

INDONESIA ON THE THRESHOLD OF FREEDOM

The core of one of the major problems the world is facing today is the problem of freedom. It is a problem which every one of us are facing as human beings and, at the same time, as nationals of a State.

In the world this problem constitutes itself on two different levels. On one level it is the problem of the freedom of the human individual, restricted by his obligations towards his community, that is to say the State of which he is a national. Or, in other words, the relationship between the individual and the State. On the other level, there is the problem of the freedom of the State and its relation to other States in the world. That is, the problem of sovereignty of a State and the restrictions which it will have to impose upon itself, or to which it is unavoidably subjected, as a result of the development of world history.

It is this problem in its two aspects which lies at the core of the question: democracy or dictatorship; colonial subjugation or independence; free enterprise or State planning? On all these questions the world is groping for the answer. And it does so in the anxious knowledge that time is running short.

People often speak of the illnesses of the present world and, from viewpoint, these illnesses are the pangs of the world, going through the laborious process of outgrowing the old concepts of full sovereignty of States, passing into a new era of recognition of the mutual inter-dependency of the national States and, thus, also passing into an era of restrictions on sovereignty as a basis for regional and world cooperation and, eventually, for the development of world cooperation and a world government, as necessitated by the material, technical and spiritual development of mankind.

Indonesia today is at the threshold of freedom. She claims her freedom as her inalienable right. At the same time, she is aware that no freedom is unrelated to the freedom of others; that in the present period of history there is no such thing as unrestricted freedom; that the attainment of freedom is only possible with the recognition of its restrictions and respect for the legitimate rights of others. And so we have the anomalous situation wherein Indonesia, and a group of other nations, are at the present time going through the qualms of nationalism in an era when the greater part of the world is outgrowing that very same thing. This in turn accounts for several complicating factors in the relationship between these young nations and the rest of the world. The Indonesian problem, therefore, cannot be dealt with as a separate problem. It is part of the problem of the whole of colonial Asia. It is part of the problem of rehabilitation of world economy because of its relationship with the economies of the countries immediately suffering from the destruction of war. It is, at the same time, part of the much wider problem mankind is facing now, of establishing and safeguarding the essential conditions of democracy and human dignity.

Therefore, I will not deal with Indonesia in all of its historical details, nor elaborate on the present situation, but I will try to show you the background against which the rising tide of Indonesian and Asian nationalism will have to be regarded, the problems her rise creates in Asia, in her relationship with Europe, western democracy and the world in general, and I will try to give at least some indication of its import on American foreign policy. Therefore, what I will try to give in the first place will be an analysis of the factors involved, an indication of the trend of the forces at play, rather than an historical account of the situation. Such analysis will, I hope, enable you to follow the course of events in that part of the world even after the clamor of armed struggle has died down.

The most important factor determining the historical development of Indonesia is its geographical and economic position. Indonesia is an archipelago extending itself over an area greater than the distance between San Francisco and New York, with a population equal to half that of the United States. It is situated between two continents, Asia and Australia, and between two oceans, the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It embraces all connections between the two important consuming and producing areas, those in the Pacific basin; China, Japan, America and the Philippines, on the one hand, and on the other side, Burma, India, the Middle East and Africa. It is situated on the sea route between Europe and the Pacific areas. It is also situated on the lifeline of the British Empire, connecting Great Britain and Australia.

The occupation of Indonesia by enemy forces would outflank both Australia and India in any defense system. At the same time, Indonesia is the main producer of several products as follows:

cinchona	91%	world	supply
pepper	86%	"	"
rubber	37%	"	"

