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After the Japanese invasion had crushed or uprooted the colonial empires in Southeast Asia, and a complete colonial reconquest proved to be impossible, the colonial powers and the world powers in general were faced with an entirely new situation. Instead of the balanced equilibrium of colonial systems in well-defined areas, a power vacuum had arisen or, rather, a new political arena had come into being, in which new nations were emerging, strong in psychological impetus, relatively weak in a military sense, and even more feeble in their political organization and their economic strength. In this new political arena, compelled by the inescapable logic of modern military and political strategy, the world powers have to manoeuvre for position in order to determine the power relations within that area, to fix the power relations of that area to the rest of the world, or, where possible, to rearrange these power relations.

People are already speaking of regional spheres of influence for the great powers in the areas of South Asia. In my opinion, such an approach is based on a misjudgment of the dominant psychological factors operating in that area. It is generally recognized--and perhaps all too readily accepted--that nationalism is the driving force behind the present upsurge in Asia. But most of the time no adequate analysis of the nature and elements of this nationalism is attempted before one proceeds to the question of how to cope with the situation that this nationalism has created. This, I feel, accounts for the general blundering by those

powers whose actions are decisive for the determination of the fate of the world and for that particular area of the world.

The nationalist movement in colonial Asia is not in the first place a movement for the improvement of living conditions or for raising the standards of living. It is first and above all a passionate upsurge against the injustices of a system which makes life for the colonized people meaningless and devoid of a future, for that is how the colonial relationship is experienced by the colonial subjects. It is a struggle to win back the one thing which really matters in life - the sense and meaning of one's own life.

Therefore, the nationalist movement in Asia is a movement of renewal and renaissance, based on the discovery of the fact that human dignity is the only basis for one's life and based on the rediscovery of the creative resources of the people. It is a spiritual movement born out of the despair and dejection of a people who can no longer acquiesce to a way of life imposed upon them from the outside. Nationalism in colonial countries is a self-assertion of the people's right and responsibility to live their own lives, and participate anew in the life of the nation. It is an act of self-deliverance from a life of subjugation. It is in essence an ethical, a moral and a just struggle and it is certainly felt to be so by those who participate in that struggle.

Colonial nationalism is fundamentally different from what is generally meant by the term nationalism. The twentieth century nationalism which has developed in free countries bears within itself the claim for universal validity and application of the spiritual and political standards it lives by. As such it could be considered an imperialist nationalism.

If colonial nationalism has any similarity to phenomena in Europe, it is similar to the nationalism of the political minorities of Central Europe. Colonial nationalism, unlike imperialist nationalism, has no universal claims. On the contrary, it has only a limited objective. It is a means, a means for the achievement of national independence. Political independence is the only basis on which the achievement of nationhood is possible, or the achievement of the national expression of the people in equality and human dignity.

Therefore, colonial nationalism in itself has only an interim character. It has no aims beyond self-determination, with the emphasis on self, and culminates in the struggle for political independence.

The essence of colonial nationalism is the all-dominating urge of a people to be free and to express themselves, and therefore its structure is one of resistance. It is in a way negative, but at the same time it has a morally compelling nature. Thus, colonial nationalism in itself has no ideological color. It is not the outlook on life nor the political ideology and conception of society which dominates, but instead the compelling will to resist all those forces which prevent the people from expressing themselves--in other words, a resistance against the colonial relationship.

This raises the question of what part of the population is involved in this colonial nationalism. It is true that political articulateness exists only among the literate minority in colonial countries, but colonial nationalism is not a political creed. Colonial nationalism is a

projection of the will of a people, and the impetus which sustains it is independent from the question of political articulateness. Therefore, the function of the literate and politically articulate minority is a representative one. It is from this representative character that the importance of the politically articulate minority stems, and this representative character also accounts for the force with which this minority speaks. This is especially so in those countries where, as a result of a change of colonial masters and the consequent disruption of the entire social fabric by direct or indirect participation in the war, as was the case during the Japanese occupation of several countries on colonial Asia, the people have become uprooted and have awakened from their inert complacency and resignation to the presence of foreign masters in their country.

