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Well, let me begin by saying how pleased and at the same time, how intimidated I am being here. I bring to this discussion no particular credentials. I am of course familiar with some of the work in futurology that is being done; I have participated in some of the networks. I must say it has left me singularly dissatisfied with the line of approach but rather than for me to talk about futurology as such, I thought it might be useful to begin by saying how I have looked over the years at Europe. My primary concern with Europe, at least in the last decade, has been governed by my search for a perception of the future and of the world that is not shaped by the superpowers and I've asked myself what is emerging out of Europe in the way of a new vision, new perspectives and I used to ask Europeans, what is Europe about, what is the European vision and I found that the Europeans were always very disturbed, that the question was posed to them in that fashion as well as by their incapacity to answer that question because of the fragmentation of Europe over and beyond the EEC I think at least I have come away with a sense of a very deep fragmentation in the perception of present day problems as well as in the capacity to project a coherent European role for Europe in the world. So I thought tonight of not so much beginning by talking about Europe as well as by the setting in which the processes that are taking place in Europe should be brought into the picture. I think we are at the moment involved in an unprecedented process of social transformation on a global scale. It goes beyond economics, it goes beyond the use of categories of the political scientists and even of those who concern themselves with world or international politics. There is a - when I speak about the process of global

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transformation I'm speaking about processes that go beyond what is happening to the international system as such. We are in a situation in which the problems that we face are in a way too big for nation states to handle and even too big for systems of nation states to handle. At the same time the nation states are too small to deal with the problems on a global scale and they are too big to deal properly with the problems that afflict their own society and I think there's a lot of truth in that because there are very powerful sources at work that escape the capacity of governments to control; at the international level we are all familiar with how the developments in the financial world have escaped the control of governments and even of inter-governmental systems. I think we are also familiar with the incapacity of governments to deal with the international migration that is taking place on a scale that is totally unprecedented and that has, an impact of a social and ethnic and cultural composition of the country concerned and one might say the adjustment mechanisms of a number of receiving countries has been stretched to the limit and one can see the beginnings of the conflicts developing along both lines not only of class but of race and of religion. The incapacity of governments to deal with these international problems has to do with what is happening in their own societies; over and beyond the familiar problems of the impact of science and technology on employment - the problems that are now beginning to emerge are problems about which these governments really are powerless to do anything - the changes in the geographic structure of countries, the aging of societies - certainly in the north in the industrial countries the reduction of the birth rate comes together with the growing assertiveness of the young of women and of the aged in a situation in which the scope of

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employment becomes increasingly limited because of automation and robotisation. There is running through this I believe a very profound process of value change - attitudes towards work have changed, what has been called the protestant work ethic is no longer there; there is a most materialistic hedonism that pervades society which has changed - the place and the value of work in the culture of many industrial countries and it has led to a decrease in productivity - I believe that the fall in productivity is not primarily a function of economic factors but of changing values. At the same time the other value change that has taken place is the emergence of women wanting to be involved in gainful employment. There are other changes and the interesting thing is that many of these value changes are taking place beyond the capacity of governments to influence them or they had nothing to do with their emergence in the first place. If one looks internationally, the liberation movement, the women's movement, ecological movement, the anti-nuclear movement are all movements that did not emanate from governments or government policies; they emanated from people who generally had been marginalised - had not asserted themselves and now do so. The value change has quite apart from the economic consequences also led to very profound political changes affecting the capacity of governments and of societies to make the very difficult decisions that will have to be made. I'm speaking about the fragmentation of the political constituencies in almost all industrial countries - the erosion of the political parties and their credibility as well as of the trade unions; whether one speaks about eastern Europe or about western Europe or the U.S. that process has been going on for quite some time. It says something about how the extent to which established social and political institutions have difficulty in adjusting to

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this fundamental value change and the result has been divided constituencies weak governments, incapable of making the hard decisions that one would have hoped that governments could make. We also see something else and that is the fragmentation of the constituencies into new types of mobilisation which is the mobilisation on single issues, -single issues politics is taking over. It has taken over in the U.S. to a very large extent, it has taken over in Germany, also in the Netherlands - I'm not entirely sure about France but I believe that that has to do with two things. One is a disgust with conventional politics. Two - it is a rejection of the complexity of modern life and the inclination to find satisfaction in the concentration of a single issue. It is a political reductionism that is a response to the growing complexity. The incapacity to deal with complexity does not only affect the young; it also affects the present political system. To take an example: the U.S. has still not rectified the Salt II agreement although they are negotiating the next stage without having been able to rectify the Salt II agreement. The Law of the Sea which I don't think will be rectified by the U.S. but what does one see that there will be an adherence by and large to the spirit of the agreement. It shows how the democratic processes are beginning to fall down on the need to deal with complexity in the normal processes of the democratic procedure and I suppose there will be more of such issues in the future and it is one of the problems that has been neglected in the consideration of political dynamic as the impact on longer term projection. And that is why we have the characteristic of our time is really our societies being torn apart by two conflicting trends - one of fragmentation and at the same time one of increasing interdependence and the political capacity to live with these two conflicting