Indonesia is the only oil-producing area in the southwest Pacific. No strategic planning, either militarily or politically, can afford to overlook these factors and, as a matter of fact, they are not being overlooked. These very factors and considerations are playing very important parts in the course of our history right now. Apart from this strategic geographical location and economic position, there are two other factors which cannot be overlooked, and which, in the past, have become the cause of our colonization - the abundance and the richness of Indonesia's natural resources - apart from the products I mentioned before and the availability of cheap human labor. The colonization of Indonesia, like other parts of Asia, was the result of the inevitable encounter of expanding western economic strength in the century with decaying feudal empires in Asia. This encounter developed from the demand in the European market and the consequent trade and commerce in native produce of the Far East. On this basis the colonies were first mainly the mere producers of spices, which were taken away to the colonizing country. Later, after the industrial revolution in Europe, the colonies changed their position from mere production areas of native produce to markets for capital investment and producing areas for raw materials needed by the expanding modern industry of Western Europe and to markets for finished industrial goods. These needs of the mother country eventually determined the economic conditions, social structure and political status of the colonies in the 19th century. The particular colonial policy for Indonesia was based on artificially preserving a one-sided agricultural economy, in order to keep down the wages of human labor necessary for the cheap exploitation of the Dutch-owned agricultural estates. ~~No efforts were made to raise the general standard of living by industrialization, for fear that this would create undue competition between the industries of the mother country and the industries of the colonies.~~ In order to secure this structure, it was necessary to maintain complete political control over the colonies. In Indonesia this was done by a rigid Dutch rule over the existing feudal organization artificially preserved as an inexpensive and effective way of complete political control. These were the dominating features of colonial rule in Indonesia.

Against this background, and in reaction to these conditions, Indonesian nationalism grew into its crowning achievement, The Republic of Indonesia. No one, however, can fathom the depth and gauge the strength of Indonesian nationalism, and, in general, of colonial nationalism without realizing the actual conditions prevailing in colonial society. What were the conditions in colonial days? A few figures will illustrate:

After $3\frac{1}{2}$ centuries of Dutch rule, only 7 out of every 100 Indonesians in 1940 could read or write.

In Indonesia, there are 1200 medical doctors for a population of 70,000,000 people.

In the United States, there are 250,000 medical doctors for a population of 140,000,000 people. This is more than 100 times as many medical doctors for the same number of people, and still the U.S. considers itself understaffed medically.

The standard of living in 1922 for the native population in the rural areas was 3¢ per person a day. In 1933 the amount had dropped to 1¢ per day. The wages of factory labor in industrial areas was about 12 to 13¢ per day.

In all of Indonesia, only 2,000,000 schoolchildren are enrolled in schools while New York City alone has a registration of over 2,000,000.

Of the total national income of Indonesia, 65% went to a group of people - the European part of the population - comprising $\frac{1}{2}\%$ of the total population. 98% of the entire population - the Indonesians - received $\frac{1}{5}$ of the entire national income. The other $\frac{1}{5}$ went to foreign Asiatics in Indonesia, a total of $1\frac{1}{2}\%$ of the population.

Of the taxable wealth in Indonesia in 1934, of 650 million guilders, only 32 million which is less than 5% was in the hands of the Indonesians, who comprise 98% of the population. Such are the factors behind the nationalist movement in Indonesia.

Strong reaction against such a rule was bound to come. But the nationalist movement in Indonesia and the whole of Asia is not, in the first place, a movement for the betterment of living conditions, or the raising of the standards of living conditions, but also a spiritual movement, borne out of the dejection and despair of a people who cannot any longer acquiesce to a way of life imposed upon them from the outside. Nationalism in colonial countries is a self-assertion of the people's right and responsibility to live their own lives. It is an act of self-deliverance from a life of bondage, from the senselessness of a life of subjugation. It is in essence an ethical, a moral and just struggle, a passionate upsurge against the injustice of a system, which makes life meaningless without prospect. It is a struggle to gain back the one thing which really matters in life: the sense and the meaning of one's own life. Therefore, the nationalist movement in Asia is a movement of renewal and renaissance, based on the rediscovery of human dignity as a basis for one's own life and the rediscovery of the creative resources of the people. It is this element, this psychological impetus, which is the driving force in Asian nationalism.

Colonial nationalism is not only a struggle for the betterment of living conditions, nor is it only a movement of spiritual renewal, nor a resistance against foreign rule, but at the same time, a revolt against the aged, outdated and decadent feudal regime in their own countries. The continued existence of such a feudal social structure was bound to become the main obstacle in the process of re-adaptation of the former colonies to the exigencies of modern western civilization - the readaptation which is the condition sine qua non for our survival and revival as a nation.