There is still another question to be answered in view of the prevailing lack of ideological coloring in nationalism. In the politically articulate minority which does exist there are of course various political factions and parties. What then is the function and the position of the ideologies by which these political factions guide themselves? The answer to this question is that political ideologies are riding the crest of the great wave of the Nationalist upsurge. These ideologies are not substantially a part of that upsurge. The wave of nationalist feeling derives its strength and impetus from the elementary force of the desire for freedom, the only feeling which pervades the entire population. These men who have risen to leadership in the nationalist movement very often derived their approach to the analysis of the colonial situation from the

existing political ideologies. But none of them could allow himself to ignore the fact that mass support was essential and that therefore the tactics to be used had to be adapted to the elementary feeling pervading the masses. Certainly a margin exists for leading and directing this elementary force according to the concepts of the ideology of a leader, but the basic character of the nationalist movement could not be changed. Therefore, the revolution in colonial Asia is a nationalist revolution, apart from the particular political ideology adhered to by some of its leaders.

The impetus deriving from this wave of nationalist sentiment will subside as soon as political freedom has been achieved. Such a situation started to develop, for example, in Indonesia immediately after the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement and before it was clear to the people that to the Dutch this agreement only provided a breathing spell in which they could reinforce their military position. It should be remembered that the different ideologies which exist in the politically articulate minority have strength and influence only insofar as they can give an answer to the hopes and aspirations of indigenous nationalism. For example, the sympathy for Soviet Russia, displayed throughout Asia in the early twenties, was not so much based on ideological grounds and far more on the apparent success of revolutionary tactics.

Other developments such as the temporary popularity of the tactics of non-cooperation, or the apparently permanent turn from racialism as a basis for the nationalist struggle to a fundamental approach in purely sociological and political terms, were all answers given temporarily or permanently to the questions nationalism faced on its road to full development. These developments are not essentially part of that

nationalist sentiment which is the urge for political and social equality.

It is true that the nationalist movements which developed in the three of four decades before the Second World War gained increasingly in democratic tendencies. The mere fact that colonial domination is essentially based on the denial of democratic rights to the indigenous population brought about a situation where the struggle for democratic rights was identical with the struggle against the foreign rulers. Colonial rule, serving alien interests, could only base itself on the exclusion of the indigenous population from participation in decisions on policy; it could only keep its position secure by restricting education, and it was to these two points that the nationalist movements first addressed themselves.

The leaders who rose in the decades before the Second World War and who were molded by the considerations of political struggle in that period, were therefore compelled if only by force of circumstances to make the nationalist struggle a democratic one and it is from these leaders that the democratic development of these new countries in colonial Asia can be expected. At the same time, to a great number of nationalist leaders, it became obvious that the mere attainment of political independence and nationhood does not in itself provide the answers for the social and economic problems of their people. Where this thinking prevailed, socialist ideology developed, based on the conception that the attainment of independence is only a means for the solution of the social and economic problems of the population.

Bearing in mind the strength of political and economic control of the colonizing administration and the force with which it attacked the nuclei of nationalist renaissance, it is also understandable that right from the beginning Marxism-Leninism provided the answer for those who believed that colonial domination could only end with the revolutionary overthrow of colonial government. It was recognized that this would be impossible as a localized act and was only attainable as a part of the general struggle against capitalism, of which colonialism was only the outgrowth and in which struggle the Soviet Union was the only leader. But here again, with all these ideologies, the extent of their popularity with the masses was dependent on the extent to which they could provide the answer for the hopes and the aspirations of the populationx. At the same time, in the general growth of political articulation among the people, these ideologies were also judged in their entirety, and it turned out that in most countries in colonial Asia communism, for example, was not able to gain leadership in the nationalist movements, or if it gained such leadership, it could not retain it for any considerable period of time. This was especially so in those territories like Indonesia where no great land ownership problem existed and where there was no problem of an industrial proletariat. The situation was of course somewhat different in those territories where the physical proximity to communist territories dominated the situation, a relationship which proves its validity even today. But in general it can be said that as long as the colonial relationship existed, the general preoccupation with nationalism predominated and will keep predominating wherever a trace of colonial relationship is left. It can therefore be said that the "national pain" under those circumstances is felt more acutely than the "social pain."