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forces I think is one of the major features of the impotence of the political systems in the industrial countries and the sense of drift that one feels as a dominant feature of international politics today. Many of these problems that I have described in the north really come together in what one might call the crisis of the welfare state. We see two reactions to that crisis; one is the conservative reaction wanting to dismantle the welfare state; the other is the defense of the welfare state by the socialist parties. I think both are wrong. I think what is needed is a vision - a new societal vision that takes us beyond the welfare state which poses a new balance between freedom and equity and between economic growth, technology and employment. The interesting thing is that so few, as far as I am aware, think in these terms. Talking with some German and Dutch socialists - I have not talked with any of the French socialists - my impression is that politics is still very much caught up in this struggle between the defence and the attack of the welfare state and I think it won't lead anywhere. It is in a way a manifestation of an underlying larger problem and it is the exhaustion of great political ideas - the great ideologies that have shaped the political dynamics and have given direction to the political processes in the first part of the century ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ have exhausted themselves and they have become in a way irrelevant because new problems have emerged. And there is no alternative political philosophy either from the left or the right that is capable of engaging the emotions of people and it is the absence of this synthesizing intellectual capacity that has made possible almost the increasing fragmentation of the political constituencies in the single issue group. I don't think that this situation will last; I think the seriousness of the problems will simply force people to think and there are a number of issues which may open up

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the broader questions that should be addressed. There is an interesting study in Japan about the implications of life expectancy of 80 years that can be expected for Japan in the year 2000. They have calculated that 80 years means about 750,000 hours. 250,000 hours have to be used for the biological function for duration of the species. Another 200,000 for learning and work. It's interesting that in their calculation they count for themselves 250,000 hours and for America 200,000. It's very interesting. That leaves about 350,000 hours leisure time. How should one fill that? The Japanese interestingly enough are not thinking of the cultural dimension so much as well as about the types of industries that would provide the means by which people can fill their time but I think the problem is a deeper one. It brings us face to face with the question of the meaning of<sup>g</sup> fulfilling life and I think at first much of the thinking turned around games. If one looked at the quality of the electronic games now one realizes how limited and how destructive present thinking is about games and I believe that we will really have to come to grips with very fundamental questions about what is man's perception of himself. Before he can answer the question of what to do with his leisure time. I'd like to finish the global context within which the processes in Europe should be seen. The tendency of the OECD countries to look at themselves as the only potential engines of the recovery of the world economy - I think it's a fallacy and in the end I suppose only Mr. Reagan will be the one who still believes in it but the signs are too obvious that such a position is untenable. The interlinkage between the economies of the north and the south are too evident but the south itself is in turmoil. There are processes of change - if one would have to characterize the state in which the Third World is, it is

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very deep instability. It is unstable because of the processes of change and the processes of change are again changes about which governments can do very little. If one looks at what is happening in India you see, quite apart from what happens in the modern sector, you see in the rural areas the very downtrodden are moving up and as they move up they are met with violence. There is a great deal of rural violence going on in India and the Assam case is simply one concentrated manifestation of the much more pervasive process. The rural violence that is taking place in India has to do with upward mobility of hitherto totally marginalised sectors of the society but changes are also taking place because of the absence of development. People move - and I think the major feature of the south now is that increasing numbers of the marginalised have become politically conscious and do not any longer accept their situation and so they move out into the urban areas and to the point where in the next 10 years we will have a major urban crisis on our hands in much of the Third World and of course, it is part of the larger population movement of international migration that I'm talking about - the tensions that are engendered by these processes will be considerable. I believe that the efforts of government to control international migration are largely ineffective. The U.S. alone has about 10 million illegal immigrants and there's nothing they can do about it unless they are willing to change their society into a police state and they are not willing to do that. Canada will soon have that problem. If the problem of Hong Kong is not solved in a way that will provide its inhabitants a sense of security, we will soon be faced with the situation where about 1 million very highly skilled people will move and find a place - where will they go? Who will accept them? \_\_\_\_\_ who cannot afford to accept them.