It is these elements of resistance against foreign rule and exploitation, as well as resistance against the injustice and sterility of our own feudal system which became the roots of the essentially democratic nature of these movements of colonial nationalism. Since foreign rule was based on the denial of democratic rights and of human rights to the native population, resistance against foreign rule was identical with the struggle for democratic rights. Resistance against the feudal structure, artificially preserved by the foreign masters, was identical with the struggle for human and democratic rights.

These are the elements constituting what is known as colonial nationalism: resistance against foreign rule; resistance against internal feudal system - both leading to democratic ideology, and, finally, the creative regeneration of the people and the struggle for the improvement of living conditions.

These are the elements inherent in the whole upsurge in Asia. They are native, indigenous. It is a tremendous revolution, both internally and externally. These elements may have other external factors superimposed on them as in the case of China and Malaya, for this revolution does not take place in a political vacuum, but in the arena of present day power-politics and may therefore not always be easily recognizable.

However, it would be a fatal mistake for any country to base its foreign policy in relation to Asia on a misjudgment and underestimation of these native elements, and to base it on factors which are, in the final analysis, additional and superimposed.

But, colonial nationalism has not only these positive and constructive elements. I would fail in my duty to give you a frank analysis of the forces at play if I did not mention here another factor which, sometimes, and certainly under conditions of complete foreign domination and negation of freedom is an equally powerful emotional element behind this upsurge in Asia. It is the feeling which arises in any community, in any country, where the freedom and the rights of a political minority are being curtailed, but which under colonialism is multiplied in strength and bitterness. And, where resistance and hatred against foreign rule were still the dominating features of colonial society in Asia, there these feelings prevailed and imbued the entire atmosphere among the nationalists. It tended to dominate all other considerations; it sometimes poisoned reason and cool reflection; it was negative, destructive, but powerful. These feelings were the most immediate and painful reaction of the human individual, and a group of individuals collectively, to the frustration caused by the imposed restriction of their freedom - resentment and envy towards the dominating people.

The attainment of freedom for most of the Asian countries now has released us from the blind domination of this aspect, giving way to other more creative features of colonial nationalism. This experience, however, has made most leaders in Asia aware of the potential, negative and dangerous factors which narrow nationalism may imply. This accounts for the moderation in these new, arising States and their realization of the necessity for an international outlook beyond the boundary limits of the nation.

It is in this connection that Pandit Nehru once said, "We suffer from the disease of nationalism, and that absorbs our attention, and it will continue to do so till we get political freedom." As Bernard Shaw said, "A conquered nation is like a man with cancer; he can think of nothing else ... There is indeed no greater curse to a nation than a nationalist movement, which is only the agonizing symptom of a suppressed natural function. Conquered nations lost their place in the world's march because they can do nothing but strive to get rid of their nationalist movements by recovering their nationalist liberty I have often yearned.... for a chance to do some solid, positive, constructive work... Destruction and agitation and non-cooperation are hardly normal activities for human beings. And yet, such is our fate, that we can only reach the land where we can build after passing through the deserts of conflict and destruction. And it may be, that most of us will spend our energies and our lives in struggling and panting through these shifting sands and the building will have to be done by children of our children's children."

This is the personal conflict, the personal tragedy sometimes, of so many of the leaders of these freedom-movements, and of so many of the rank and file, who were forced and pushed into the nationalist movements not by their own free will and according to their talents, mental and psychological make-up, but only driven by their feelings of responsibility for the fate of their own people.

It is clear that since colonial nationalism was a reaction against colonialism in all its aspects, this nationalism was not limited to the boundaries of the different colonies, but that there was a strong bond of solidarity of fate, which characterized this movement up to the present.

As a matter of fact, these movements in the different countries were all born in the form that we know them today, around the same period, i.e., the first decade of the 20th century. General resistance against the imposition of colonial rule had never ceased up until the end of the 19th century. This resistance usually took the form of local and spontaneous revolts. It was only in the first decade of the 20th century that throughout Asia this resistance changed its nature and became the nationalist movement as I described it just now. It was reborn as a movement based on the new concepts of western ideology, set up along modern lines of mass organization and strategy. It was the first fruitful adaptations of western ideas to the needs of the colonized people. It was 1911 when Dr. Sun Yat Sen started a revolution in China; 1909 when the young Turks started their movement of reorganizing the Turkish State; 1905 when Japan won her victory over Imperial Russia and 1908 when the first nationalist organization was founded in Indonesia.