The shift of position of many Asian leaders through all the colors of the political spectrum in the course of their careers indicates that even for them nationalist aspirations were the predominant factor, and the various political ideologies appeared valid only insofar as they appeared to offer better and speedier means of reaching the nationalist goals. It is this growing awareness of the relativity of their own nationalist struggle which accounts for the turn toward social activity and the laying of the democratic groundwork of the nationalist political machinery. It also accounts for the moderation displayed by most of the Asian leaders now, and substantially contributed to a broader international outlook and the democratic development of these movements.

All these factors project themselves into the arena of concrete politics in South Asia. They constitute the driving forces behind the emerging nations. But with them other forces have arisen, released by the general instability and the revolutionary situation which the war left behind. These forces are in part the undigested remnants, so to speak, of the emotional complexities through which colonial nationalism had to go to reach its final expression. These are forces for which no room is found in modern political life, and on which no modern secular state can be based. In that part of the world these forces are racialism, communalism, religious fanaticism, and narrow, self-sufficient, exclusive and separatist local nationalisms and even tribalism. Contrary to the centripetal process of the integration of the people into nationhood after the attainment of political independence, these forces are centrifugal and disintegrating.

It should then be remembered that all the political structures emerging from these nationalist revolutions are characterized by their basic weakness; No differentiated and well-developed party system based on political principles and ideologies did exist, since in the past all parties and political factions were based primarily on the colonial situation, bound together by the common aim of national independence. The differentiation on this basis only took place after independence was achieved, as was the case in India, Burma and Indonesia, when the emphasis of the political atmosphere shifted from political independence toward the social and economic questions and sometimes questions of foreign policy. It was then that usually the strong coalitions which led the nationalist struggle broke down.

It should also be remembered that under colonial rule no normal political life was possible because of the stringent curbs imposed on educational and on political organizations.

And even apart from this, modern political life and the functioning of the modern political democratic machinery presupposes the prevalence of social and analytic thinking and the grouping of people on the basis of common political principles rather than grouping on the basis of personal loyalty.

It presupposes the ability to think in terms of interests, rather than of predetermined social order, the two ways of thinking which characterized the modern and the feudal outlook on life. They constitute the problems with which central authority in the newly emerged nation has to cope immediately. Where that new central authority is weakened, either as a result of the disruption of the social structure by two consequent military

invasions, as in Burma, or by continued colonial warfare, politically, economically or militarily, by the former ruler, as in Indonesia, it may very well be that temporarily these forces gain prominence and a process of disintegration sets in with the possibility of eventual defeat of the very purposes and aims of the nationalist revolt. But not even colonial warfare is necessary to initiate this process of disintegration. Where the present moderate leadership fails to achieve constructive results with its policy of conciliation with the metropolitan powers and a sense of frustration sets in among the people, this frustration will inevitably give scope to more extreme political concepts which seem to offer better prospects for the deflated nationalist hopes and aspirations of the people. Their failure to achieve results which could meet the nationalist sentiments of the people, inevitably undermines the position of the leaders and consequently the central authority. Such a situation made the communist revolt in Indonesia possible in the latter part of 1948.

As I said before, there is no place in modern political life for these disintegrating forces. They will have to be channelled into politically constructive directions and their energy released in the field of democratic and parliamentary politics.

This can only be achieved where the central authority is in a position from which it can effectively exercise its function, without being undermined by political failure in their dealings with their former colonial rulers and where their machinery is not destroyed by all-out colonial warfare. Only in this way can political stabilization ~~be~~ be achieved: by ending military and political warfare once and for all.

Stability is not possible today in South Asia on the basis of foreign armies. The upheaval in South Asia has to take its course. The question is how to get it over with as fast as possible. For an early stabilization, politically and economically, in Asia is absolutely necessary. It is necessary, not only for Asia but for the world at large. The importance of South Asia to the world is sufficiently known and I will not try to deal with it today. Political instability in a neighboring country under the present conditions, and in that part of the world, has too many dangerous consequences for these nations to sit back and watch the outcome of a colonial military attack.