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It's one of the problems Australia is going to face for instance. The questions of this kind that have to do with the internal instability and the internal dynamics in the Third World and Europe is very much affected by it. More than 100 wars have been fought in the Third World since World War II and the prospect is there will be wars and not all of these wars were instigated by external powers; they are very much part of the instability. We will be faced within the next 10 years if, as I believe, the OECD countries will go even after recovery from the recession, the OECD countries will be in for a long period of slow economic growth, the impact on Africa will be disastrous. Already now we can see the beginnings of what I expect to happen in the next 10 years - that is a major crisis in Africa of collective states because they were not viable to begin with and the increasing loss of interest of Europe in dealing with Africa as a region, preferring to deal with selected countries in Africa, and this may lead to the collapse of states and the collapse of economies, civil war, large migration and essentially the rewriting of political geography of Africa. So all this of course will become linked in one way or another with the superpower rivalry and it will require a great capacity of understanding the dynamics of the process of global transformation - not to panic and not to react the way the U.S. in the present administration is reacting by reducing all the complexities of the problems to Soviet subversion. The process of social change and transformation - and I speak about transformation because much of the changes are structural in character - envelops the whole world. And this makes many of the projections and the scenarios that futurologists make still useful - I still believe that scenarios are very useful and very important for us to keep working on them but the validity of the scenarios are very much put in question by the complexity of the problem, the interlinkages

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between changes in Chad or some remote part of the world with international politics - they are very much related to the incapacity of the social scientists to deal with problems of this complexity. One of the things that social scientists will have to develop is a greater capacity to understand and deal with complexity; the interactions between complex interaction systems. And of course not only in terms of politics but also in terms of the capacity of governments to deal with them and the capacity of the international system to deal with them. Part of the changes that are taking place to which very little attention has been paid and which I believe is of very great importance are value changes that affect human behaviour and human expectations; there are two. One is the expectation among many of the young that they will not live their natural lifetime; it is an awareness and affects their behaviour, affects their demands and effective lifetime. There is also another development and that has to do with the search for spiritual \_\_\_\_\_. There is almost everywhere in the world a discovery of the sacred; Daniel Bell speaks about the return of the sacred and he speaks about it with a wistfulness of some kind because he, himself, is incapable of identifying with it. He notes it and he recognizes its importance but he can't look at it from the inside because he cannot share that kind of a dimension to life but I think it's important to realize that the Khomeinis are not only in Iran; you also find them in the U.S., in several parts of the world and other religions - in India - not only among the Moslems but also among the Hindus. We should expect that although Europe seems to be a latecomer in this process I believe that Europe too cannot escape this new discovery of the transcendental dimension to human life and that one of the problems that we face is that as humankind generally begins to live

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from a heightened religious intensity of one kind or another, how the world of humankind can develop. The proportionate higher degree of tolerance to live together. I think that is one of the most difficult problems because it is the kind of problem about which people generally don't want to talk. I find people quite willing to talk about their sex life rather than about their religious life. And the social sciences have rather effectively moved religion away from the \_\_\_\_\_ of the discipline except by accepting a little part of sociology of religion but no sociology of religion is capable to even begin to fathom the power and the dynamics of religion of human - what we see in Iran, India, the Middle East are only \_\_\_\_\_ of the profound values and on the one hand I personally believe that the return of the sacred are the recovery of a sense of the transcendental nature and significance of human life is in advance in the human endeavour, at least to the extent that it is not fundamentalist and a rejection of nationality science and technology but out of that flows the other problem and I'm baffled by it - how do we engender in our various cultures which I see emerging because I really do see that we are close to the end of the supremacy of western civilisation. There will be other civilisations emerging in the next 30, 40, 50 years - non western, modern but operating from different basic values - value configurations - different patterns of industrialisation. How we can engender the higher degree of tolerance that will be necessary to live in a pluralistic world of considerable intensity. In a sense the complexity of the world will lead people to feel at ease only when they have a strong sense of values but the strong sense of values in a pluralistic world can be more divisive than unifying while the interdependence grows. In the past it used to be religious institutions which

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at least \_\_\_\_\_ among the young a sense that those Christians outside our country, however different they are, they are still fellow Christians. Same in Islam - outside the Arab region there is a community of the faith that unites even those who happen not to be Arab. The growing secularisation these institutions have lost their credibility and they have nothing to replace them and I think some of our educationalists should start thinking about these problems. So in that context then returning to the question what is the significance of Europe. I think that Europe will remain significant as long as it is does not get involved in this wave of cultural pessimism; I think it's important for Europe to realize that cultural pessimism are waves that are essentially temporary in character - pessimism and optimism I think are functions of an \_\_\_\_\_ vitality of nations and of cultures and of people and it would seem that the vitality is there but the vitality is no longer expressed in terms that are familiar to European civilisation as it was in the past 5 centuries. What is breaking through are at a non-rational level intuitive reactions of young people to situations which they reject. There is some sense of what they want but because of their anti-intellectual stance they have difficulty of articulating them and of relating them to the larger issues of the societies and to the complexities of those issues and here there is of course a role for mediating intellectuals between the young and the intellectual traditions of European civilisation but this requires the growth of a number of intellectuals in Europe who are not prisoners of their own discipline and who rooted in their own civilisation still can take some distance from it and look at the relativity of that civilisation in terms of the total global needs and requirements of human society. What may come out of that I don't

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know but whether Europe can generate this kind of intellectual power and vision will in the end determine the future of Europe and European civilisation.

Well, I have talked longer than I had planned to. I apologise but I thought maybe ...