies in the socio-historic-economic reality involving men of different race, each with their own interests, sentiments and subjectivities. Efforts towards cultural unity have achieved some progress through education. In the arts and sports there is little discrimination to be found.

But in matters concerning economy, particularly trade, conflicting interests collide, and each party speaks for its own group. And as this matter clearly involves superiority on the part of the pure and mixed-blood Chinese, who since Dutch rule have long been well established in terms of capital as well as technical intricacies, as opposed to new comers backed by the bureaucracy, the solution does not lie in sociology or anthropology which draws conclusions and provides instructions. Rather, the answer may lie far beyond these conclusion, but in government and parliamentary policies. Questions of legalities and constitutionalities form unending points of conflict, in which polemics are bound to appear. In such a scene a lawyer such as Yap Thiam Hien may act more on principle than would a practical, possibly opportunistic busi-

nessman. *Suipoa* remains above politics. As such it is only natural that the choice of citizenship be based on *suipoa,* and not on ideals.

Accordingly, the discussion becomes hard to follow as different interpretations are given for the terminology applied. For instance, Yap Thiam Hien tends to equate "assimilation" with "amalgamation", whereas *"Tokoh Sepuluh"* leans towards "integration." According to the terminology of Dutch jurisprudence in Indonesia, the assimilation of a person of foreign descent conveyed total deculturization, and acceptance by the majority society (the indigenous). This meant release from the Civil Registry Laws, the Civil Laws and Trade Laws which were valid for the Chinese. Consequently the farmers of Tanggerang, Cemara (Rengasdengklok) and Sarengseng (Bekasi) remain unassimilated for they are still subject to the Civil Laws and Western Trade Law.

This then is the cause of such a Babylonian confusion of tongues.

Finally, it is my opinion that this collection of writings is as yet incomplete, for it does not contain such important works as the formal speeches of Mr. Tan Po Goan, as State Minister for Minorities in Sjahrir's First Cabinet; the writings of Tonny Wen, a republican from Solo; those of Wang Ren Shu, a sympathizer of the Republic from Pematang Siantar/Medan (in "Suluh Merdeka" under the name Barhen and the "Democratic Daily News") and the articles of Oey Tiang Tjoei, editor of "Kung Yung Pao" (ex-"Hong Po", Jakarta) and director of "Kakyo Sokai" (the Chinese Society) during the Japanese occupation.

Furthermore, several biographical notes are incomplete or erroneous. Even so, this book makes worthly reading material.

Prisma Articles in the Indonesian Edition

This is a compilation of *Prisma* articles published in the Indonesian edition of September and November 1980. Readers interested in the translation of these articles may write to the Editor and if there is sufficient demand for them, the articles will be published in one of the coming issues of the English edition.

Articles in Prisma No. 10, October 1980, appear in this issue.

Prisma No. 11, November 1980

Frans Seda, "The New Order and its Political Culture"
Sediono M.P. Tjondronegoro, "Socialism, Conservatism or Populism?"
Maroelak Sihombing, "Participation as Liberator"
M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Development during the 1970's: Towards an Alternative Strategy"
Onghokham, "A Profile of Indonesian Intellectuals Based on *Prisma* Publications"
Chris Manning, "Doctoral Thesis — Labor Market Segmentation and Wage Differentials in Indonesian Manufacturing"

Prisma No. 9, September 1980

John A. Dixon, "The Staple Food System in Indonesia"
Ace Partadiredja, "Problems in Food Production"
Leon A., Mears and Suroso Natakusuma, "The Changing Rice Marketing Scene in Indonesia"
Rudolf Sinaga and Faisal Kasryno, "Economic Aspects and Execution of Laws on Crop-Sharing"
Sajogyo, "Food Sufficiency and the Paths to Equitable Distribution"
Special Report, "A Day in the Life of a West Javanese Farmer"
J. Soedradjad Djiwandono, "Doctoral Thesis — A Monetary Analysis of an Open Economy: the Case of Indonesia 1968-1978"