The groping and wavering beginnings had a mutually strengthening influence in all these places and the solidarity of Asia was an idea which found its crystallization in that period. The recent conference of the nineteen countries in New Delhi to take action on the Indonesian question is, therefore, not only the perennial monument to Dutch blindness and stupidity in fighting against the course of history, but is much rather the latest milestone in the course of the formation of a regional Asian alignment.

We have now reviewed the motivating forces of the tremendous upheaval in Asia; we have also seen the growing solidarity of the countries who were born or rejuvenated, riding on this wave of renewal. These forces now express themselves in the field of practical politics and we, therefore, now have to deal with the essential core of the colonial problem as a whole as it presents itself today in Asia. The description of the nationalist movement which I have given makes it clear that the aims of this movement are: raising the standard of living; by raising, increasingly, the general productivity; and organization of the production in such a way that, simultaneously, sufficient guaranty is provided, for a just distribution of the national income.

In view of the low standard of intellectual development of our peasants, and the weakness of our middle-class, in many respects the state will have to provide the necessary stimulation for capitalization, and in some cases even participate therein. At the same time, the state will have to embark upon a program of arrangements for social security, wage-regulations, and working-hours, things unheard of in a colonial society.

And this all constitutes the social substance of the freedom of our people, our answer to the problem of freedom. The means to this end are: industrialization and encouragement to foreign capital investment, thus enabling the expansion of the exploitation of the natural resources. In Indonesia, for instance, only about twenty percent of the estimated resources have been explored and only between five and ten percent actually exploited. Further, modernization and improvement of production, both in the agricultural field and its related industries would have to be undertaken. There should be Indonesian participation in the capital development to ensure capital accumulation by the native population, itself. This will have to be taken into account in determining the capital structure of the corporations.

On the other hand, there are the interests of the colonizing country; the protection of the colonies as markets for the home industries; the protection of existing monopolies; the protection of markets of investment for their capital and the protection of a field of employment for part of the population of the home country. In general, there is no unwillingness on the part of the former colonies to recognize these interests. On the contrary, as in the case of Indonesia, the policy of the Republic of Indonesia, from the very outset, was based on the recognition of these rights. (See Political Manifesto) But all this, on the fundamental understanding that such a recognition was made within the framework of our national independence, that is to say that it would be the Indonesian people, and not the Dutch, who would eventually decide about our economic future, and that, therefore, political power was to be only in the hands of the Indonesian people themselves. This is the core of the colonial problem as it presents itself today in the relationship between the mother countries and their former colonies. Mutual adjustment and accommodation is desired and possible in the opinion of the former colonial subjects but this within the framework of their national existence. And such a possibility is conditioned by the existence of friendly relations between the former mother country and the former colony.

If such feelings of friendship exist, and if there is the mutual desire to cooperate in overcoming the initial difficulties, the transition from colonial status to the status of nationhood, need not create serious dislocation of the economy of the former mother country.

For the Netherlands of course the economic emphasis on the rich revenues from their agricultural investments, their estates will be curtailed, also the position of their monopolies, but the losses and disadvantages here could be countered considerably by the rise of the standard of living of the Indonesian people, and consequently the rise of Indonesia as a market for the finished products of their industries.

Also Indonesia would be retained as a market for capital investment, although now on a competitive basis. This especially in view of the fact that the problem of Indonesian poverty is the underdeveloped nature of its natural resources. In order to combat the general poverty of the people, it will not be necessary to curtail the activities and possibilities of the Dutch people and their capital; on the contrary, fight against poverty will have to be waged by a determined expansion of the exploitation of the natural resources and improving the productivity of labor, and therefore, by widening even the possibilities of Dutch participation. Thus, there is a considerable margin of joint interests between the Netherlands and Indonesia, on which such a readaptation of the economy of the mother-country could be based. But here again I say, the feelings of friendship and good-will are the conditio sine qua non for such a procedure.

