

Account of the Oral Statement of the Rector at the SIPRI Meeting
at Stockholm as Dictated by him on Tape while in Geneva

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I would like to preface my comments on this topic with a few remarks on the discussions that we have had so far. The deadly fascination with the numbers' game in dealing with the problem of nuclear threat in Europe is, of course, understandable. However, it should also be realized that the condition of global instability, and specifically of the third world, is bound to have an impact on the security situation of Europe as well as of the rest of the world. It is to me inconceivable that the growing instability in the third world, resulting from the impact of the economic recession which has reached the outer limits of the social and economic resilience, fragile as it always was, of third world countries and the outer limits of the resilience of their political system. Sustained conditions of instability in the third world will have considerable effects on the strategic balance in the world, but also on the political will and the orientation of major constituencies in Europe, which in turn will affect the military balance and affect the political constraints that governments will have to take into account in responding to the perceived threats Europe is facing. I hope that this international conference will deal with some of the linkages between these two problems.

Coming then to my topic proper, it should be stated from the outset that no generalizations are possible when it comes to the identifying of the policies that would flow from the concept of common security. Still, a few things could be said and I would suggest that the elements that would have to go into such policies would become clearer when we start with an analysis of the simplest theoretical case, namely the case in which a third world country has no perception of an immediate threat from within the region or from outside a region. Then the common security policies would lead to efforts to prevent security threats to emerge, and this would require regional co-operation for development and security. This would involve the various

developmental activities that may upset existing balances. It therefore means a minimum of transparency of developmental plans and complementarity of industrial policies. Such co-operation would also have to include energy-intensive sectors and energy generation. Especially with regard to nuclear energy plans, it would be important to develop an infrastructure of regional co-operation in the production and distribution of energy and their production of the hardware throughout the region as an insurance that no member of a regional arrangement would acquire a monopoly position in the generation of nuclear energy. This co-operation should also involve arms production. Here again, transparency is a minimum condition, but then also it might be a requirement to break up the production process in component parts, the production of which should be distributed among the member states of the regional system, also the transparency and co-operation in military training at each other's military academies and other confidence-building measures among and between the populations concerned. And this should include areas of information exchange, cultural exchange and exchange in the area of education. What will have to be built is the social architecture for peace. When into this simple case model we bring other factors, the complexity and the difficulties begin to show. If countries in the third world have a history of border dispute, here standing committees, observer teams from non-involved members and peace-keeping forces before conflicts become open in line with their vulnerability suggest themselves. In addition, however, many third world countries have a heritage of domestic conflict resulting from the colonial preferences and discrimination from among the various ethnic groups within a third world country. There are, in addition, traditional ethnic rivalries, but also the unresolved problems of poverty and equality and ethnic and religious tension. There is a need for structural change in most of these countries to overcome this problem, and there is a need, once open conflict erupts, to reduce the chances of external intervention which would make these problems insoluble. We still lack the understanding of these processes, sufficient to recognize the likely breaking point in the cohesiveness of a society. What will be required is a willingness on the part of contending factions to observe agreed limits of dissent because the penalty of going beyond

those limits would mean the breakup of the society as a whole and the likelihood of external intervention. Such policies are impossible if the commitment to national integrity is less strong than the drive for power or than ideological commitments or dreams of expansionism. What is important now especially in addition is that the recession and the prospect of slow economic growth in the world economy has stretched the internal resilience of the economic and political systems to the breaking point. It has already erupted in various places in ethnic conflict and economic destruction and tribal and religious conflicts. Another factor which continues to undermine any establishment of credible policies for common security is the food dependency that has developed in a number of third world countries. Then, of course, there is the existence of imperialist aspirations among some developing countries with or without a particular ideological or religious commitment. Here in such situations, concepts of common security show their limitations. Common security, of course, requires strengthening weak nation states, of which there are many in the third world. An additional complication arises for third world countries in close proximity to major powers or located in areas of geopolitical importance to major powers. The problem of buffer states and working out acceptable configurations of domestic power is an essential condition for common security, and these are not problems that are easily resolved. The category of small countries, of course, constitutes a special problem, especially small and weak countries next to big countries. It is clear, then, that common security policies work primarily in the preventive phase before the eruption of conflicts, or once conflicts are resolved as a means to reduce the likelihood of recurrence.

In the third world the competition of major power rivalries does constitute a destabilizing factor and countries in the third world should well remind themselves of the fact that it was the rivalry of European powers, and not their unity, that led to the expansion of imperialism in the world. It is a lesson that we should draw when

third world countries look at the super power rivalries between the USA and the USSR.