I would like to draw your attention to another aspect of this situation. The rising tension in the world seems to make it inevitable for the great powers to draw colonial South Asia into their political and military calculations. In the capitals of the world people are thinking in terms of a regional bloc in South Asia tied up with Britain and Western Europe; others are thinking in terms of a Pacific Pact as a logical extension of the Atlantic Pact. It should be remembered, however, and it should be very seriously taken into consideration that, as long as the colonial issue exists in one form or another in that region, the dominating urge for self-determination will prevail, and this feeling is not restricted to one's own nation. The attitude and actions taken by most of the Asian powers with regard to the Indonesian question, the support given by India and Pakistan to the Russian proposal in the United Nations General Assembly with regard to the Italian colonies, the polite silence with which President Truman's fourth point was greeted in Asia, and the repeated utterances of Prime Minister Nehru to the effect that India does not want any part in the conflict and in the process of the delineation of positions in the face of the world conflict which is

already outlining itself, all make it very clear that, even at the present moment, where several of the colonial countries have achieved their political independence, this principle of self-determination in the fullest sense of the word, and with all its consequences, is still the main and predominant factor in the psychological complexion of South Asia.

Political expediency, considerations of strategical necessity for the major powers, will under no circumstances be allowed to take precedence over the insistence on the application of the principle of self-determination. The integration of South Asia in the world, and especially in the Western World, is possible but only, and solely, on the basis of the full recognition of national independence and the principle of self-determination. This has nothing to do with the conflicting political ideologies of today. It has to do with the fact that the problems for these countries, once independence has been achieved, are on an entirely different level from the problems which constitute the core of the rising conflict today. These problems are political independence and stability for their own nation and its neighbors - the problems of development and social reform. There is no inclination to give precedence to other political considerations outside the immediate scope of these problems. There is, however, a more compelling reason. Especially in those areas where a central authority has been weakened by colonial warfare, the premature inclusion of these areas in political or military defense systems, with a center of gravity outside these areas, would be felt by these people to be an incursion into that very principle of self-determination. This holds true for any ideology from any country.

It would inevitably evoke the same type of reactions as colonial nationalism, reactions of resistance and antithesis, and, in the face of national frustration which already exists as a result of the metropolitan powers'

inaction in putting an end to colonial warfare in Asia, it would only increase the tendency towards extremism and would strengthen the disintegrating forces in the social and political body of these new political entities. It would tend to weaken and to undermine the position of the present leadership in Asia, and, instead of contributing to stability, it would increase instability. It is only this present leadership in Asia which could lead or direct the revolution in Asia toward stability and democratic development. The revolution in South Asia cannot be stopped. The question is what course it will take, and in order to secure a democratic direction of this revolution, it is absolutely essential that the present leadership be retained, that all acts undermining their position should be eliminated. That means putting an immediate end to colonial warfare in South Asia and the avoidance of the imposition of any outside plans or alignments. An approach merely in terms of anti _____ strategy could not be adequate, and might even produce the reverse results.

Early stabilization in South Asia is South Asia's and the world's only chance for a rational and democratic development in these areas and time is running short. For this stabilization will have to be achieved or at least its bases secured before other political and military strategic considerations with regard to Asia can take precedent on account of changes in the overall political and military situation and especially in view of the new developing factors of political proximity.

The acuteness of the present situation is aggravated by the continuance of colonial warfare and even more so by the inability of the Security Council to cope with this problem. Given this chance, the countries in South Asia will be thrown together by the similarity and even the identity of the political and economic problems they all face now and in the immediate future. There is a growing awareness among the peoples of these areas that

many of their social and political problems cannot be solved on a national basis, that the political interdependency of these regions and nations is too great to indulge in any thinking along lines of political or economic self-sufficiency. This will strengthen the hands of the present leaders in South Asia who have, right from the beginning, realized the anomaly of the situation in which nationalism is creating new nations and states in the world in which nationalism, or rather, unlimited sovereignty, has proved its bankruptcy. And only on this basis, and only if material assistance from the Western democratic powers will be made available for an indigenous development, can the stability of Asia be secured. Much will depend on the leadership of those who have led this nationalist upsurge from its inception, but to no less a degree will it also depend on the ability and the willingness on the part of the democratic powers to allow this development to take its course and to assist morally and materially in this process, on the basis of full recognition of that principle of self-determination. This is the last and only chance.