In the case of Indonesia, those feelings of friendship did exist in the first period after the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia. Not much is left of it after two consecutive military attacks, both unjustified and unwarranted. The war which is now going on, and which is being fought with all the brutality and bestiality of all colonial wars, is a result of the fundamental inability of the Dutch to adapt themselves, psychologically and politically, to this change in Indonesia and Asia. Holland now is destroying the very psychological foundation of friendship and good-will on which such an adapted economic relationship could be established. But the Dutch have always been unable to be objective and reasonable about the inevitable rise of nationalism in their colonies.

In 1908, the first modern nationalist organization was created. The Dutch dispensed with it in the belief that it was merely an organization of uprooted individuals. But when by 1925 several other organizations had sprung up and developed into a genuine mass movement, they still could not see the forces at work and could not discover the native character of Indonesian nationalism; they dispensed with it as a movement of criminals and communists.

In 1929, the Dutch Government - awakened to the dangerous proportions to which the movement had developed - cracked down on them by long-term imprisonment and exile of the principal leaders. Not much was left then of the organizational structure of the nationalist movement. However, by 1935 the movement had recovered.

In 1939, when the Indonesian nationalists became aware of the imminent danger of a Japanese imperialist invasion, they asked for two things - the establishment of an Indonesian militia and democratic rights for the people. Both were refused. As a matter of fact, when in 1941 the Atlantic Charter was formulated, laying down the ideological foundations of the cause of democracy and freedom, we asked the Dutch whether the Atlantic Charter was not also applicable to us. After a considerable delay, we were told that, since the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter had always been the guiding principles of the Netherlands in its conduct of affairs in Indonesia, the Atlantic Charter was not applicable to Indonesia.

When Japan invaded our country in 1942, we had not the slightest chance of defending ourselves against the aggressor. We had no arms and had no responsibilities for the affairs of State. We had as our only weapon an organized popular nationalist movement. Unarmed as we were, we had no alternative but to try to preserve this nationalist movement as our weapon and to try to strengthen this movement as much as possible. At the same time, we realized we would have to prepare ourselves for a more aggressive and active role, both against the new Japanese rulers and, later, against the reimposition of Dutch rule, which we knew was imminent in the wake of an allied victory. It was therefore decided to split the nationalist movement into a part led by Dr. Soekarno, who would work legally, and a part led by Sjahrir, working underground. Both these movements rejoined later in the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia in August, 1945. Even then the Dutch were unable to discern the real motivating elements behind the proclamation of this Republic.

The developments in the past three years, since the Proclamation of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia, are proof of this fact. Twice we reached an agreement with the Dutch. Twice the agreements were abrogated by the Dutch and twice military action was started against us. And the core of the problem is still the same -- final control of political and economic power in the whole of Indonesia.

When agreement was impossible on Dutch terms, the Netherlands resorted to military action in order to destroy the nucleus and stronghold of the entire Indonesian nationalist movement embodied in the Republic of Indonesia. Destruction of this Republic would mean the destruction of the only political entity in the archipelago not created by the Dutch and therefore not under the control of the Dutch. Destruction of the Republic would mean the possibility of rearranging Indonesia within the framework of the Dutch empire. It would mean the reimposition of Dutch colonial rule, although perhaps in a more enlightened disguise.

This is the essential truth of the matter, despite the ever-changing allegations made by the Dutch. All these Dutch allegations are chosen in accordance with the prevailing tenor of world opinion at a given moment. But they only serve to hide the core which is the question - freedom or political and economic domination.

War is now going on in Indonesia. I have no doubts about the final outcome of this struggle. Indonesia will emerge as a free and sovereign nation. In fact, the present war will not decide the question of independence, but it will decide the question whether there will be any relationship at all between the Netherlands and Indonesia. All the negotiations in the past were based on the mutual assumption that such a relationship was both desirable and possible. Two consecutive military attacks have not left much of this desire, at least as far as the Indonesian people are concerned, especially now that the Dutch have embarked upon a vicious campaign of reprisals against the civilian population.

The Dutch on March 10, 1949, announced at a meeting of the Security Council that they would not comply with the Security Council's resolution. If they are not going to be forced by the Security Council to do so, and if the Security Council will once again acquiesce to this new act of defiance by the Dutch, fighting will go on in Indonesia since the recent Security Council resolution is the absolute minimum basis for a solution as far as the Indonesian people are concerned. As a matter of fact, after the acquiescence by the Council to the continuation of Dutch military action, the military situation has developed in such a way that even this resolution may not be adequate any more to meet the exigencies of the situation.

Our troops, regrouped in guerilla bands have been able to regain the general initiative. They have been able to disrupt all communications and to disrupt all economic activity on the part of the Dutch. Our people believe that we are nearing the final goal of our guerilla fight: the complete exhaustion of the Dutch, militarily, economically and also politically.

If, by inaction of the Security Council, fighting will continue in Indonesia, the solution of the Indonesian problem will not be in the hands of the Security Council; will not be based on mutual recognition of interests but such a solution will be determined by the forces of history. On this basis there will be no room for a friendly relationship between Indonesia and Holland.

But at the same time, a much more important question will be decided upon, or at least greatly influenced by the war in Indonesia, and its handling by the western nations.

The implications of this war in Indonesia have proved to be much wider and much more dangerous than just another colonial war in a forgotten territory outside the civilized world. The recent months have shown how violent and widespread the popular repercussions are in the surrounding Asian countries to this unwarranted attack by the Dutch on the Republic of Indonesia. And apart from the righteous indignation and feeling of solidarity all people feel in reaction to unjustified aggression, a much more immediate and vital issue was touched.

The military attack by the Dutch made the Asian people wonder what the price would be of their leaning to the West. The essential element of colonial nationalist movements, as I have just described to you, will, I hope, have made it clear that they all result in a general ideal for the establishment of a democratic way of life.

Also, the needs for capital investment of these Asian countries for western technical skill, and other economic and political interests, naturally result in a general inclination to look to the western democratic powers. At the same time, this modern colonial war in Indonesia has made them realize that, even so, they themselves could be subjected to the dangers of renovated colonialism from the same western democratic countries.

In the case of Indonesia, you have a country which fervently tried to establish a democratic way of life. By its very nature it looked to the Western European countries for guidance and it is now attacked by one of those countries. To find justice, it took recourse in the Security Council, which is dominated by the same western democratic countries which are, at the same time, the colonial countries.

It was in the face of this situation that the 19 Asian Countries immediately took steps to try to stop the Dutch aggression and to devise means to facilitate and if necessary to enforce a solution. They did so with two aims in mind:

1. to forestall the violent popular reaction in their own countries against this latest act of white colonial imperialism which might become so strong as to force the Government to take this powerful and dangerous element into their calculation in determining their foreign policy.
2. to try to find a basis of mutual cooperation, and possibly regional cooperation, on the basis of which the generally felt vulnerability from undue pressure from the metropolitan powers could be diminished.

This danger was not only felt on the immediate military and political field, but also and much more so on the economic and financial field. There was also a third reason behind this conference, never publicly mentioned, but ever present: the question of preservation and safeguarding the possibilities for indigenous and democratic development in their own countries. As you know, despite the strong popular feelings against the West which were arising at that time, it was the general realization on the part of the Asian leaders that it was to the interests of both Asia and the West to preserve the possibilities for friendly relationship and cooperation between them. However, it would be a serious mistake to judge the future potentialities of this new political alignment in that part of the world from the moderation displayed at New Delhi. Behind this moderation still lurks the tremendous and explosive emotional energy of peoples who have not yet entirely overcome their resentment and hatred against three centuries of colonial subjugation, and who are still in the process of converting and releasing these energies into more constructive and creative channels.

From the European viewpoint, the situation is equally clear. The resources of Asia are essential for a speedy and permanent recovery of Europe. But not all European countries have awakened to the fact that under the present conditions in Asia a friendly and fruitful relationship between Asia and Europe is only possible on the basis of equality and voluntary cooperation. It was clear for Great Britain, who arranged her timely withdrawal from her Asian dominions and at the same time retain her political control over her African territories. It was not so clear for Holland, France or for Belgium with their huge uranium deposits in the Congo.

To Great Britain, the Dutch attack meant a serious danger for her relationship with her new Asian dominions, India and Pakistan, whom she wanted to stay within the British commonwealth of nations. On the other hand, her economic position in Europe, her close trade relations with Holland, her leadership in the Western Union, the fact that the negotiations for the Atlantic Pact with the United States would require the greatest solidarity and mutual cooperation of the Western European countries, made Great Britain quite reluctant to do anything substantial about the Dutch folly.

She was not too anxious to sacrifice her good relations with the other colonial powers in Western Europe, on which so much depended for her immediate political future for long-term interests in the East. Therefore, pressure which has been brought to bear on the Dutch was done privately while publicly nothing was done which could possibly lead to a split in the Western European front. So much for the European position.

But the revolution in Asia is not to be stopped. It will inevitably destroy all impediments in its course, leading to its final political and social expression. Inability to recognize this condition will lead to colonial war and permanent instability. Political and economic stability are also the most vital interests of the Asian countries, themselves, since only economic and political stability will be able to safeguard the ideals of democratic life in those countries. Only economic and political stability will allow these countries to align themselves in such a way as to minimize the dangers resulting from their position in the rising antagonism between the two giant powers in the world.

It is, therefore, a delicate balance in Asia - a balance between fruitful cooperation with the West and democratic development on the one side and rigid, narrow, fanatic and explosive nationalism on the other.

The decisions the Security Council will take on the Indonesian question will also be decisive in determining the final outcome of this balance. But the Security Council, alas, is not a body which acts on the basis of justice. It is a political body - a body which only reflects the balance of power on the international political field - a body which is only an arena, or rather one of the arenas of international politics. But if the Security Council, paralyzed by the unwillingness of its colonial members, or paralyzed by considerations of temporary expediency based on loyalties which have no bearing on the merits of the question, acquiesces to this Dutch aggression, the developments in Asia will reline another stimulus to move outside the sphere of influence of Europe, damaging not only democratic development in Asia, itself, but also damaging the possibilities of economic recovery for Western Europe. In a wider scope, it would prove the fundamental inability of the Security Council to solve any problem. No one in the world expects the Security Council to do anything about the rising conflict between two of its permanent members, but everyone certainly expects the Security Council to be able to solve a problem brought about by aggression not perpetrated by one of its permanent members. A disappointment on this point would lead to an increase in the tendency for regional arrangements for mutual defense and would once again shift the emphasis of world security from the United Nations to the interested countries themselves.

We have now reviewed the forces of history at work in Asia; we have also seen the problems that Indonesia's ascendance to freedom is creating for Asia, for the Western Democracies, and for the commonwealth of nations and last but not least, for herself. I have tried to show all of this to you against the background of a world which now is seeking to find its relationship to freedom at a time when technical and economic development serve to emphasize the interdependence of the entire world, which in itself necessitates restrictions on freedom. Two simultaneous processes are now going on in the world - the establishment of freedom and the discovery of the limits and limitations of that very freedom. The establishment of freedom means the abolishment of colonialism; on the other hand, the shrinkage of the world makes it increasingly clear that there is no longer any place for unlimited sovereignty in this world.

Where does the United States of America come into this picture? American security and prosperity depends on the stability and prosperity of the other countries in the world. One of the basic assumptions underlying the Marshall Plan is the availability of the resources of Asia for Europe. Stability in Asia, therefore, and the peaceful cooperation between Asia and Europe, benefiting the general recovery of Europe, are both American interests. Both the stability and these friendly relations are now endangered by the folly of this Dutch military attack. How the situation will develop will largely depend on the attitude the United States of America will take. To a great extent, the possibilities of cooperation with the West will be measured by the Asian countries - by the American attitude in relation to the Indonesian question. It will also be judged by the United States attitude in relation to the economic and other needs of these countries.

It should then be realized that a fruitful foreign policy for America, with regard to Asia, should take full cognizance and full acceptance of the innate elements of the Asian revolution itself, and should not be based on an approach merely and only in terms of an anti-Communist strategy. Only such a policy would be able to abate the general critical attitude of the people in these parts of the world with regard to America, which has been developing gradually since the end of the war. Only such an attitude would tend to foster the democratic development of this part of the world in the interests of the whole world.

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